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Abstract
Multi-modal logics are among the best tools developed so far to anal-
yse human reasoning and agents’ interactions. Recently multi-modal
logics have found several applications in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and
Computer Science (CS) in the attempt to formalise reasoning about
the behavior of programs. Modal logics deal with sentences that are
qualified by modalities. A modality is any word that could be added to
a statement p to modify itsmode of truth. Temporal logics are obtained
by joining tense operators to the classical propositional calculus, giving
rise to a language very effective to describe the flow of time. Epistemic
logics are suitable to formalize reasoning about agents possessing a
certain knowledge. Combinations of temporal and epistemic logics are
particularly effective in describing the interaction of agents through the
flow of time. Although not yet fully investigated, this approach has
found many fruitful applications. These are concerned with the devel-
opment of systems modelling reasoning about knowledge and space,
reasoning under uncertainty, multi-agent reasoning et c.
Despite their power, multi modal languages cannot handle a changing
environment. But this is exactly what is required in the case of human
reasoning, computation and multi-agent environment. For this pur-
pose, inference rules are a core instrument. So far, the research in this
field has investigated many modal and superintuitionistic logics. How-
ever, for the case of multi-modal logics, not much is known concerning
admissible inference rules.
In our research we extend the investigation to some multi-modal propo-
iv
sitional logics which combine tense and knowledge modalities. As far
as we are concerned, these systems have never been investigated before.
In particular we start by defining our systems semantically; further we
prove such systems to enjoy the effective finite model property and to
be decidable with respect to their admissible inference rules. We turn
then our attention to the syntactical side and we provide sound and
complete axiomatic systems. We conclude our dissertation by intro-
ducing the reader to the piece of research we are currently working on.
Our original results can be found in [9, 4, 11] (see Appendix A). They
have also been presented by the author at some international confer-
ences and schools (see [8, 10, 5, 7, 6] and refer to Appendix B for more
details).
Our project concerns philosophy, mathematics, AI and CS. Modern
applications of logic in CS and AI often require languages able to rep-
resent knowledge about dynamic systems. Multi-modal logics serve
these applications in a very efficient way, and we would absorb and
develop some of these techniques to represent logical consequences in
artificial intelligence and computation.
v.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Modelling human reasoning and agents’ behaviour in a system is nowadays a
very active area. There are several ways to approach this research field and
multi-modal logics are definitely quite a strong candidate for this purpose.
These logics provide a combination of great expressive power and intuitive
semantic tools and they have already been successfully applied to both Arti-
ficial Intelligence and Computer Science in the attempt to formalise, for in-
stance, reasoning about the behaviour of programs (cf. Goldblatt [27, 26]),
social interactions, games and so on. Multi-modal logics can thus be re-
garded as a very good tool in the analysis of Multi-Agent systems.
Our approach to Multi-Agent reasoning does lay its foundation on multi-
modal propositional logic. We aim at defining some temporal multi-epistemic
logics, focusing on the aspect of admissible inference rules in these systems.
Our starting point is a basic understanding of the problems and the
themes related to Multi-Agent reasoning. This introduction aims at pro-
viding the reader with a concise knowledge base in support of the further
1
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development of our analysis. We start by explaining the reasons that led us
to our choice of multi-modal languages and logics. We proceed by reviewing
a few representative and successful attempts to systematise the subject. We
turn then our attention to the area of inference rules and we survey the
latest results in the area. Finally we summarise both the content and the
structure of the following chapters.
1.1 Choosing Multi-Modal Languages
The main feature of modal languages is that they enable the switch from
extensionality (the expression of facts, statements which can be either true
or false) to intensionality.
Classical Propositional Logic is, in fact, purely truth-functional : the
truth value of a complex proposition as p∧q is completely dependent on the
truth values of its components p and q. Let us say, for instance, that the
proposition p stands for it is raining whereas q means I take my umbrella.
Then the truth value of the proposition p∧ q would be true if and only if it
is true both that it is raining and that I take my umbrella, i.e. if both the
propositions share the same truth value true.
This approach works fine in any case of assertive speech, whenever we
utter sentences which state facts, statements linked to each other by means
of the classical logical connectives. However as soon as we read what we
write or listen to what we say, we realise that not all the sentences we use
are necessarily so. There are so many sentences that in spite of being both
grammatically correct and meaningful are not suitable to be interpreted us-
ing a truth-functional approach. The classical example of a sentence whose
truth value does not depend only on the truth values of its components is
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provided by Frege [19]. Let us say, for instance, that I know that the morn-
ing star is the planet Venus, although I lack the knowledge of the fact that
the morning star and the evening star are actually the same star, which is
not a star, by the way, but the planet Venus. Thus a proposition as I know
that the morning star is the planet Venus would be true and intuitively a
proposition as I know that the morning star is the evening star would be
false, for I do not possess the latter information. Nevertheless according
to the rules of Classical First Order Logic, the expressions morning star,
evening star and planet Venus are interchangeable by Leibniz’ Law, as they
share the same semantics. Therefore it is clear how a sentence as the one
provided is not truth-functional at all: its truth value does not depend on
the truth values of its component parts. In fact, as soon as we get proposi-
tions qualified by modalities as can, could, might, may, must, know, believe
et c. the truth functionality is no longer applicable. These phrases tell some-
thing more than a pure fact: they say something about the mode of truth
of the sentence itself. Such sentences belong to the realm of modal languages.
In order to construct a modal language we usually add to a classical
boolean language a set of modal operators according to the set and the
quality of sentences we want our language to be able to express. Clearly
the expressive power of a modal language is much greater than the one of
a language which does not contain operators. The modal operator which
is traditionally added to the language of Classical Propositional Calculus
in order to get a new modal language is the box operator 2 (starting from
which its dual, the diamond operator, can be easily defined). Likewise,
multi-modal logics are obtained by adding more than one modal operator
to an existing language.
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Although traditionally read as expressing necessity and possibility, modal
operators may be given potentially endless interpretations. The choice would
be then suggested by the context one is to describe. In the case of tense log-
ics, one can interpret the modal proposition 2p as it will always be the case
that p, and its dual 3p as at some point in the future it will be the case that
p. Such language is, therefore, effective whenever a description of the flow
of time, towards both future and past is needed. Multi-epistemic languages,
on the other hand, are suitable to formalise reasoning about agents not pos-
sessing a complete base of information (see Fagin et al. [17], Rybakov [56]).
However, these languages may suffer of an expressive limitation, for it may
be difficult to deal with modifications in the pieces of information each agent
possesses as well as to give an account of a changing environment. Adding
a dynamic dimension to such languages is therefore almost a necessity. The
most natural way partially to improve on the expressive limitation is adding
a temporal operator to a multi-epistemic one. Hence we would generate a
multi-modal language combining tense and knowledge operators (see Fagin
et al. [17], Halpern et al. [30], C. and Rybakov [9, 4], C. [11]).
1.2 Choosing Multi-Modal Logics
We have seen how versatile multi-modal languages are, but we have not
mentioned yet one of the main reasons that led so many researchers to
use multi-modal logics as tools to build Multi-Agent systems, to investigate
knowledge, to construct models in computer science and so on. The rea-
son is that multi-modal languages can be interpreted in the Possible Worlds
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Semantics, or Kripke Semantics, which is a highly intuitive tool to study
modal logics (cf. Kripke [41, 42, 43]).
Kripke Semantics is based on the idea of dealing with objects interpreted
as possible worlds. Such objects are linked one to each other by some binary
relations. This set of worlds plus the binary relations are a Kripke-frame.
Let us consider for simplicity the traditional case of the necessity operator.
Let us suppose we want to interprete a modal sentence as 2p in this scenario.
Then we could say that in some world in the model, the expression is true
if it is true in all the worlds accessible by it. This is to say that a sentence
as it is necessary that I am reading is true in a world if the fact that I am
reading holds true in all the worlds related to it. It is immediately clear
how versatile this framework is for many purposes. Let us suppose that we
want to interpret some temporal language. Then, we might consider each
world as a moment and we can interpret the binary relation as an order on
moments. Hence a sentence like it will rain eventually is true at a moment
if there is another moment which comes later, i.e. that is related to the
present moment, in which the fact that it is raining holds true1. Likewise
one could interpret an epistemic language in this scenario. In this case we
can interpret the possible worlds as the states of affairs that I consider pos-
sible. In this spirit, a sentence as I know that it is raining in Manchester is
true if I cannot imagine a situation in which Manchester is dry, which is to
say that in all the worlds related to mine, in Manchester it is raining cats
and dogs.
In order to get an even clearer idea of how such semantic tools work, we
1see Prior [50]).
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can read a passage from the already cited book written by Fagin et al., which
we find particularly effective in explaining how Kripke semantics works:
The intuitive idea behind the possible-worlds model is that be-
sides the true state of affairs, there are a number of other pos-
sible states of affairs or worlds. Given his current information,
an agent may not be able to tell which of a number of possible
worlds describes the actual state of affairs. An agent is then
said to know a fact φ if φ is true at all the worlds he considers
possible (given his current information). For example, agent 1
may be walking on the streets of San Francisco. Thus, in all
the worlds that the agent considers possible, it is sunny in San
Francisco. (We are implicitly assuming here that the agent does
not consider it possible that he is hallucinating and in fact it is
raining heavily in San Francisco.) On the other hand, since the
agent has no information about the weather in London, there
are worlds he considers possible in which it is sunny in London,
and others in which it is raining in London. Thus, this agent
knows that it is sunny in San Francisco but he does not know
whether it is sunny in London. Intuitively, the fewer worlds an
agent considers possible, the less his uncertainty, and the more
he knows. If the agent acquires additional information – such
as hearing from a reliable source that it is currently sunny in
London – then he would no longer consider possible any of the
worlds in which it is raining in London2.
Thus if we combine the intuitive tools of Kripke Semantics with the nu-
merous applications Multi-Agent systems have in different areas, it becomes
2Fagin et al. [17] p.16
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clear the reason why so many researchers are currently devoting their stud-
ies to the analysis of this topic.
1.3 Multi-Agent Reasoning
As we have anticipated, multi-modal languages and logics are a very useful
and versatile tool to build up the so called Multi-Agent systems. These
systems are actually rather more useful than the classic investigations on
situations in which only one agent is present in the system:
When trying to understand and analyze the properties of knowl-
edge, philosophers tended to consider only the single-agent case.
But the heart of any analysis of a system is the interaction be-
tween agents.. [. . . ] Our agents may be negotiators in a bargain-
ing situation, communicating robots, or even components such
as wires or message buffers in a complicated computer system.
[. . . ] We are often interested in situations in which everyone in
the group knows a fact. 3
As M. Wooldridge clearly states in the Preface to his book An Introduc-
tion to Multiagent Systems [70]:
Multiagent systems are systems composed of multiple interact-
ing computing elements, known as agents. Agents are computer
systems with two important capabilities. First, they are at least
to some extent capable of autonomous action - of deciding for
themselves what they need to do in order to satisfy their design
3Fagin et al. [17] p.2
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objectives. Second, they are capable of interacting with other
agents - not simply by exchanging data, but by engaging in ana-
logues of the kind of social activity that we all engage in every
day of our lives: cooperation, coordination, negotiation and the
like4.
Thus, typical agents are computer programs which run on some plat-
form, although they may also be seen as buffers and other devices linked
to the realm of Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence. Moreover, one
may also see agents as human beings operating and co-operating in a social
environment in order to reach a common goal. This approach can hence pro-
vide analytical tools to be used in the study of social-economic phenomena
(e.g. game theory, economical analysis of markets, local and global social
interactions). Being a fairly new and active area, the potential applications
one may think of are flexible and potentially infinite.
[. . . ] Multiagent systems seem to be a natural metaphor for un-
derstanding and building a wide range of what we might crudely
call artificial social systems. The ideas of multiagent systems are
not tied to a single application domain, but, like objects before
them, seem to find currency in a host of different application
domains5.
As a matter of fact, systems generated by joining operators representing
both time and knowledge have already proved themselves to be particularly
effective in describing the interaction between agents through the flow of
time (see Fagin et al. [17], Gabbay et al. [21], Halpern et al. [30]).
4Wooldridge [70], p. xi.
5ivi.
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These systems are based on a language which contains two sets of modal-
ities: one to model the flow of time, the other to describe agents’ knowledge.
The interaction of such modalities gives a precise account of the dynamic
development of agents’ knowledge.
The last decades have given birth to many Multi-Agent systems based
on multi-epistemic temporal languages. Several systems have also been de-
veloped and successfully applied both in the study of human reasoning and
in computing (see [17, 26, 28, 71, 30]). These theories are concentrated
on the development of systems modelling reasoning about knowledge and
space, reasoning under uncertainty or with bounded resources, Multi-Agent
reasoning and other aspects of artificial intelligence. Nevertheless we are
talking to a relatively young research area and there is still quite a lot of
work to be done in the filed.
1.4 A brief historical overview
We have seen that the power of a language with interacting temporal multi-
epistemic modalities combined with the tools of Kripke Semantics makes
multi-modal logics quite appealing to researchers willing to investigate the
field of Multi-Agent reasoning. Thus, in order to understand the subject in
a deeper way, we feel that we need some basic notions about the history of
the subject. As we have anticipated, we aim at studying temporal multi-
epistemic logics which are a combination of Temporal Logics and Epistemic
Logics.
The study of Temporal Logics is closely linked to many sciences and we
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could actually say that tense logics may work as a common background:
[...] it is obvious that time plays such a fundamental role in our
thinking that there is a clear need for precise reasoning about it,
such as we see in Physics, formal Linguistics, Computer Science,
and Artificial Intelligence. While these enterprises are not nec-
essarily concerned with the same concept of time, they all could
go under the heading of Temporal Logic6.
Nevertheless, throughout the decades, tense logic has usually been con-
sidered in a more restricted way, as a branch of modal logic. Arthur Prior
(1914-1969) can be considered the founder of modern temporal logic. He
found out that it is possible to relate some of the aspects of Diodorean
Logic to modal logic and he built up a calculus in which the modal oper-
ators were interpreted as representing quantifiers over temporal states or
moments (see Prior [50]).
When it comes to talk about multi-modal logics which combine tense
and epistemic modalities, it is natural to think about the work of Halpern,
Moshe and Vardi (see Halpern et al. [30]). In this paper the authors consider
some previous works written by themselves and by others. They introduce
a general framework to fit all the previously defined logics in and then they
find a complete axiomatisation for several propositional logics which combine
tense and knowledge modalities. In particular the authors take their starting
point from the work of Sato [64], Spaan [66], Fagin et al. [17] and others.
They analyse the work done and manage to fit a significant part of the
previously introduced systems into a more general framework. In particular:
6Venema [69]
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Logics for knowledge and time were categorized along two ma-
jor dimensions: the language used and the assumptions made
on the underlying distributed system. The properties of knowl-
edge in a system turn out to depend in subtle ways on these
assumptions. The assumptions considered in [HV89]7 concern
whether agents have unique initial states, operate synchronously
or asynchronously, have perfect recall, and whether they satisfy
a condition called no learning. There are 16 possible combina-
tions of these assumptions on the underlying system. Together
with 6 choices of language, this gives us 96 logics in all. All
the logics considered in the papers mentioned above fit into the
framework. [...] Of these 96 logics, 48 involve linear time and
48 involve branching time. [...] We focus here on the linear time
logics and provide axiomatic characterizations of all the linear
time logics for which an axiomatization is possible at all (i.e., for
those logics for which the set of valid formulas is r.e.).8
As we shall see in the further chapters, the language adopted by Halpern,
Moshe and Vardi has one more tense operator than the one we adopt. In
particular, concerning the tense modalities, they use the operators until U
and next ©, whereas we use only the operator 24, to be read as true from
now on. Since they do not consider the case of branching time, they do not
take into account the operator ∀©, which is suitable to quantify over all the
possible future paths. Our case involves a linear time line as well, therefore
we do not consider on this particular modality either (although, as we shall
see, we describe a case which simulates branching time while keeping the
7Halpern [31].
8See Halpern et al. [30], page 1.
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actual time line linear). Informally speaking, saying that an agent has per-
fect recall is equivalent to assume that such agent may not forget the piece
of information given at any time. Conversely an agent which does not have
perfect recall is someone who is somehow allowed to forget. In our logics,
we consider this latter case, allowing agents to forget as well as to learn.
The condition of no learning, in fact, implies that agents may not increase
their knowledge base throughout the time. If associated with the condition
of perfect recall, we get a set of agents with a stable knowledge base, which
stays unchanged throughout the flow of time, and this is not the case we
want to model. We believe, in fact, that one of the most useful tools pro-
vided by multi-modal languages and logics is allowing the description of an
environment which may change and affect agents’ knowledge bases, mim-
icking up to some extent what happens to human beings’ knowledge bases
throughout time.
In a system in which several agents are operating, we can imagine that
there is a sort of clock, external to the system itself and that such clock
measures time:
We assume that time is measured on some clock external to the
system. [...] This external clock need not measure real time. [...]
In general, we model the external clock in whatever way makes
it easiest for us to analyze the system9.
Finally, in a synchronous system
[...] we assume that every agent has access to a sort of global
clock that ticks at every instant of time, and the clock reading
9Fagin et al. [17] pp. 112–113
1.5. FOCUSING ON INFERENCE RULES 13
is part of its state. Thus, in a asynchronous system, each agent
always “knows” the time10.
A standard assumption in many systems is that agents have ac-
cess to a shared clock, or that actions take place in rounds or
steps, and agents know what round it is at all times. Put another
way, it is implicitly assumed that the time is common knowledge,
so that all the agents are running in synchrony. [...] Indeed, al-
though synchrony is not a necessary assumption when modelling
games, it is often assumed by game theorists. When linguists
analyze a conversation, it is also typically assumed (albeit im-
plicitly) that the agents share a clock or that the conversation
proceeds in structured steps. In computer science, many proto-
cols are designed so that they proceed in rounds (where no agent
starts round m+ 1 before all agents finish round m)11.
We shall also set agents as operating synchronously. By doing so we aim
at simulating the human condition: many agents operating on the framework
of a shared time line.
1.5 Focusing on Inference Rules
The main results proved by Halpern, Moshe and Vardi is one of greatest in-
terest and, as a matter of fact, it is the starting point of our research. Among
the 96 logics they describe, they consider 48 cases (the ones involving linear
time, as we have seen) and provide an axiomatisation whenever this is pos-
sible. One could then think that another work on multi-modal logics with
10Halpern et al. [30]
11Fagin et al. [17], p.135
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epistemic modalities on a linear time framework is somehow unnecessary or
at least redundant. But although the subject of combined multi-epistemic
tense logics has been fairly widely studied, we think that not enough at-
tention has yet been dedicated to the investigation of admissible inference
rules in this specific area. In fact whereas complete axiomatic systems have
recently been provided for several multi-epistemic temporal logics, many
problems regarding inference rules related to these systems are, as we shall
see later in this Chapter, indeed still open. There are excellent works ori-
ented to the study of wide classes of multi-epistemic temporal logics, as we
have seen, but very few analysing the area of inference rules applied to such
systems. This is the main reason that led us to start our research topic and
it is in this area that we give our main contribution.
The results and techniques related to the study of axiomatic systems and
their complexity work fine in numerous applications, but it is reasonable,
however, to ask whether and how the inference machinery could be enlarged:
inference rules are, as a matter of fact, extremely important in derivations.
But why is it so important to focus on the investigation of inference rules?
First of all, let us introduce the concept of inference rule. An inference rule,
or a logical consequence or else just an argument is a set of formulae called
the premisses of the argument followed by a formula called the conclusion.
It is usually displayed as:
A1
...
An
B
The premisses A1, . . . , An are separated from the conclusion B by a line, indi-
cating that between the two sets of formulae there is some sort of connection.
1.5. FOCUSING ON INFERENCE RULES 15
This link is the logical entailment: a rule can be read as given the premisses
A1, . . . , An, the conclusion B may be inferred. Clearly this does not hold
true for every rule in every system. The study of the truth of this type
of sentences referred to rules is the core of the research concerning logical
consequences. In particular, one may be interested in finding out whether
a given rule is correct for some logic, which is to say if its conclusion must
hold true whenever its premisses do so. If such relation between premisses
and conclusion holds for a logic, the rule is said to be valid or admissible
for the logic itself. One can say that if a rule is valid for a logic, the truth
of the premisses is transfered to its conclusion12.
Intuitively the set of admissible rules for a logic is the widest class of
rules which can be implemented in the logic itself without altering its set of
theorems: it is the class of all those rules under which the logic is closed.
Finding valid rules for a logic is quite important. For instance, a rule which
has already been checked as valid for a logic can be immediately used in
derivations in order to produce new theorems. Moreover, in modal logics,
rules can describe properties of modal frames in some cases in which using
formulae may be difficult. A good example is Gabbay’s irreflexive rule (cf.
[22]):
ir :=
¬(p→ 3p)→ A
A
(where p does not occur in the formula A). This rule states that each world of
a model, where A is not valid, should be irreflexive. Admissible consequences
have been deeply investigated for many modal and superintuitionistic logics
(see, for instance, Ghilardi [23, 24, 25], Golovanov et al. [29], Iemhoff [34,
36], Jerˆa´bek [38], Rybakov [53, 54, 55]).
12cf Bellissima and Pagli [1].
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Moreover, having a wider set of rules available is very useful in order to
simplify derivations. Once an inference rule has been proven to be admissible
for some logic, it can be used in a derivation with the result of shortening
significantly the whole process. But let us focus on the concept of admissible
rule. When can we say that an inference rule is admissible, rather than just
derivable? Are these two concepts really that different?
The study of classical propositional logic may lead one to think that the
study of admissible rules is very important. But as soon as we move to the
realm of non classical logics, the situation changes substantially. In fact the
definition of admissible rules does not depend on the choice of a specific
axiomatic system. We say that the class of admissible rules is the widest
class of rules which can be applied to a given logic without altering its set of
theorems. This is a very comprehensive notion and should not be confused
with the syntactical concept of derivable rules. A rule is derivable, basically,
if there is a derivation of its conclusions given its premisses as assumptions
in a specific axiomatic system. Therefore it is clear that the collection of
derivable rules in some system depends completely on the specific choice of
the axiomatic system itself. The question which naturally rises at this point
is whether these two concepts, even though characterized in such a different
way, do always have the same extension. A negative answer is given by
Harrop [32]: there are axiomatic systems which can be actually enlarged
by adding rules which are admissible although not syntactically derivable.
In particular, according to Harrop, the intuitionistic propositional logic IPC
admits rules which are not derivable on the system itself. We say that this
logic is not structurally complete, which is to say that it is not, in some sense,
self-contained13. As it usually happens in logic, a negative answer opens a
13cf. Rybakov [55]: p.10
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new field of study and research. In fact in his One Hundred and Two Prob-
lems in Mathematical Logic, Friedman has been led by Harrop’s observation
to ask whether there is a way to establish, given some inference rule, whether
it is admissible or not in IPC14. This question has been solved in a series
of papers by Rybakov (see for instance [51, 52]) and later summarised in a
book [55]. Rybakov has also extended his results to many well known modal
calculi and a robust mathematical theory has been developed15.
More specifically, Rybakov has built an algorithm which is able to check
wether any inference rule is admissible for IPC or not. Moreover he showed
that the Intuitionistic Propositional Calculus itself does not admit any fi-
nite basis. This is to say that there is no finite collection of inference rules
starting from which one can generate all the possible admissible inference
rules. Nevertheless, both de Jongh and Visser have defined a recursively
enumerable set of rules which they conjectured to be an infinite basis for
IPC’s admissible rules. This conjecture has been proved to hold true by
Iemhoff [35, 34, 36, 37] in her Phd thesis. Iemhoff’s results are based both
on Rybakov’s and Ghilardi’s techniques.
Using the techniques developed by Ghilardi and employed by Iemhoff, in
2005 Jerˆa´bek provided explicit bases of admissible rules for a representative
class of normal modal logics (including the systems K4, GL, S4,Grz, GL.3)
(see Jerˆa´bek [38]). Later on he turned his attention to the problem of com-
plexity when dealing with inference rules [39].
Rybakov has Recently dedicated much of his work to the investigation
14see Friedman [20], problem 40
15For a more detailed historical account see Rybakov [55], Iemhoff [35].
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of admissible inference rules in tense logics. In particular he has examined
the case of intransitive temporal linear logic of finite intervals [61], discrete
linear temporal logic [58, 60], linear temporal logics [57], linear temporal
logics based on integer numbers [62, 63], temporal next-time logic [59], and
other types of tense logics.
However, for the case of multi-modal logics, not much is known con-
cerning admissible inference rules, though there have been some attempts
to approach the problem (see for instance Golovanov et al. [29, 28]).
In our research we aim at going a little deeper towards this direction, fo-
cusing on the aspect of inference rules in some combined multi-modal logics.
Most of the material we are going to present in this dissertation has already
been published in C. and Rybakov [9, 11] and C. [4] and it has also been
presented at several international conferences ([8, 10, 5, 7, 6]). The Reader
may refer to the Appendix for a complete collection of our published works.
1.6 Our research: Objectives, Methodology and
Overview
Our research started in order to achieve three objectives and to give our
contribution to common knowledge in three different ways. (i) We wanted
to build some logical systems suitable to model the behaviour of agents op-
erating on a temporal framework. Since these logics should be applicable
both to Computer Science and to Artificial Intelligence, they ought to en-
joy some specific properties. In particular we wanted to introduce a logic
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decidable with respect to its theorems. (ii) Moreover, in order to master an
infinite number of formulae, we wanted our logics to be generated by a finite
number of axiom schemata. (iii) Finally we wanted to give our theoretical
contribution to a systematic and complete investigation of the problems re-
lated to inference rules applied to multi-modal propositional logic. As we
have seen in this introductory chapter, in fact, the investigation of multi-
modal logics from the perspective of inference rules has begun quite recently
and the results provided are not numerous yet. We would like to give our
contribution to this field by providing some decidability results related to
multi-epistemic temporal logics.
Our work can be seen as a further step towards the investigation of
the wide field of multi-modal logics. Starting from a specific logical system
which combines tense and epistemic modalities, we try to give an answer
to some of the questions we have been introducing so far. In particular, in
our dissertation, we have decided to organize our research in four chapters,
where each of them is devoted to the investigation of a specific problem.
The first two chapters analyse semantic aspects of the problem, whereas the
last section is mostly devoted to a syntactical analysis.
In Chapter 2 we provide a semantic definition of the logic LTK and some
other systems. These logics are introduced as the set of all those formulae
valid in a specific class of multi-modal Kripke-frames. We make here a sub-
stantial use of the so called Possible World Semantics or Kripke-semantics.
As we shall see, the application of the standard techniques implied in this
field is not at all straightforward and it needs to be modified according to our
specific needs. As far as we are concerned our logic are, in fact, original and
they have never been studied before. After describing the intended models
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of the most general of our logics, namely LTK, we prove some basic semantic
properties. In particular we show that the logic LTK has the effective finite
model property and it is hence decidable with respect to its theorems. This
is much more than showing that a logic enjoys only the finite model prop-
erty. In fact if a logic L has the finite model property, then for each formula
A which is not a theorem of L there is a finite model M such that: (i) in
M all the theorems of L are true; (ii) the formula A is not true in M. The
effective finite model property implies something more. It actually adds a
very important condition which makes a great difference. In fact a logic L
has the effective finite model property if it enjoys the finite model property
and (iii) the size of its finite model M is computable and bounded by the
size of A. This means that for each formula A which is not a theorem of L we
can build a modelM, whose size is finite and computable from the size of A,
such that it verifies all theorems of L and falsifies A. The two definitions are
deeply different. The last one implies that a logic is decidable with respect
to its theorems, whereas the former one does not. In fact in order to check
whether a formula A is a theorem of a logic L with the finite model property,
we should check if none of the finite models of L falsifies A. This means that
one should check an infinite number of models and this is not possible in
a finite time. On the other hand if L has the efective finite model property,
one has to check if none of the finite models of L whose size is at most n for
some finite n falsifies A. This is quite different, as the number of models one
should check would now be finite. We prove that our logic enjoys this last
property. Therefore for any formula A in the language of our logic LTK, we
can check in a finite number of steps whether A is or is not a theorem of LTK.
In Chapter 3 we turn our attention to the topic of inference rules. We
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construct some special n-characterising models which enable us to show that
one of the systems introduced is decidable with respect to inference rules.
To fulfil this task, we use several semantic techniques introduced by Ry-
bakov [55], modifying them to suite our case. In fact all the logics presented
in [55] are normal 1-modal systems, i.e. systems based on a language con-
taining only one modal operator. The systems we deal with are, on the
other hand, multi -modal, as their language may contain countably many
modal operators. An algorithm designed for a specific 1-modal system can-
not straightforwardly be applied to a multi-modal system without being
deeply modified. In Chapter 3 we generalise the techniques presented in [55]
in order to apply them to the case of our multi-modal systems.
Chapter Chapter 4 is entirely devoted to quest for an axiomatic sys-
tem modelled to capture all and only the theorems of LTK. We provide a
sound and complete axiomatisation for our logic and a generalised version
of it. Here we make a substantial use of well known techniques such as
the filtration one developed by Segerberg [65], finding a way to adapt well
known results in modal logic to our specific case. In fact the application of
the standard techniques is not straightforward and several difficulties arise
whenever one is to prove an axiomatic system to be sound and complete
with respect to a class of multi-modal frames. According to Bennett et al.
[2] and Kurucz [44], if there is no interaction between modalities, a transfer
of properties (such as finite model property, decidability, et c.) from the com-
ponent simple modal logics to the newly generated multi-modal system does
apply. However, as soon as such interaction takes place it is not straight-
forward anymore to prove that the combined system is conservative with
respect to the properties of its components. In some cases the opposite may
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apply. Nevertheless, despite such difficulties, interaction between modalities
is necessary to exploit the power of multi-modal languages. As we shall see
after the introduction of the multi-modal language we adopt, it is impossi-
ble to express concepts as learning and forgetting if the interaction between
different modalities is not allowed. Let us consider, for instance, two modal
operators Ki and 3, to be read as meaning agent i knows . . . and sometimes
in the future it will be true that . . . respectively. Without interaction, one
could only express formulae as KiA or 3A, meaning agent i knows A and
in the future it will be the case that A. On the other hand, as soon as the
interaction is allowed, one could express the following: ¬KiA ∧3KiA, to be
read as agent i does not know A but in the future it will be the case that
he/she will know it. In the example above it is clear how the concept of
learning can be expressed by the interaction of two different modal opera-
tors. The same case happens for the idea of forgetting. An expression as
KiA∧3¬KiA could be interpreted as meaning the agent i knows A but in the
future he/she will forget it. It seems clear that learning and forgetting are
intrinsically temporal: in order to express them one needs both epistemic
and temporal modalities and, most important of all, a way to combine such
modalities. Being able to express concepts as learning and forgetting is very
important. In a language which is not powerful enough to express these
notions, in fact, it would be impossible to handle changing knowledge bases:
each agent would just possess a static piece of information. On the contrary
we aim at describing the specific dynamic aspects of knowledge bases which
may (or may not) change through the flow of time. For this reason we want
a language which can deal with learning and forgetting situations and hence
with changing knowledge bases. The axiom schemata we define in Chapter
4 allow the interaction between modalities and they are, therefore, suitable
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to express both learning and forgetting.
Finally, in Chapter 5 we present both our last result and our current
research topic. We start by proving that the logic LTK1 is not structurally
complete. Intuitively this means that there are inference rules which are
not derivable on the axiomatic system which generates LTK1. These rules,
are, nevertheless, admissible for LTK1. In this Chapter we define an infinite
set of rules with this property. Since all admissible rules can be applied
in derivations without altering the set of theorems of a logic, the class of
admissible and not derivable rules we present here adds new syntactical tools
which can be used in derivations.
Moreover we provide Algebraic Semantics for LTK1. Although Kripke
Semantics is widely used in order to deal with modal logics, Algebraic Se-
mantics is historically the first developed. In this Chapter we introduce
algebraic tools as well as all those results which link Algebraic to Kripke
Semantics. Moreover we translate the results from the previous chapters
into the language of this alternative semantic framework.
Finally, we introduce the further work and the piece of research we are
currently working on. We start to investigate the problem of finding a finite
basis for admissible inference rules. This is to say that we aim at finding a
set of rules to axiomatise all the inference rules admissible for LTK1, i.e. the
smallest set of rules starting from which one can derive all the admissible
rules for LTK116. This topic, as we shall see, is rather problematic and it is
currently an open research field. We introduce the reader to the problems
related to such investigation and we show our attempts to solve these prob-
lems.
16Please refer to Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 for a formal definition of the system LTK1.
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Chapter 2
A Semantic Definition of LTK
Multi-modal logics, as we have seen in the introductory chapter of our dis-
sertation, are clearly a powerful tool to deal with multi-agents contexts. In
this chapter we shall introduce in more detail our approach to multi-modal
logics. We shall start by introducing a new multi-modal language and we
shall proceed by defining semantically the set of modal logics we shall work
with in what follows.
Our multi-modal language is a propositional language with some opera-
tors. According to our needs, we shall define the meaning of each operator.
2.1 Syntax: The Language LLTK
A propositional logical language has two components: an alphabet, or sig-
nature, which includes all the symbols one is allowed to use and a series of
formation rules, which gives precise instructions to build grammatical sen-
tences.
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The alphabet of the language LLTK includes a countable set of propo-
sitional letters P := {p1, . . . , pn, . . .}, round brackets (, ) and the boolean
operations {→,⊥} as well as a set of modal operators {24,Ke,K1, . . . ,Kk}.
Well formed formulae (wff’s henceforth) are defined as follows: each propo-
sitional letter p ∈ P is a wff and if A is a wff, then so are 24A, KeA, KiA.
We assume 34, 3e and 3i to be abbreviations for ¬24¬, ¬Ke¬ and ¬Ki¬
respectively. The boolean operations ¬,∧,∨ are defined in the usual way
by means of → and ⊥. In paricular > := ⊥ → ⊥ (cf. Rybakov [55] and
Blackburn et al. [3]).
The intended meaning of the modal operators formerly introduced is:
(i) 24A: the fact A is true from now on; (ii) KeA: A is true everywhere in
the environment ; (iii) KiA: the agent i operating in the system knows A in
the current moment in the sense that all the information points accessible
to agent i provide the information A.
Formulae in the language LLTK allow occurrences of temporal operators
in the scope of the epistemic modalities K1, . . . ,Kk, leading to the possibility
of expressing formulae such as Ki34A, interpreted as agent i knows that
eventually it will be the case that A. Sometimes we may not want to be able
to express this kind of expression. In fact, as we shall see later, according
to the kind of semantics we shall further introduce, this might generate
epistemic paradoxes. Suppose, for instance, that a fact A is true at some
point in the future. According to the standard definition of truth in Kripke
Semantics, this implies that each agent would know that such event is bound
to happen eventually. Although this might not create any problem in most
situations, it might sound unnatural in other cases. If one is, for instance,
interested in describing human behaviour, the assumption that agents know
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future events may not result of use. In order to provide tools to describe a
larger number of situations, we can introduce another version of the language
just described. Thus, in order to prevent agents from having pre-knowledge
concerning future events, we introduce a weaker language L−LTK. Let us
define a formula A local if and only if it does not contain any occurrence
of the modal operator 24, i.e. each propositional letter is local and if A is
local, then so are KeA and KiA for each i. Well formed formulae are defined
as they are in the former case, with the exception of formulae containing a
modal operator Ki for some i: if A is a wff, then KiA is a wff, provided that
A is local.
By the expression Fma(LLTK) we denote the set of all the wff’s on LLTK
and by the term formula we usually refer to a member of Fma(LLTK) unless
otherwise specified. Clearly Fma(L−LTK) ⊂ Fma(LLTK).
We have suggested that the language L−LTK may help to solve the prob-
lem of agents having pre-knowledge of future events. But is it really this
the solution to all our problems? Let us assume that we want to model a
situation in which four people are playing poker. Then we would have four
agents and each of these four agents would be in a certain state: each agent
would have some cards, know how much the players playing before him had
bet, have some information about the usual behaviour of the players and
so on. On the other hand, something he definitely would not know is what
kind of cards the other players have, otherwise the game would be pretty
dull. If we try to formalise this situation using our language, then we could
say that each agent in the set {a, b, c, d} has access to a set of information,
whereas the environment collects all those formulae which are true in the
environment. Then if we suppose that the agent a knows that she has cer-
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tain cards (information A), we can formalise this information as KaA and
consequently the formula 3eKaA would be true at any point in the environ-
ment cluster. Therefore we would get Ke3eKaA and so each agent and in
particular b would know this piece of information, i.e. Kb3eKaA. Clearly
this would greatly spoil the game! If we move outside the example of the
poker game, we can see that in many situations it is very unlikely that each
agent is aware of the knowledge base of other agents. Therefore whenever
we deal with such a situation, we may want to use a language which is even
more restricted than L−LTK. Let us define the language L
−−
LTK in the follow-
ing way. We call a formula agent-local if it is local and, if we have a set
{1, . . . , k} of agents, the modal operator Ke does not occur in the scope of
any modal operator Ki. This is to say that a propositional letter p is agent-
local and if A and B are both local and agent-local, then ¬A, A ∧ B, A ∨ B,
A→ B and KiA for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k} are agent-local too. Going back to our
poker example, we can see that the formula Kb3eKaA is no longer gramatical.
We have now defined three different languages which are suitable to
formalise and talk about different situations. Our choice would then be
made according to the specific state of affairs we want to model. Sum-
marising: (i) the language LLTK allows the agents to have pre-knowledge of
future events; (ii) the language L−LTK forbids agents to have pre-knowledge
of future events; (iii) the language L−−LTK prevents agents both from having
pre-knowledge and from having access to the knowledge base of any other
agent operating in the same environment at the same moment.
Clearly the set of formulae in any of these three languages is properly in-
cluded in the set of formulae in the more expressive language, LLTK being the
most expressive one and L−−LTK the least, i.e. Fma(L
−−
LTK) ⊂ Fma(L−LTK) ⊂
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Fma(LLTK).
2.2 Semantics
2.2.1 Key Concepts: Multi-Modal Kripke Semantics
As we have already pointed out in the Introduction, one of the main features
of multi-modal logics is that they have been provided with a very intuitive
set of semantic tools. Although Algebraic Semantics is historically the first
developed, the Possible Worlds Framework, or Kripke Semantics is definitely
the type of semantics which has been adopted more widely (cf. [27]). This
is due to the fact that these tools have an extremely intuitive interpretation
and are flexible enough to be employed in various circumstances without loss
of their intuitive counterpart. This is the reason that leads us to introduce
the Possible Worlds Semantics first. In later chapters, nevertheless, we shall
also use traditional Algebraic Semantics. We shall introduce it in a more
mature stage when many results based on Kripke Semantics are already
stated and described.
As we have anticipated, Kripke Semantics (cf. Kripke [41, 42, 43]) has
a very intuitive interpretation which confers great appeal. The idea behind
it is very simple. It takes its origins in the ideas of Leibniz, who stated that
there is a plurality of possible worlds, and the actual one is nothing but one of
the many possibilities. According to Leibniz, nevertheless, the actual world
is definitely the best one among all the possibilities, chosen by God who has
the capability of searching and choosing the perfect solution. Nowadays,
however, researchers in modal logic tend to bypass these theoretical and
metaphysical aspects while keeping the main idea of Leibniz’s approach.
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For instance, let us suppose that we want to describe any situation which
sees several agents interacting one with each other. Let us suppose that
such agents are, for instance, playing dice. Then whenever the pair of dice
is cast, there are several possible outputs. It is perfectly clear how we can
consider each of the possible outputs as a different world. This may be of
use for instance if we want to make considerations on probability and so on.
Moreover, we may turn our attention to the analysis of agents’ knowledge.
Any fact p is then known by an agent whenever he cannot consider as possible
a state of affairs in which p does not hold.
The intuitive idea behind the possible-worlds model is that be-
sides the true state of affairs, there are a number of other pos-
sible states of affairs or worlds. Given his current information,
an agent may not be able to tell which of a number of possible
worlds describes the actual state of affairs. An agent is then
said to know a fact φ if φ is true at all the worlds he considers
possible (given his current information). For example, agent 1
may be walking on the streets of San Francisco. Thus, in all
the worlds that the agent considers possible, it is sunny in San
Francisco. (We are implicitly assuming here that the agent does
not consider it possible that he is hallucinating and in fact it is
raining heavily in San Francisco.) On the other hand, since the
agent has no information about the weather in London, there
are worlds he considers possible in which it is sunny in London,
and others in which it is raining in London. Thus, this agent
knows that it is sunny in San Francisco but he does not know
whether it is sunny in London. Intuitively, the fewer worlds an
agent considers possible, the less his uncertainty, and the more
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he knows. If the agent acquires additional information – such
as hearing from a reliable source that it is currently sunny in
London – then he would no longer consider possible any of the
worlds in which it is raining in London1.
Although we assume the reader to be familiar with Possible Worlds se-
mantics, we provide few basic definitions necessary to understand the par-
ticular case we shall work with.
Definition 2.2.1 A k-modal Kripke-frame is a tuple F = 〈W,R1, . . . ,Rk〉
where W is a non-empty set of worlds and each Rj is some binary relation
on W ×W . Given a frame F, by WF we denote its base set.
Given a Kripke-frame F, a Kripke-model (or just a model) M on F is a
tuple M = 〈F, V 〉 where V is a valuation mapping the elements of a set
P of propositional letters into the power set of the universe of F, i.e. the
valuation V associates to each propositional letter p a set of worlds from
WF, intuitively those worlds in which p is true.
In what follows we shall use some symbols in our meta-language, namely
the symbols & and ⇒ shall be used in order to shorten the english ex-
pressions and and implies respectively. Moreover we shall use the symbols
(quantifiers) ∀ and ∃ as meaning for all and there exists.
Definition 2.2.2 Given a Kripke-frame F := 〈WF,R1, . . . ,Rk〉, for any Ri,
an Ri-cluster of worlds is a subset CRi ofWF s.t.: ∀w∀z ∈ CRi (wRiz & zRiw)
and ∀z ∈WF∀w ∈ CRi ((wRiz & zRiw)⇒ z ∈ CRi).
An Ri-cluster is said to be: degenerate if it consists of one single Ri-
irreflexive world; simple if it consists of a single Ri-reflexive world; proper
1Fagin et al. [17] p.16
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if it contains at least two Ri-reflexive worlds.
For any Ri, CRi(w) is the Ri-cluster s.t. w ∈ CRi(w). Given two Ri-clusters
Cm and Cj the expression CmRiCj is an abbreviation for ∀w ∈ Cm∀z ∈
Cj(wRiz).
2.2.2 Linear Time and Knowledge structures: LTK-Frames
We use a special kind of multi-modal Kripke frames called LTK-frames,
where the prefix LTK is an acronym for Linear Time and Knowledge. These
structures aim at modelling a set of agents operating in a temporal frame-
work.
Definition 2.2.3 An LTK-frame (Linear Time and Knowledge frame) is
a k+2-modal Kripke-frame F := 〈WF,R4,Re,R1, . . . ,Rk〉, where WF is the
disjoint union of certain non empty sets Cn, for n ∈ N: WF :=
⋃
n∈N Cn.
The binary relations R4, Re, and Rj are as follows:
(i) R4 is the linear, reflexive and transitive relation on WF such that:
∀v∀z ∈WF(vR4z iff ∃i, j ∈ N ((v ∈ Ci) & (z ∈ Cj) & (i ≤ j)))
(ii) Re is a universal relation on any Ci ∈WF:
∀v∀z ∈WF(vRez ⇔ ∃i ∈ N (v ∈ Ci & z ∈ Ci));
(iii) each Rj is some equivalence relation on each Ci.
Each world can be interpreted as a single information point. The linear
temporal relation R4 links such information points so that, given two worlds
v and z, the expression vR4z means either that v and z are both available
at a moment n, or that z will be available in the future with respect to
v. Hence two information points are concurrent if they belong to the same
R4-cluster (time-cluster) and an R4-cluster can be seen as a moment in the
time line. Although time is usually perceived as continuous, it may as well
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Figure 2.1: Scheme of the structure of an LTK-frame: here each big circle
represents both a moment in the time line and an environmental cluster,
whereas each small circle is intended to represent a single information point.
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be thought as discrete.
[. . . ] Although we typically think of time as being continuous, as-
suming that time is discrete is quite natural. Computers proceed
in discrete time steps, after all. Even when analyzing situations
involving human agents, we can often usefully imagine that the
relevant actions are performed at discrete time instances [. . . ]2.
In this context the property of discreteness means that given any two
distinct points in the time line, there might be only a finite number of mo-
ments between them (though each moment may contain an infinite number
of information points). Therefore the relation R4 is discrete with respect to
time-clusters. This is actually the way in which computers work. Moreover,
the temporal line has a first point starting from which it proceeds towards
the future. The most important assumption is to consider the flow of time
as linear and hence not branching. If we assumed the time to be branching
we might have different possible future paths: among these, only one would
become actual. Conversely, if the time line is assumed as linear, there is
only one possible path towards the future: the actual one. This implies that
we may not quantify over possible, although not actual, temporal paths. In
other words, what is relevant is only the actual path the world goes through.
Such strong theoretical deterministic assumption may be practically justi-
fied by the observation that, in analogy to the human situation, all the
agents operating in the system are not aware of the prefixed unicity of their
temporal path and they act as heading to a not-determined future.
The relation Re is defined at each moment in the time line and it links
all the information points belonging to the same environment or network.
2Fagin et al. [17] page 112.
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Thus, we define an environment as the collection of all the concurrent infor-
mation points which are accessible to a set of agents at a given time. Hence
the environment an agent operates in is nothing but the collection of the
information points potentially available. It represent the informations net-
work each agents operates within. Each agent (see below) may have access
to all, some or none of such information points, nevertheless these points
form the environment this agent lives and operates in. Notice that in the
semantics we have just described a moment and an environment do coin-
cide. In this specific semantics, in fact, only one environment is possible at
each moment and hence time-clusters and environment-clusters do coincide.
We remind the reader to Chapter 4, Section 4 for a more general semantic
definition and further discussion. We shall introduce, in fact, some gen-
eralised Kripke-frames which allow different environments to occur at the
same moment.
The relation Ri links all the information points accessible by agent i in
a given environment. Any information point provides the agents with some
information.
It can be easily noticed that LTK-frames are a suitable tool to interpret
the language L−LTK and L
−−
LTK as well as L
LTK. The only difference would be
that in the case of L−LTK, all the facts available to the agents are local and
therefore do not concern any future event, whereas in the case of L−−LTK the
piece of information available to the agents is agent local. Nevertheless at
each world a certain number of statements about the future could be true,
but this piece of information would not be available to the agents.
We have now described the intended interpretation of our semantics. Let
us suppose, for instance, that one is to describe a conference with several
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parallel sessions using our semantic tools. The situation would then be
interpreted as follows:
- the base set of the model would be the set of all the sessions (informa-
tion points);
- a moment n would be the collection of all those lectures given at the
time n;
- any person attending the conference would be an agent operating in
the system;
- any agent has access to some information point at any moment.
According to our semantic definition, LTK-frames enjoy some properties
and among these, the most important and peculiar ones are the following:
PM.1: vRez ⇒ (vR4z & zR4v) i.e. the information points available in
the same environment are concurrent
PM.2: vRiz ⇒ vRez i.e. the information points available to agent i
must be in the same environment (hence at the same moment)
PM.3: (vR4z & zR4v) ⇒ vRez i.e. concurrent information points are
in the same environment
A model M on F is a pair 〈F, V 〉, where F is an LTK-frame and V is
a map (valuation) which associates to each propositional letter p ∈ P a set
of worlds from the base set of F. The valuation V can be extended in the
standard way from the set P onto all the well formed formulae built up on
P . In particular, ∀v ∈WF,
(i) (F, v) V p ⇔ v ∈ V (p);
(ii) (F, v) V 24A ⇔ ∀z ∈WF (vR4z ⇒ (F, z) V A);
(iii) (F, v) V KeA ⇔ ∀z ∈WF (vRez ⇒ (F, z) V A);
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(iv) For each j, (F, v) V KjA ⇔ ∀z ∈WF (vRjz ⇒ (F, z) V A).
If M = 〈F, V 〉 is a model on a frame F, a formula A is said to be true in
the model M at the world v if (F, v) V A; A is true in the model M, notation
F V A, if ∀v ∈WF, (F, v) V A; A is valid in the frame F, notation F  A,
if, for any valuation V for F (that is for any model MF on F), F V A.
Given a class of frames F, A is valid on F (and we say A to be F-valid) if
∀F ∈ F, F  A.
Definition 2.2.4 Let LTK be the class of all LTK-frames. The logic LTK
is the set of all LTK-valid formulae: LTK := {A ∈ Fma(LLTK) | F 
A & F ∈ LTK}. If A belongs to LTK, then A is a theorem of LTK. Likewise
LTK− := {A ∈ Fma(L−LTK) | F  A & F ∈ LTK} and LTK−− := {A ∈
Fma(L−−LTK) | F  A & F ∈ LTK}.
2.3 Effective finite model property for LTK
The first question we shall give an answer to is whether LTK has the effective
finite model property (efmp). If so, the same property would clearly be
enjoyed by LTK− and LTK−− too.
Showing that a logic has the effective finite model property (efmp) is
quite different from showing that it enjoys only the finite model property. In
fact if a logic L has the finite model property, then for each formula A which
is not a theorem of L there is a finite model 〈F, V 〉 such that:
(i) in 〈F, V 〉 all the theorems of L are true, i.e. for each formula B ∈
L, F V B;
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(ii) the formula A is not true in 〈F, V 〉, i.e. F 6V A.
The effective finite model property implies something more. It actually adds
a very important condition which makes the difference. In fact if a logic L
has the effective finite model property, then for each formula A which is not
a theorem of L there is a finite model 〈F, V 〉 such that:
(i) in 〈F, V 〉 all the theorems of L are true, i.e. for each formula B ∈
L, F V B;
(ii) the formula A is not true in 〈F, V 〉, i.e. F 6V A.
(iii) the size of 〈F, V 〉 is computable and bounded by the size of A, i.e.
‖WF‖ ≤ f(‖A‖), where f is computable.
This means that for each formula A which is not a theorem of L we can
build a model 〈F, V 〉 whose size is finite and computable from the size of A;
this model verifies all theorems of L and falsifies A. The two definitions are
deeply different. The last one implies that a logic is decidable with respect
to its theorems, whereas the former one does not. In fact in order to check
whether a formula A is a theorem of a logic L with the finite model property,
we should check if none of the finite models of L falsifies A. This means that
one should check an infinite number of models and this is not possible in
a finite time. On the other hand if L has the efective finite model property,
we should check if none of the finite models of L whose size is at most n
for some computable and finite n falsifies A. This is quite different, as the
number of models one should check would now be finite.
We shall prove below that LTK has the efmp and hence it is decidable.
Thus for any formula A in the language of our logic LTK, we can check in a
finite number of steps whether A is or is not a theorem of LTK. The result
we show in this Chapter may be found in C. and Rybakov [9].
Definition 2.3.1 Given a Kripke-frame F = 〈W,R1, . . . ,Rk〉 and a world
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w in WF, wRi≤ := {z | wRiz} and wRi< := {z | wRiz & ¬(zRiw)}. Given a
Ri-cluster C, CRi≤ := {Cj | CRiCj} and CRi< := {Cj | CRiCj & ¬(CjRiC)} (In
what follows we shall always use the expression w4 and C4 as abbreviations
for wR4≤ and CR4≤ respectively. We shall also use w< and C< instead of
wR4< and CR4<).
Theorem 2.3.2 (C. and Rybakov [9]) The logic LTK has the efmp and
hence it is decidable with respect to its theorems.
Proof. Take a formula A such that A 6∈ LTK; then there are an LTK-
frame F1 := 〈WF1 ,R14,R1e ,R11, . . . ,R1k〉, a model M1 := 〈F1, V1〉 and a world
w ∈ WF1 such that (F1, w) 6V1 A. Notice that F1 is infinite by definition.
Starting from this fact, our proof follows 4 steps:
Step 1. We make a filtration on each time cluster, in order to get a
new model 〈F2, V2〉 which contains only time-clusters with a finite number
of worlds. We show that in 〈F2, V2〉 the formula A is still false.
Step 2. We proceed by reducing the number of time-clusters, so that
we can deal with a finite frame. The resulting model 〈F3, V3〉 is based
on a special finite frame which we shall define as a reflexive LTK-balloon.
Moreover in the model 〈F3, V3〉 the formula A is still false.
Step 3. We construct a new model by deleting time-clusters from 〈F3, V3〉.
The resulting model 〈F4, V4〉 has a finite and computable base set. Again,
in 〈F4, V4〉 the formula A is false.
Step 4. We show that since any LTK-balloon (and hence also 〈F4, V4〉)
is the p-morphic image of some LTK-frame, in 〈F4, V4〉 all the theorems of
LTK hold true whereas the formula A does not.
Hence by the end of the fourth step we have a model such that:
(i) all the theorems of LTK are true;
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(ii) the formula A (which is not a theorem of LTK) is false;
(iii) the size of the model is computable from the size of A.
Hence the logic LTK has the efmp and it is decidable with respect to its
theorems.
Take a formula A such that A 6∈ LTK; then there are an LTK-frame F1 :=
〈WF1 ,R14,R1e ,R11, . . . ,R1k〉, a model M1 := 〈F1, V1〉 and a world w ∈ WF1
such that (F1, w) 6V1 A.
Step 1: Filtering each single time-cluster We start by reducing the
number of worlds belonging to each R14-cluster C of worlds from WF1 using
the standard filtration technique, briefly sketched below. Let Sub(A) be the
set of all the sub-formulae of A. Define the equivalence relation ≈ on WF1
as follows:
∀w∀z ∈ WF1(w ≈ z ⇔ wR14z & zR14w & ∀B ∈ Sub(A) ((F1, w) V1
B⇔ (F1, z) V1 B))) (Recall that the condition wR14z & zR14w is equivalent
to ∃i(w ∈ Ci & z ∈ Ci), that is the worlds w and z belong to the same
time-cluster and hence wR1ez).
Next, define the quotient set of the original model: ∀w ∈WF1 [w] := {z |
w ≈ z}, ∀n ∈ N [Cn] := {[w] | w ∈ Cn}. Let F2 := 〈WF2 ,R24,R2e ,R21, . . . ,R2k〉
be a frame where:
(i) WF2 :=
⋃
n∈N[Cn];
(ii) [w]R24[z]⇔ wR14z;
(iii) [w]R2e [z]⇔ wR1ez;
(iv) ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k [w]R2i [z] ⇔ ([w] ∈ [Cn] & [z] ∈ [Cn] & ∀KiB ∈
Sub(A)((F1, w) V1 KiB⇔ (F1, z) V1 KiB)).
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Let M2 := 〈F2, V2〉 be a model on F2 where V2 is defined as:
Dom(V2) := Prop(Sub(A))
∀p ∈ Sub(A) V2(p) := {[w] | w ∈ V1(p)}
Since the model described is the result of a filtration, the standard filtration-
lemma holds:
Lemma 2.3.3 For any formula B ∈ Sub(A), for any world w ∈W1, (F1, w) V1
B⇔ (F2, [w]) V2 B.
Corollary 2.3.4 F2 6V2 A.
Thus the model M2 refutes A as well. Moreover, each R24-cluster contains a
finite number of worlds, bounded by the size of A, namely ‖C‖ ≤ 2‖Sub(A)‖
for each R24-cluster C. The result of this operation gives still an LTK-frame,
i.e. an R24-linear sequence of Re-clusters. The difference is that now each
R24-cluster contains a finite number of worlds.
Step 2: Reducing the number of time-clusters We shall reduce, now,
the number of time-clusters (i.e. R24-clusters) to a finite one. We need few
preliminary facts and definitions.
Definition 2.3.5 Let M1 := 〈W1,R1, V1〉 and M2 := 〈W2,R2, V2〉 be two
Kipke-models and f be a one-to-one mapping of W1 onto W2. Then M1 and
M2 are isomorphic, in symbols M1 ∼=M2, if and only if:
(i) V1 and V2 share the same domain;
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(ii) ∀w, v ∈W1(wR1v ⇔ f(w)R2f(v));
(iii) ∀w, v ∈W1(w V1 p⇔ f(w) V2 p).
Evidently, the following holds:
Proposition 2.3.6 There is only a finite, computable from the size of A,
number of non-isomorphic w.r.t. Sub(A) time-clusters C from WF2.
Definition 2.3.7 Given an LTK-frame S := 〈WS,R4,Re,R1, . . . ,Rk〉 and
a model M := 〈S, V 〉, an R4-cluster Cs is a stabilising cluster if and only
if for any R4-cluster Ci ∈ C4s , for any R4-cluster Cj ∈ C4s there is an R4-
cluster Ck ∈ C4i such that Cj ∼= Ck, i.e. the sets C4s and C4i coincide up to
isomorphism between R4-clusters.
Lemma 2.3.8 The model M2 has a stabilising R24-cluster Cs.
Proof. By Proposition 2.3.6 the number of non-isomorphic R24-clusters C
is finite. Moreover, we have that for any pair of R24-clusters Ci, Cj from
WF2 , CiR
2
4Cj ⇒ C4i ⊇ C4j . Consider the sequence of all the time-clusters
C1,C2, . . .. We construct a subsequence C′n of the sequence Cn, n ∈ N
as follows. Take C1; if C1 is a stabilising cluster, then we stop, and the
subsequence is chosen. Otherwise, assume that a subsequence C′1, . . . ,C′n is
chosen. If C′n is not a stabilising cluster, then there is a cluster Ck, where,
up to isomorphism, C′4n ⊃ C4k . Take the R24-smallest Ck with this property
and set C′(n+1) := Ck. Since C
′4
n ⊃ C′4(n+1), this procedure must terminate,
and it stops at a stabilising cluster.
Lemma 2.3.9 If Cs is a stabilising cluster, then, for all the R24-clusters
Ci, Cj of worlds fromWF2 such that CsR
2
4Ci and CsR
2
4Cj, if Ci is isomorphic
to Cj by a mapping f , then
∀B ∈ Sub(A), ∀w ∈ Ci (F2, w) V2 B ⇔ (F2, f(w)) V2 B.
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Proof. It may be given by an easy induction on the length of B. Both
the basis of the induction and the inductive steps regarding the boolean
operations and the modal operators Ke and Ka are evident. Hence, we turn
our attention only to the case B is 24D, (F2, w) V2 24D and w4 ⊂ f(w)4.
It follows that ∀z ∈ w4, (F2, z) V2 D. Since for any Ck ∈ ∪C4j there
is a C′k in ∪ C4i such that Ck ∼= C′k and C′k V2 D, it follows that ∀v ∈
f(w)4, v V2 D by inductive hypothesis and hence (F2, f(w)) V2 24D.
Consider the set C4s . We want to reduce the number of its elements to a
finite one. Firstly, we make a partition of this set into equivalence classes.
We take each time-cluster of worlds from C4s and we define its equivalence
class w.r.t. isomorphic time-clusters [C]∼= := {Cj | CsR24Cj & C ∼= Cj}.
Then the class [C]∼= contains all those clusters which are both isomorphic
to C and such that they are after the stabilising cluster Cs. Clearly in M2
there is only a finite number m of such equivalence classes, as the domain
of V2 contains a finite number of propositional letters, the ones occurring in
Sub(A). Take and fix for any such equivalence class [Cj ]∼= a representative
element Rep(Cj) ∈ [Cj ]∼= and set REP :=
⋃
1≤j≤m Rep(Cj). Let us introduce
a new frame St := 〈WSt,RSt4 ,RSte ,RSt1 , . . . ,RStk 〉 where:
(i) WSt :=
⋃
C∈REP C
(ii) RSt4 :=WSt ×WSt
(iii) RSte := R
2
e WSt (i.e. RSte is the restriction of R2e on WSt.)
(iv) for 1 ≤ a ≤ k, RSta := R2a WSt
Evidently, the frame St is nothing but an RSt4 -cluster of R
St
e -clusters. We
consider, now, the linear part of M2 up to the stabilising cluster Cs and we
define a subframe Fl v F2, Fl := 〈Wl,Rl4,Rle,Rla〉, where WFl := WF2 −⋃
C
4
s . The LTK-frame F3 := 〈WF3 ,R34,R3e ,R31, . . . ,R3k〉 has the following
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structure (see Figure 2.2):
(i) WF3 :=WSt ∪WFl
(ii) R34 := R
St
4 ∪ Rl4 ∪ {〈w, z〉 | w ∈WFl & z ∈WSt}
(iii) R3e := R
St
e ∪ Rle
(iv) for 1 ≤ a ≤ k, R3a := RSta ∪ Rla
The kind of frame formerly described, is what we call a reflexive LTK-
balloon, a graphic representation of which may be found depicted in Figure
2.2. Let MF3 := 〈F3, V3〉 be the model in which V3 is the restriction of V2
on WF3 .
Lemma 2.3.10 For any formula B ∈ Sub(A), for any world w ∈ WF3,
(F3, w) V3 B⇔ (F2, w) V2 B.
Proof. The proof can be given by induction on the length of B. We consider
only the case in which B is 24D, (F3, w) V3 24D and w ∈WSt. This means
that D is true at all those worlds z ∈ WF3 s.t. wR34z, i.e. all the worlds
belonging to WSt (recall that RSt4 is an equivalence relation on WSt). Notice
that the world w belongs to F2 and, by construction of F3, w ∈ ∪C4s where
Cs is the R24-deepest stabilising cluster in F2. By Inductive Hypothesis
we have that (F2, z) V2 D for any z belonging both to WF3 and to WF2 .
Consider a world v ∈WF2 such that v ∈ C4s . We can have two cases: either
v belongs to WSt or v does not. In the former case (F2, v) V2 D holds by
Inductive Hypothesis, while in the latter, since v belongs to an R24-cluster
isomorphic to an RSte -cluster from WSt, (F2, v) V2 D holds by Lemma 2.3.9.
Therefore (F2, w) V2 24D.
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Figure 2.2: Scheme of the structure of the frame F3, a case of reflexive
LTK-balloon.
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Step 3: Getting a finite and computable number of time-clusters
The base set of MF3 contains a finite number of worlds, but, since we do
not know how many they are, we need to contract it again and we shall do
so by dropping some clusters.
Step 4. For each B ∈ Sub(A), we consider the R34-maximal R3e-cluster C
of worlds fromWF3 such that ∃w ∈ C, (F3, w) V3 B and we denote it by CB.
Likewise, by C¬B we denote the R34-maximal R
3
e-cluster containing a world z
refuting B. Then we introduce a new frame F4 := 〈WF4 ,R44,R4e ,R41, . . . ,R4k〉
where:
WF4 :=
⋃
B∈Sub(A)
CB ∪
⋃
B∈Sub(A)
C¬B ∪ WSt
and all the binary relations are the restriction of the ones from F3 on WF4 .
LetM4 := 〈WF4 , V4〉 be a model on F4 where V4 is nothing but the restriction
of V3 on WF4 . Clearly the frame F4 is still a case of reflexive LTK-balloon.
Lemma 2.3.11 For any formula B ∈ Sub(A), for any world w ∈ W4,
(F4, w) V4 B⇔ (F3, w) V3 B.
Proof. We conduct an easy induction on the length of B, and we illustrate
only the case B is 24D, (F4, w) V4 24D and w 6∈WSt. Suppose (F3, w) 6V3
24D. Then there is a world z ∈ WF3 such that wR34z, (F3, z) 6V3 D and
z 6∈WF4 . By construction ofMF4 , there must be an R44-maximal R4e-cluster
C¬D in F4 such that there exists a world v ∈ C¬D, (F4, v) 6V4 D. Since
C¬D is R44-maximal, we also have wR
4
4v. This is a contradiction, hence
(F3, w) V3 24D.
Now the number of worlds from WF4 is finite and it is f(‖A‖), where f
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is a computable function and f(‖A‖) ≤ (2‖Sub(A)‖(2‖Sub(A)‖+ 22‖Sub(A)‖)).
Step 4: Defining a p-morphic image. Our final step is to show that
F4 is the p-morphic image of an LTK-frame and hence ∀B ∈ LTK, F4  B.
After doing so, we shall be able to show a more general result, namely that
any reflexive LTK-balloon may be unraveled in order to get an LTK-frame
which is a p-morphic image of the original frame. Let us start by defining a
p-morphism (pseudo-epimorphism):
Definition 2.3.12 Let f be a mapping of a frame S1 := 〈S1,R1〉 into a
frame S2 := 〈S2,R2〉. The mapping f is called a p-morphism if:
(i) ∀w, v ∈ S1(wR1v ⇒ f(w)R2f(v))
(ii) ∀w, v ∈ S1(f(w)R2f(v)⇒ ∃t ∈ S1(wR1t & f(t) = f(v)))
The frame S2 is also said to be a p-morphic image of S1.
Definition 2.3.13 Given two models M1 := 〈S1, V1〉 and M2 := 〈S2, V2〉, a
mapping f is a p-morphism of M1 into M2 if and only if:
(i) f is a p-morphism of S1 into S2;
(ii) the valuations V1 and V2 share the same domain;
(iii) ∀p ∈ Dom(V1),∀w ∈W1(w V1 p⇔ f(w) V2 p).
Theorem 2.3.14 If f is a p-morphism of a Kripke-modelM1 := 〈W1,R1, V1〉
onto a Kripke-model M2 := 〈W2,R2, V2〉, then for any formula A which is
built up on letters from the domain of the valuation V1, ∀w ∈ W1(w V1
A⇔ f(w) V2 A).
Let CSt1 , . . . ,C
St
i be an enumeration of all the R
4
e-clusters of worlds from
WSt and let F5 := 〈WF5 ,R54,R5e ,R51, . . . ,R5k〉 be a frame such that:
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(i) WF5 :=
⋃
1≤j≤i C
St
j
(ii) ∀w∀z ∈WF5 (wR54z ⇔ (w ∈ CStj & z ∈ CStk & j ≤ k))
(iii) ∀w∀z ∈WF5 (wR5ez ⇔ wR4ez)
(iv) for 1 ≤ a ≤ k, ∀w∀z ∈WF5 (wR5az ⇔ wR4az)
Let F∞ = 〈WF∞ ,R∞4 ,R∞e ,R∞1 , . . . ,R∞k 〉 be an LTK-frame consisting of an
infinite repetition of F5 and let F6 = 〈WF6 ,R64,R6e ,R61, . . . ,R6k〉 be a subframe
of F4 such that WF6 =WF4 −
⋃
C<s (recall that Cs is the stabilising cluster
of F4). Let F = 〈WF,R4,Re,R1, . . . ,Rk〉 be an LTK-frame such that:
(i) W =WF∞ ∪W6
(ii) R4 = R∞4 ∪ R64 ∪ {〈w, z〉 | w ∈WF6 & z ∈WF∞}
(iii) Re = R∞e ∪ R6e
(iv) for 1 ≤ a ≤ k, Ra = R∞a ∪ R6a.
It is easy to see that F4 is a p-morphic image of F.
Notice that in this proof we have examined only the general case in which
the formula A is not valid in an infinite LTK-frame. If such frame is a finite
one, we do not need to go through steps 2, 3 and 5.
Corollary 2.3.15 Any reflexive LTK-balloon has a p-morphic image which
is an infinite LTK-frame.
We can then conclude that for any formula A, if A is not a theorem of
LTK, then there is a finite reflexive LTK-balloon which refutes A and whose
size is computable and bounded by A.
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2.4 Kripke Semantics: On the Ontology of Possi-
ble Worlds
Attempts to give a semantical explanation of quantified modal logics start
around the mid Forties with the work by Rudolf Carnap [12]. During the
Fifties, new semantics for modalities in the predicative case are developed
by Kanger [40], Montague [45] and Kripke, but it is only during the Sixties
that such theories become systematic and general, thank to the work by
Jakko Hintikka [33] and Saul Kripke.
Kripke’s work in 1963 [42] is the most influential piece of research in
the field. It presents a general semantics for quantified modal logics which
extends the Tarskian semantics for classical logic. This is one of the main
reasons of its great success: it allows us to deal with modal logics with the
same techniques developed in model theory applied to extensional logics (cf.
Corsi [13, 14]).
The key concept in this new semantical approach is the one of possible
worlds. Although in computational and multi-agent approaches, possible
worlds are generally considered only as descriptive tools to talk about pre-
cise states of a machine or social situations, there is, nevertheless, a debate
which is going on in the philosophical community on the ontological status
to be given to possible worlds. The ontological status of such objects is, in
fact, quite controversial. Although we are little concerned with philosophical
and metaphysical issues in this dissertation, we have nevertheless decided
to provide the reader with a very brief introduction to the subject, just to
give the flavour of the problems related to modal logic in other fields. Logic
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is, in fact, an intrinsically multi-disciplinary subject and being so it can be
analysed using the tools of various disciplines together (mathematics, com-
puter science, philosophy).
We would like to present two different positions about the ontological
status of possible worlds. First we shall see Kripke’s and then Plantinga’s.
This will show the core of the discussion on such matters and it will also
give a deeper understanding of some of the expressions one may find, or has
already found, in our dissertation.
As a start, we shall point out one of the most famous objections to Possi-
ble Worlds Semantics. The point is that whenever we want to interpret the
diamond modal operator 3 (in its historical acception as meaning possibil-
ity) in the possible worlds framework, we should read an expression as 3p
as there is a possible world in which p holds true and there is, therefore, an
existential quantification over possible worlds. There is no problem as long
as we aim at talking about actual situations. The scenario changes whenever
we aim at talking about a situation which is merely possible. In this case we
are forced to accept the existence of possible objects which are not actual:
we should accept in our ontology not only real things, but possibilia as well.
Melvin Fitting [18] underlines that the same situation happens in the se-
mantics for Classical Propositional Calculus: we take under consideration,
in fact, all the possibilities, i.e. all the lines of a truth table, and such pos-
sibilities cannot happen simultaneously.
Kripke’s answer is that the problem comes from a wrong use of the term
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possible world : if we clarify this notion giving it a fixed and formal mean-
ing, one realises that there is nothing wrong in considering possible worlds
for philosophical or technical purposes as abstract entities (cf Kripke [43]).
Possible worlds should not be considered as far away planets which come
into existence in some other dimension. In order to avoid this kind of confu-
sion, Kripke states that it would be better to change terminology: instead of
speaking of possible worlds, it would be better to talk about possible states
or stories of the world.
In order to understand his acception of possible worlds, Kripke asks us
to consider two common six faced dice: dice A and dice B. If we cast them,
we would get 36 possible combinations for the couple: for each dice there are
six possible outputs. These 36 combinations are literally 36 possible worlds:
we completely ignore the rest of the world but the two dice and the faces
they show. Only one of these 36 worlds is the actual one, but it is inter-
esting, however, to consider also the others whenever we ask counterfactual
questions. When we talk about the 36 possible combinations there is no
need to assume the existence of other 35 entities in some other dimension
which correspond to the physical object we face. A possible world is not
a far away country we visit or see through a telescope. A possible world
is given by its descriptive conditions. Possible worlds are stipulated, not
found (cf. Kripke [43]). Kripke provides us with this definition of possible
worlds in order to correct a frequent philosophical mistake which is caused
by a wrong use of the terms involved. It is a classical problem of quantified
modal logics and modal logics in general.
Alvin Plantinga [47, 46] has a similar position concerning the ontological
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status of possible worlds. He defines them as states of affairs possible and
maximal. He thinks, moreover, that talking about possible worlds is neces-
sary and not a mere speculation. There are, in fact, linguistic ambiguities
which can be cured and understood only if we refer to the possible worlds
semantics.
In order to understand Plantinga’s view point, it is necessary to intro-
duce the de dicto versus de re distinction, which is typical of the quantified
approach to modal logic.
A modal sentence is a de dicto modality whenever a modal property is
associated to a dictum or sentence, as in the phrase it is necessary that
all men are mortal, where the necessity operator is applied to the sentence
all men are mortal. On the other hand we call a sentence a de re modal-
ity if the modal property is given to an object, as in the phrase all men
are necessarily mortal, in which the property being necessarily mortal is ap-
plied to all mankind. It is clear that such a distinction is lost whenever we
lose the expressive power of predicate logics in order to analyse the case of
propositional calculus. A classical example to explain the necessity of possi-
ble worlds is provided by Thomas Aquinas3. In his Summa contra Gentiles
Thomas Aquinas considers the problem of God’s pre-knowledge. God can,
according to the philosopher, see the action which is taking place. This
is coherent with human freedom. In fact consider the truth value of the
following sentence:
(1) If I see someone sitting, he is necessarily sitting.
This is clearly true if read in the de dicto way:
3Thomas Aquinas, Summa de veritate catholicae fidei contra Gentiles [1259-1264],
Roma: edizione Leonina, 1918-1930, voll. XIII-XV.
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(2) It is necessary that if I see someone sitting, that person is sitting.
which is to say:
(2∗) In every possible world if I see someone sitting, that person is sitting.
The sentence nevertheless ceases to hold true as soon as we apply the de
re reading:
(3) If I see someone sitting, such person has the necessary property of
being sat
i.e. (3∗) If I see someone sitting, in every possible world that person is
sitting
which is clearly false.
It would not be possible, according to Plantinga, to understand such a
distinction if we cease to use the possible worlds framework. Just another
example to understand such distinction is provided by Fitting4. Consider
the sentence The number of planets is necessarily odd. A de re reading
would suggest that the number of planets in the solar system is odd in every
possible world. Any person without radically deterministic philosophical
views would then disagree with it being true. On the other hand its de re
interpretation proves to be true: in every possible world it is true that in the
actual world the number of planets is odd.
4Fitting [18], p. 86
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Leaving planets and men sitting necessarily or not and moving to some-
thing more useful in our everyday life, Thomason [67] shows how such a
distinction may help in remove the ambiguity in some english expression as
any and some. Consider the following couple of sentences:
a. Everyone can come along with us.
b. Anyone can come along with us.
In fact the sentence a. could be read as It is possible that all come with
us, i.e. 3∀xCome(x, us), whereas b. would be All can possibly come with
us, i.e. ∀x3Come(x, us). As soon as we formalise them, we realise how the
syntactic difference of the two is actually linked to a different scope of the
universal quantifier and this can help in understanding the difference in the
use of any and some in the english language.
If we consider the modal operators as quantifiers over possible worlds,
the distinction we are talking about becomes the problem of the swap of the
two types of quantifiers.
Going back to Plantinga’s position, we have stated that he accepts the
necessity of the use of the possible worlds. The problems start when he also
states to be an actualist, someone who does not accept anything which is
merely possible. Possible worlds must, therefore, exist in some way. But
which way? A possible world is according to Plantinga an abstract ob-
ject which is capable of action and causal relations. For instance being for
Socrates shorter than Plato is a state of affairs and it is actual only if Socrates
is actually shorter than Plato. On the other hand being for Socrates able to
play the violin is a state of affairs which exists but is not actual. We find
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this last statement a contradiction with Plantinga’s actualism.
From our point of view, we find hard to believe in the actual existence of
possible worlds and whenever we shall use such expression in what follows
we shall refer to its mathematical acception, i.e. as an object in a model the-
oretical structure. We shall not make any ontological assumption, although
we are prone to consider possible worlds as the interpretation provided by
Kripke: we believe them to be mere counterfactual situations which are
useful to describe some aspects of the world.
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Chapter 3
Admissible Rules in LTK1:
Decidability
We shall now start the analysis of one of the main topics of our dissertaion,
i.e. the investigation of inference rules in the logic we formerly defined. An
inference rule, or a logical consequence or else just an argument, is a set of
formulae called the premisses of the argument followed by a formula called
the conclusion. It is usually displayed as:
A1
...
An
B
The premisses A1, . . . , An are separated from the conclusion B by a line, indi-
cating that between the two sets of formulae there is some sort of connection.
This link is the logical entailment: a rule can be read as given the premisses
A1, . . . , An, the conclusion B may be inferred. Clearly this does not hold true
for every rule in every system. The study of the truth of this type of sentence
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referring to rules is the core of the research concerning logical consequences.
In particular, one may be interested in finding out whether a given rule is
correct for some logic, which is to say if its conclusion must hold true when-
ever its premisses do so. If such relation between premisses and conclusion
holds for a logic, the rule is said to be valid or admissible for the logic itself.
One can say that if a rule is valid for a logic, the truth of the premisses is
transfered to its conclusion1. In the light of what we have just said, one can
state that in order for a rule to be valid for a logic, it is necessary to fulfill
the following two conditions:
(i) If the premisses are theorems, so is the conclusion;
(ii) The validity of the conclusion depends only on the logical structure
of the premisses .
It is well known, in fact, that there might be arguments with true pre-
misses and a true conclusion which are, nevertheless, not valid. In order to
catch the intuition behind these concepts, let us consider few examples in
a natural language taken from common situations. Consider the following
argument:
Some women are philosophers
Some philosophers are lecturers
Therefore some lecturers are women.
In this example although both premisses and conclusion are true in the
model represented by England in 2008, the argument is not valid. On the
other hand, we can also have valid arguments with false conclusions:
All men are honest
All politicians are men
1cf Bellissima and Pagli [1].
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Therefore all politicians are honest2.
In spite of the falsity of its conclusion the argument is, nevertheless,
valid. It is its logical skeleton which matters here, not the content of what
it is said. This argument stays true no matter what terms we (uniformely)
substitue to it.
But one could still argue why it is so important to find valid arguments.
Being able to recognise admissible inference rules is actually a very useful
tool at this stage of our research. Rules are, in fact, the dynamic engine
of a logic. Theorems are static in a way: one can find a formula which is
actually a theorem in a given logic and then the game is over, for nothing
new can be generated by this information. On the other hand, whenever
a rule is checked and recognised as admissible, it is immediately available
to us in order to find other new theorems. We have not defined our logic
syntactically yet. What we have at this point is just a decidable set of for-
mulae. Finding admissible rules is, therefore, of crucial importance.
In this chapter we carry out the work started in Chapter 2 concerning
decidability. In Chapter 2, in fact, we found an algorithm to check whether
a given formula is a theorem of the logic LTK or not. In the same spirit
the task we have now is to build a new algorithm whose goal is to check
whether a given rule in the language of LTK1 is admissible (or valid) for the
logic LTK13. The logic LTK1 is nothing but a particular case of LTK, namely
a system in which only one agent is operating on a temporal framework.
Hence, a Kripke-frame for this logic is a tuple of type 〈W,R4,Re,Ra〉 where
2This is a typical example of a barbara syllogism, according to the Mediaeval Aris-
totelian terminology, in which both premisses and conclusion are in affermative universal
form.
3it is clear how this result can be easily extended to the case of LTK1
− and LTK1−−.
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the relation Ra is intended to represent all the worlds visible from the agent’s
point of view.
Scheme and Methodology. The results presented in this Chapter may
be found in C. [4]. The techniques employed here are largely taken by Ry-
bakov’s methods as presented in [55].
In Section 3.1 we introduce some basic semantic definitions and oper-
ations on Kripke-frames. This is propaedeutical to the construction which
follows. We define special Kripke models called n-characterising. This con-
struction will prove to be the core of the whole chapter. After doing so, we
prove that the model defined is n-characterising for LTK1.
In Section 3.2 we prove several technical lemmas, in particular we show
that our n-characterising model has a very interesting property: for each
world in its base set there is a formula which is true at that world and only
at that world. In other words, each point in this model is definable. This is
done by means of Jankov Formulae, i.e. special formulae on LLTK intended
to be true at a single world in the model we work with. After introducing
these formulae, we show that the definition is a correct one and therefore
each world in the model is definable.
Finally, in Section 3.3, we present the main results. We show that an
inference rule r is admissible in LTK1 if and only if it is valid in all the frames
of a special kind, whose size is computable and bounded by the size of r.
As it will be clear later, these frames are a variant of the reflexive balloon
as described in Chapter 2. Hence, we prove that LTK1 is decidable w.r.t.
inference rules.
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3.1 Construction of ChLTK1(n)
In this section we shall construct special countable n-characterizing models
for the logic LTK1 (see Definition 3.1.1) based on the tecniques presented by
Rybakov [55]. This construction is the ground on which we shall base our
main result. The intuition behind it is to construct a model in which only
and all the theorems of LTK1 built up on a finite number n of propositional
letters hold true. More technically:
Definition 3.1.1 (n-Characterising Model) Given a logic L, a Kripke-
model M := 〈F, V 〉 is an n-characterizing model for L iff:
(i) Dom(V ) := {p1, . . . , pn}
(ii) for any formula A built up from Dom(V ), F V A ⇔ A ∈ L.
Let us introduce few definitions and basic operations on Kripke-frames
and models. Given an LTK-frame F := 〈WF,R4,Re,Ra〉, a world w (or an
R4-cluster C) from WF has R4-depth n, in symbols depthR4(w) = n, if the
number of R4-clusters in CR4(w)
4 is n (in what follows, we shall always
use the expression depth instead of R4-depth or depthR4). The expression
Sln(F) denotes the n-slice of F, i.e. the family of all the elements of depth n
from WF. Sn(F) is the set of all the elements from WF with depth at most
n. Given a model M := 〈F, V 〉 and a world w ∈ WF, by V alV (w) we shall
denote the set {pi | w V pi}. For any valuation V , Dom(V ) denotes the
domain of V .
A very well known truth preserving operation on Kripke-structures and
models in the disjoint union of different frames. Since we shall use it in the
following construction, we define it as follows:
Definition 3.1.2 (Disjoint Union) Let Fi = 〈WFi ,Ri1, . . . ,Rik〉, for i ∈ I,
be a family of k-modal Kripke-frames with pairwise disjoint base sets, i.e.
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WFi ∩WFj = ∅ for each i, j ∈ I. The disjoint union of Fi is the frame:
⊔
i∈I
Fi = 〈
⋃
i∈I
WFi ,
⋃
i∈I
Ri1, . . . ,
⋃
i∈I
Rik〉
Given a family Mi = 〈Fi, Vi〉 of Kripke-models on the family of frames Fi,
the disjoint union of Mi is the model:
⊔
i∈I
Mi = 〈
⊔
i∈I
Fi,
⋃
i∈I
Vi〉
Theorem 3.1.3 (i) Let
⊔
i∈I Fi = 〈
⋃
i∈I WFi ,
⋃
i∈I R
i
1, . . . ,
⋃
i∈I R
i
k〉 be
the disjoint union of some Kripke-frames Fi, i ∈ I. Then for any formula A
(
⊔
i∈I Fi  A⇔ ∀i ∈ I(Fi  A));
(i) Let
⊔
i∈IMi = 〈
⊔
i∈I Fi, V 〉 be the disjoint union of models on a
family of frames Fi, i ∈ I. Then for any formula A built up on propositional
letters from V , (
⊔
i∈I Fi V A⇔ ∀i ∈ I(Fi Vi A)).
We are now ready to start our construction of an effective n-characterising
model for LTK1.
Step 1: the first slice of ChLTK1(n). Let F be a class of finite LTK-
frames (i.e. LTK-frames whose base sets are finite) such that, for any frame
F ∈ F, ∀w∀z ∈ WF(wR4z & wRez). Let C(F)n be the class of all the
possible different, non isomorphic models C := 〈F, V 〉, where:
(i) F ∈ F;
(ii) Dom(V ) = {p1, . . . , pn};
(iii) ∀w∀z ∈WF
((
(V alV (w) = V alV (z))&({V alV (w′) | wRaw′} = {V alV (z′) |
zRaz
′}))⇒ (w = z)).
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It is easy to notice that the size of C(F)n is computable and bounded by n.
Let P(C(F)n) be the set of all the subsets of C(F)n.
Given a set S = {C1, . . . ,Cj} from P(C(F)n), for each Ci ∈ S, we display the
model Ci as Ci := 〈Wi,Ri4,Rie,Ria, Vi〉.
For any set S = {C1, . . . ,Cj} from P(C(F)n), TS is the Kripke-model TS :=
〈WS,R4,Re,Ra, V 〉, where:
(i) WS :=
⋃
1≤i≤j Wi
(ii) R4 :=WS ×WS
(iii) Re :=
⋃
1≤i≤j R
i
e
(iv) Ra :=
⋃
1≤i≤j R
i
a
(v) Dom(V ) := {p1, . . . , pn}
(vi) ∀p ∈ Dom(V )(V (p) := ⋃1≤i≤j Vi(p))
Since the temporal relation R4 is universal, each TS is an R4-cluster of
Re-clusters.
Let S1(ChLTK1(n)) :=
⊔
S∈P(C(F)n) TS.
Hence the first slice contains a finite number of pairwise disjoint models,
where each model is an R4-cluster of Re-clusters.
Step 2: the second slice. Consider any TS from S1(ChLTK1(n)), and any
Re-cluster Ci from C(F)n s.t. ∀C ∈ TS, Ci is not isomorphic to a submodel
of C.
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For any TSi from S1(ChLTK1(n)) we adjoin a copy of each Cj ∈ C(F) pro-
vided that ∀Ck ∈ TSi , Cj 6∼= Ck. We set Cj to be an immediate R4=predecessor
of TSi . The resulting model is defined as S2(ChLTK1(n)).
Step 3: the i + 1th slice. Suppose we have already constructed the
model Si(ChLTK1(n)) for i ≥ 2 such that its frame is a frame for LTK1 and
given two different R4-clusters Cj , Ck from this frame, if Cj is an immediate
R4-predecessor of Ck, then Cj is not isomorphic to a submodel of Ck. To
construct Sli+1(ChLTK1(n)) we add Re-clusters from C(F)n in the following
way. We take each Re-cluster C of depth i and we add as its immediate R4-
predecessors all the possible different Re-clusters Cj from C(F)n, but only
provided that Cj is not isomorphic to a submodel of C.
Let Si+1(ChLTK1(n)) be the model resulting from all such additions. The
frame of the resulting model is again a frame for LTK1.
Step 4: the final model. The final model ChLTK1(n) := 〈WCh(n),R4,Re,Ra, V 〉
is given by ⋃
i∈N
Si(ChLTK1(n))
We call Ch(n) the frame on which ChLTK1(n) is based.
Clearly what we need now is to prove that the model defined is really
n-characterising for LTK1. To do so, we prove the following lemma:
Lemma 3.1.4 The model ChLTK1(n) = 〈Ch(n), V 〉 is n-characterizing for
LTK1.
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Proof. Since Ch(n)  LTK1 by construction, the claim A ∈ LTK1 ⇒ Ch(n) V
A, for any formula A built up from the propositional letters p1, . . . , pn, follows
immediately.
Suppose there is a formula A built up from p1, . . . , pn s.t. A 6∈ LTK1. In
order to prove that A is not true in ChLTK1(n), we will construct a model
refuting A, which is isomorphic to an open submodel of ChLTK1(n).
By Theorem 2.3.2, there is a finite LTK1-reflexive balloon F1 = 〈WF1 ,R14,R1e ,R1a〉
(whose size is computable and bounded by the size of A) and a model
M1 := 〈F1, V1〉 such that F1 6V1 A. For any R1e-cluster C from WF1 ,
∀w, z ∈ ∪C, if the following two conditions hold:
(i) V alV1(w) = V alV1(z)
(ii) {V alV1(w′) | wR1aw′} = {V alV1(z′) | zR1az′}
then we delete either w or z. The resulting model M2 := 〈F2, V2〉 is a p-
morphic image of M1 := 〈F1, V1〉, thus it still refutes A.
Let St1 be the set of R1e-clusters of depth 1 from F1, and let St2 be the
set of R2e-clusters of depth 1 from F2 (cf. Section 2.3 and Figure 2.2). We
delete R2e-clusters from St2 as follows: for any C1, C2 from St2 s.t. C1 6= C2,
if C1 is a submodel of C2, then we delete C1. Let M∗1 be the resulting model.
Clearly, M∗1 is a p-morphic image of both St1 and St2 and, moreover, it is
also isomorphic to an open submodel of ChLTK1(n).
Suppose we have already constructed the model M∗i := 〈F∗i , V ∗i 〉 s.t.:
(i) ∀w ∈WF∗i , depth(w) ≤ i
(ii) M∗i is a p-morphic image of the open submodel of M2 generated by
the set
⋃
C4, where C is an R24-cluster of depth i.
(iii) M∗i is isomorphic to some open submodel of ChLTK1(n).
The following procedure will explain how to obtain the model M∗i+1. Let
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C be the R∗4-deepest R
∗
4-cluster in M
∗
i . Consider the R
2
4-cluster Ci+1 in
M2 of depth i + 1. If Ci+1 is not a submodel of C, then we adjoin Ci+1
as the immediate R∗4-predecessor of C, otherwise we do not add anything.
This procedure ends when we reach the R24-deepest R
2
4-cluster C inM2. We
denote the resulting model by M∗. Clearly, M∗ is a p-morphic image of the
original model M1, therefore it refutes A. Since M∗ is also isomorphic to
some open submodel of ChLTK1(n), it follows Ch(n) 6V A.
3.2 Definability of worlds
We have seen that there is a procedure to build n-characterising models for
LTK1 for any finite n. What we want to show now is that such models enjoy
a very interesting property. In fact we can prove that each world in the base
set of these kind of models is definable. This means that given any world w
we are able to construct a formula such that it is true at w and only at w.
This gives us a powerful tool to achieve our goal of proving decidability for
inference rules. In fact, as we shall see in the last section of this chapter,
this is a fundamental condition for our main results.
Let us first give a precise definition of definability:
Definition 3.2.1 Given a model M = 〈F, V 〉, a world w ∈WF is definable
if and only if there is a formula β(w) such that:
(i) (F, w) V β(w);
(i) ∀z ∈WF ((F, z) V β(w) ⇒ (w = z)).
In other words, we say a world w definable if and only if there is a
formula β(w) whose valuation is the set containing w as its only member:
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V (β(w)) = {w}.
In order to construct our defining formulae, we shall use the abbreviation
Si for Si(ChLTK1(n)). If depth(w) = 1, the expression TS(w) will denote the
R4-circle of Re-clusters to which w belongs.
Step 1: Defining a world of depth 1. We start by analysing the case
depth(w) = 1, that is w belongs to some TS(w) ∈ S1(ChLTK1(n)). we shall
use the following formulae:
α(w) :=
∧
w∈V (pi)
pi ∧
∧
w 6∈V (pi)
¬pi
ρa(w) :=
∧
wRaz
3aα(z) ∧ Ka
∨
wRaz
α(z)
ρe(w) :=
∧
z∈CRe (w)
3e
(
α(z) ∧ ρa(z)
)
∧ Ke
∨
z∈CRe (w)
(
α(z) ∧ ρa(z)
)
ρ4(w) :=
∧
z∈TS(w)
34
(
α(z)∧ρa(z)∧ρe(z)
)
∧24
∨
z∈TS(w)
(
α(z)∧ρa(z)∧ρe(z)
)
ρ<(w) :=
∧
z∈TS(w)
2434
(
α(z) ∧ ρa(z) ∧ ρe(z)
)
We set the formula β(w) to be:
β(w) := α(w) ∧ ρa(w) ∧ ρe(w) ∧ ρ4(w) ∧ ρ<(w) (3.1)
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The intuition behind the formulae just defined is:
(i) ρa(w) specifies the structure of the Ra-cluster generated by w;
(ii) ρe(w) describes the Re-cluster generated by w;
(iii) ρ4(w) indicates all the R4-accessible worlds from w and it also
specifies that they are the only ones R4-seen by w;
(iv) ρ<(w), finally, says that the R4-maximal time-cluster that is R4-
accessible from w consists of all the Re-clusters from TS(w).
Step 2: Defining worlds of depth i + 1. Suppose w is an element of
depth i + 1. The formulae α(w), ρa(w) and ρe(w) are defined in the same
way as the former case. Recall that w< := {z | wR4z & ¬(zR4w)}.
γ(i) :=
∧
z∈Si
¬β(z)
ρ′4(w) :=
∧
z∈w<
34β(z) ∧
∧
z∈Si&z 6∈w<
¬34β(z)
δ(w) := 24
( ∨
z∈w<
β(z) ∨
∨
z∈CR4 (w)
(
α(z) ∧ ρa(z) ∧ ρe(z) ∧ γ(i)
))
We can now define β(w):
β(w) := α(w) ∧ ρa(w) ∧ ρe(w) ∧ ρ′4(w) ∧ γ(i) ∧ δ(w) (3.2)
The formula ρ′(w) says that w R4-sees a specified set of worlds from Si,
while γ(i) avoids the case w ∈ Si. Finally, δ(w) says that if a world z is
R4-seen by w, then either it belongs to the set of all the R4-successors of
3.2. DEFINABILITY OF WORLDS 69
w, or it is in the R4-cluster generated by w.
What we have to show now is that our definition is correct and each
world is actually defined by a formula of the type introduced in 3.1 or 3.2.
Lemma 3.2.2 For any n-characterising model ChLTK1(n), each world w
from WCh(n) is definable.
Proof. Clearly the fact that for each world w, w V β(w) follows directly
from the definition of β(w).
Let us show that the second part of Definition 3.2.1 also holds true. We
have to check if for any w, z from ChLTK1(n), the assumption z V β(w)
implies that (w = z). There can be two cases:
Case 1. Assume w has depth 1 and suppose there is a point z s.t.
z V β(w).
(i) If depth(z) = 1, then the structure of β(w) implies that the R4-open
submodels generated by z and w are isomorphic, so they should coincide.
Hence, by the structure of S1(ChLTK1(n)), we have w = z.
(ii) The case depth(z) = 2 is impossible because ρ<(w) is a conjunct of
β(w).
(iii) If depth(z) > 2, then either zR4w or ¬(zR4w). The case zR4w is
impossible for the structure of S2(ChLTK1(n)) (i.e. there should be an Re-
cluster C s.t. depth(C) = 2, C ∈ CRe(z)4 and C 6∈ CRe(w)4). Since ρ<(w) is
also a conjunct of β(w), the case ¬(zR4w) is impossible as well.
Case 2. Assume w has depth i + 1 and suppose there is a point z
s.t. z V β(w). By the structure of the conjunct γ(i) of β(w), we have
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depth(z) > (i + 1). By the conjunct ρ′4 we have ∀v ∈ Si(wR4v ⇒ zR4v).
We can have two cases:
(i) If depth(z) = i + 1, then, by the construction of ChLTK1(n), CR4(w) =
CR4(z) and so w = z.
(ii) Suppose depth(z) > i+1; then either zR4w or ¬(zR4w). Assume zR4w;
then there are R4-clusters C1, . . . ,Cm between CR4(z) and CR4(w) such that
CR4(z),C1, . . . ,Cm,CR4(w) is an R4-chain of R4-clusters (i.e. CR4(z)R4C1,
CmR4CR4(w) and for each i, j 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ m, CiR4Cj). By the structure of
the conjunct δ(w), each R4-cluster from C1, . . . ,Cm is isomorphic to CR4(w)
and this is impossible by the construction of ChLTK1(n). Assume ¬(zR4w);
then there are R4-clusters C1, . . . ,Cm such that depth(Cm) = i + 1 and
CR4(z),C1, . . . ,Cm is an R4-chain. Again, by the structure of δ(w), each
R4-cluster from C1, . . . ,Cm is isomorphic to CR4(z) and this is impossible
by the construction of ChLTK1(n).
3.3 Decidability for LTK1 with respect to inference
rules
We have now all the tools we need in order to show the main result of this
Chapter. Summarising, we know that for any finite n there is a special
countable n-characterising model for LTK1 and in this model all the worlds
are defined by a finite and constructible formula. These two important prop-
erties enjoyed by our logic shall prove to be of crucial importance for our
next result.
As we have anticipated, we want to show that for the case of LTK1,
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admissibility of inference rules is a decidable property. Let us start by
defining what inference rules are in a more formal fashion:
Definition 3.3.1 (Inference Rule) An inference rule r is an expression
of the form
r :=
A1(p1, . . . , pn), . . . , Am(p1, . . . , pn)
B(p1, . . . , pn)
where any Ai(p1, . . . , pn) and B(p1, . . . , pn) are wff built up from the letters
p1, . . . , pn (in what follows, we shall sometimes use the expression
A1(p1, . . . , pn), . . . , Am(p1, . . . , pn)/B(p1, . . . , pn)).
As we said, an inference rule is basically a set of premisses followed by
a conclusion. Between the premisses and the conclusion, there might be
certain links. For instance, it may be the case that in a class of models the
conclusion holds true whenever the premisses also do so. In this case, we
would call the rule valid or admissible for the logic generated by the set of
models. This is to say that if the premisses of the rule are always theorems
of a logic L, the same should be true for its conclusion. Let us analyse this
concept more formally.
A substitution σ is a map which assigns a formula to each propositional
variable. Given a formula A, σ(A) is the result of the application of σ to A.
Definition 3.3.2 Given a logic L and an inference rule r := A1, . . . , Am/B,
r is said to be admissible for L if and only if for each substitution σ, if
σ(Ai) ∈ L for each i, then σ(B) ∈ L.
Therefore, the greatest class of rules which can be implemented for a
given logic, i.e. which are compatible with the set of its valid formulae, is
the class of its admissible rules: this is the class of all those rules under
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which the theory itself is closed.
A concept of great importance in this scenario is the one of definable
valuation:
Definition 3.3.3 (Definable Valuation) Given a model 〈F, V 〉, a valua-
tion V ′ is definable if and only if ∀p ∈ Dom(V ′) there is a formula αp s.t.
V ′(p) = V (αp).
If we combine an n-characterising model and a definable valuation, we
are immediately able to state an important result. In fact, Theorem 3.3.3
in Rybakov [55] follows immediately:
Lemma 3.3.4 An inference rule r := A1, . . . , An/B is not admissible for
LTK1 iff there is an n-characterising model ChLTK1(n) := 〈Ch(n), V 〉 and a
definable valuation V2 s.t. Ch(n) V2
∧
1≤i≤n Ai and Ch(n) 6V2 B.
In order to apply such result to our specific needs, we have to introduce
some particular Kripke-frames which are a variant of the reflexive balloon
previously defined. These are a special kind of 3-modal Kripke-frames. We
denote them as LSP-frames, the acronym meaning Loop String Point. As
their name suggests, these frames contain three different components. We
can get an intuitive idea if we imagine a reflexive balloon with a hanging
world before each R4-cluster plus a single element R4-maximal cluster. The
structure of an LSP-frame is depicted in Figure 3.1.
Definition 3.3.5 (LSP-frames) Let FL, FS and FP be Kripke-frames with
the following structure:
(i) The frame FL = 〈WFL ,RL4,RLe ,RLa〉 (LOOP-component) is as follows:
WFL is a nonempty set of worlds; R
L
4 = WFL ×WFL; RLe is an equivalence
relation on WFL; R
L
a is some equivalence relation on R
L
e -clusters;
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(ii) Let F = 〈WF,R4,Re,Ra〉 be a finite LTK-frame (i.e. it is an LTK-
frame with a finite base set of worlds. See Definition 2.2.3); let C1, . . . ,Ci
be an enumeration of all the R4-clusters of worlds from WF; let Dots :=
{w1, . . . , wi} be a set of worlds such that ∀wj , 1 ≤ j ≤ i(wj 6∈ WF). The
frame FS = 〈WFS ,RS4,RSe ,RSa〉 (STRING-component) has the following struc-
ture: WFS = WF ∪ Dots; RS4 = R4 ∪ {〈wj , z〉 | wj ∈ Dots & z ∈ ∪C4j } ∪
{〈wj , wj〉 | wj ∈ Dots}; RSe = Re ∪ {〈wj , wj〉 | wj ∈ Dots}; RSa = Ra ∪
{〈wj , wj〉 | wj ∈ Dots}.
(iii) The frame FP := 〈WFP ,RP4,RPe ,RPa 〉 (POINT-component) is such
that its base set contains only one world denoted by @, WFP := {@}, and all
the binary relations on WFP are universal.
An LSP-frame (loop-string-point frame) is a tuple Flsp = 〈Wlsp,Rlsp4 ,Rlspe ,Rlspa 〉
where WFlsp = WFL ∪ WFS ∪ WFP; Rlsp4 = RL4 ∪ RS4 ∪ RP4 ∪ {〈w, z〉 | w ∈
WFS & z ∈WFL}; Rlspe = RLe ∪RSe ∪RPe ; Rlspa = RLa ∪RSa ∪RPa (See Figure 3.1).
As we have anticipated, LSP-frames play a central role in our proof, in
fact we can prove that any inference rule which is not admissible for LTK1
has a finite and countable counter-model based on a frame of this kind. This
is to say that the class of admissible rules for LTK1 is the class of all the
inferences which are valid in all the finite LSP-frames. Since the proof of
this result is quite long and technical, we have decided to break it into two
theorems corresponding to the two directions of the equivalence.
Theorem 3.3.6 If an inference rule
r := A1, . . . , Am/B is not admissible for LTK1, then there is a finite LSP-
frame Flsp, whose size is computable from ‖V ar(r)‖ (where V ar(r) is the
set of all the variables occurring in r), and a model Mlsp = 〈Flsp, V 〉 s.t.
Flsp V
∧
1≤i≤n Ai and Flsp 6V B.
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Figure 3.1: Scheme of the structure of an LSP-frame.
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Proof. Let us suppose that an inference rule r := A1, . . . , Am/B is not
admissible for LTK1 and let p1, . . . , pk be all the letters occurring in r. Hence
there are formulae γ1, . . . , γj , 1 ≤ j ≤ k, s.t.
∧
1≤i≤m Ai(γ1, . . . , γj) ∈ LTK1
and B(γ1, . . . , γj) 6∈ LTK1. Let Prop(γ) be the set of all the propositional
letters occurring in γ1, . . . , γj .
By Lemma 3.3.4 there is an n+1-characterising model ChLTK1(n+1) :=
〈Ch(n+1), V 〉 and a new definable valuation V2 with Dom(V2) := Prop(γ)∪
{pn+1}, where pn+1 6∈ Prop(γ), s. t. Ch(n + 1) V2
∧
1≤i≤m Ai(γ1, . . . , γj)
and Ch(n+ 1) 6V2 B(γ1, . . . , γj).
Take a world w ∈WCh(n+1) such that:
(i) (Ch(n+ 1), w) 6V2 B(γ1, . . . , γj)
(ii) ∀v ∈ w4(v 6∈ V2(pn+1))
(iii) ∀v ∈WCh(n+1)(((Ch(n+ 1), v) 6V2 B(γ1, . . . , γj) & v4 ∩
V2(pn+1) = ∅) ⇒ ‖w4‖ ≤ ‖v4‖) (i.e. w4 is the smallest set of the
kind v4 containing a world refuting B and such that none of its elements
belongs to V2(pn+1)).
It can be easily noticed that, since the propositional letter pn+1 does not
occur in any γi, such a world w exists in ChLTK1(n+ 1).
Let C1, . . . ,Ci be an enumeration of all the R4-clusters of worlds from
w4. Now we take and fix, for each R4-cluster Cj a world wj such that:
(i) wj is an immediate R4-predecessor of Cj , i.e. wjR4Cj , ¬(CjR4wj)
and if there is a world z s.t. wjR4z, zR4Cj and ¬(CjR4z), then z = wj .
(ii) for any k, 1 ≤ k ≤ i, if dp(Ck) > dp(Cj), then ¬(wjR4Ck)
(iii) wj ∈ V2(pn+1)
The existence of such a world for each R4-cluster is guaranteed by the
construction of ChLTK1(n + 1). In fact, since wj ∈ V2(pn+1) while none of
the worlds from any Cj belongs to V2(pn+1), we have that for any j, CR4(wj)
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is not a submodel of Cj . Let Dots = {w1, . . . , wi} be the set of those worlds
wj . Take and fix a world @ ∈WCh(n+1) such that:
(i) @ 6∈ w4 ∪ Dots
(ii) @4 = {@}
Let MFlsp := 〈Flsp, V2〉 be an open submodel of ChLTK1(n + 1) where
WFlsp := w
4∪Dots∪{@}. SinceMFlsp is a generated submodel of ChLTK1(n+
1), we have Flsp V2
∧
1≤i≤m Ai(γ1, . . . , γj) and Flsp 6V2 B(γ1, . . . , γj). More-
over, by Definition 3.3.5, Flsp is an LSP-frame. Though Flsp is finite, the
number of worlds from its base set is not known. To reduce such number,
we apply the technique used in the proof of Theorem 2.3.2 in a slightly
different way. Consider the STRING-component FS of Flsp (cf. Definition
3.3.5, item (ii)). For each D ∈ Sub(B), we consider the R4-maximal world
v ∈ WFS such that (Flsp, v) V2 D. We can have two cases: either v ∈ Dots
and hence v = wj for some j, or v ∈ Cj for some j. In both cases, by
CD we denote the set
⋃
Cj ∪ {wj}. Likewise, by C¬D we denote the set⋃
Cj ∪ {wj} such that there is a world v ∈
⋃
Cj ∪ {wj} which is the R4-
maximal world refuting D, i.e. (Flsp, v) 6V2 D. Then we define a subframe
Flsp′ := 〈WFlsp′ ,Rlsp
′
4 ,R
lsp′
e ,R
lsp′
a 〉 where:
WFlsp′ :=
⋃
D∈Sub(A)
CD ∪
⋃
D∈Sub(A)
C¬D ∪
⋃
C1 ∪ w1 ∪ {@}
(recall that C1 is the R4-maximal cluster defined in the enumeration
C1, . . . ,Ci and w1 is its dot-world).
Let MFlsp′ := 〈Flsp′ , V3〉 be a model s.t. V3 = V2  WFlsp′ . It is easy to
verify thatMFlsp′ refutes r and Flsp′ is an LSP-frame. Moreover, the number
of worlds fromWFlsp′ is finite and computably bounded by the size of V ar(r)
(cf. item (iii) page 75).
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Theorem 3.3.7 For any inference rule r := A1, . . . , Am/B, if there is a finite
LSP-frame Flsp, whose size is computable from ‖V ar(r)‖ (where V ar(r) is
the set of all the variables occurring in r), and a model Mlsp = 〈Flsp, V 〉 s.t.
Flsp V
∧
1≤i≤n Ai and Flsp 6V B, then r is not admissible for LTK1.
Proof. Suppose that we have an inference rule r := A1, . . . , Am/B, an LSP-
frame Flsp and a model MFlsp := 〈Flsp, S〉 such that Flsp S
∧
1≤i≤n Ai and
Flsp 6S B. Let Prop(WFlsp) := {pw | w ∈ WFlsp} and VAR := Prop(WFlsp) ∪
V ar(r). We define a new valuation S2 for Flsp in the following way:
(i) Dom(S2) = VAR
(ii) ∀pw ∈ Prop(WFlsp)
(
S2(pw) = {w}
)
(iii) ∀x ∈ V ar(r)(S2(x) = S(x))
Clearly the new model 〈Flsp, S2〉 still refutes B, but not any Ai. We construct,
following the procedure explained in Section 3.1, the model ChLTK1(n) :=
〈Ch(n), V 〉, where n = ‖VAR‖. It is easy to see that the model 〈Flsp, S2〉
formerly defined is (isomorphic to) an open submodel of ChLTK1(n). we
shall construct, now, a new definable valuation V2 for Ch(n) refuting r. The
basic idea is finding a way to extend the valuation S2 from Flsp to the whole
frame Ch(n). Recall that by Lemma 3.2.2 we know that each world from
the base set of ChLTK1(n) is definable (recall that for any world w, by β(w)
we denote that particular formula defining w).
Let @ be the name of that world from WFlsp such that:
(i) @4 = {@}
(ii) ∀w ∈ WFlsp
(
(wRe@ or wR4@ or wRa@) ⇒ w = @
)
(See Figure
3.2.)
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Figure 3.2: Scheme of the structure of Ch(n) and the sets Entry and notEntry.
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We define the set of all those worlds from WCh(n) that are not R4-related
to any point from [WFlsp − {@}] (see Figure 3.2), i.e. we set
notEntry := {v | v 6V 34β(w), ∀w ∈ [WFlsp − {@}]}
Let Dots be a subset of WFlsp as defined in Definition 3.3.5, i.e.:
Dots = {wj | wj ∈ [WFlsp − {@}] & ∀z ∈WFlsp (zR4wj ⇒ wj = z)}
Take and fix, for each R4-cluster Cj of worlds from [WFlsp − {@}] − Dots a
representative world zj belonging to Cj . Let Rep be the set containing all
those representative elements.
For each representative world zj from Rep, we shall define, now, an entry-set
(see Figure 3.2). It contains all those worlds v fromWCh(n)−WFlsp which are
R4-predecessors of zj and such that zj is the R4-deepest world belonging
to [WFlsp − Dots] which is R4-accesible from v: ∀zj ∈ Rep
Entry(zj) := {w | w 6∈ WFlsp & w V 34β(zj) & ∀v ∈ [WFlsp −
Dots]
(
(vR4zj & ¬(zjR4v))⇒ w 6V 34β(v)
)} (See Figure 3.2.)
For each representative world zj from Rep, we define a formula φ(zj) that is
true only at those worlds belonging to Entry(zj). ∀zj ∈ Rep:
φ(zj) :=
∧
v∈WFlsp
¬β(v) ∧34β(zj) ∧
∧
v∈WFlsp&vR4zj&¬(zjR4v)
¬34β(v)
It can be easily verified that, given a world v, it belongs to Entry(zj),
for some zj ∈ Rep, if and only if φ(zj) is true at v under V . Recall that for
any zj ∈ Rep, by wj we denote the world from Dots such that zj is one of
its immediate R4-successors.
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To define the valuation V2, let Dom(V2) := VAR;
∀p ∈ VAR, V2(p) :=
⋃
v∈WFlsp&v∈V (p)
V (β(v)) ∪
⋃
v∈notEntry&@∈V (p)
V (β(v)) ∪
⋃
zj∈Rep&zj∈V (p)
V (φ(zj))
Obviously the valuation V2 is definable, in fact, for each p ∈ VAR, there
is a formula αp such that V2(p) = V (αp), namely, ∀p ∈ VAR:
αp :=
∨
v∈WFlsp&v∈V (p)
β(v) ∨
∨
v∈notEntry&@∈V (p)
β(v) ∨
∨
zj∈Rep&zj∈V (p)
φ(zj)
Next step is to show that the inference rule r is not valid in the new
model 〈Ch(n), V2〉. It is sufficient to show that the following claim holds:
for any formula A on LLTK containing only letters from VAR
Flsp S2 A ⇔ Ch(n) V2 A.
Notice that the three statements below follow immediately by the definition
of V2:
(i) ∀w ∈WFlsp (Ch(n), w) V2 A ⇔ (Flsp, w) S2 A (the model 〈Flsp, S2〉
being isomorphic to 〈Flsp, V2〉 which is an open submodel of 〈Ch(n), V2〉);
(ii) ∀zi ∈ Rep, ∀v ∈ Entry(zi) (Ch(n), v) V2 A ⇔ (Flsp, wi) S2 A;
(iii) ∀v ∈ notEntry (Ch(n), v) V2 A ⇔ (Flsp,@) S2 A.
SinceWCh(n) =Wlsp ∪ notEntry ∪
⋃
zj∈Rep Entry(zj), the model 〈Ch(n), V2〉
refutes r.
Corollary 3.3.8 An inference rule r := A1, . . . , Am/B is admissible for LTK1
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if and only if for any LSP-frame F, r is valid in F, i.e. F  A1, . . . , Am
implies F  B.
Corollary 3.3.9 (C. [4]) The logic LTK1 is decidable with respect to infer-
ence rules.
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Chapter 4
The Axiomatic System ASLTK
This Chapter is entirely devoted to the research of an axiomatic system gen-
erating only those theorems belonging to the logic LTK. The work done in
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 is mostly semantical. Summarising we have intro-
duced our logic semantically as the set of all the formulae which are valid
in a particular class of frames and proved it to be decidable with respect
both to its theorems and to its admissible inference rules. This means that
given any formula and any inference rule we are now able to check whether
they belong to LTK or else they are admissible to LTK1 respectively. What
we still lack is an automatic method to generate valid formulae. What we
need is a machine which can produce only those formulae which are theo-
rems of LTK. This implies the switch from the study of semantical aspects
to syntactical ones. And this is exactly the task we aim at fulfilling in the
following pages.
It is clear how helpful it could be having an axiomatic system available
for our purposes. However, several difficulties arise whenever one is to prove
an axiomatic system to be sound and complete with respect to a class of
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multi-modal frames. According to Bennett et al. [2] and Kurucz [44], if there
is no interaction between modalities, a transfer of properties (such as finite
model property, decidability, etc.) from the component simple modal logics
to the newly generated multi-modal system does apply. However, as soon
as such interaction takes place it is not straightforward anymore to prove
that the combined system is conservative with respect to the properties of
its components. In some cases the opposite may apply. Let us consider, for
instance, our specific case. As it will be clear later in this chapter, in order
to axiomatise the behaviour of the modal operator 24 we use an S4.3 modal
system, known to be sound and complete with respect to the class of lin-
ear frames; regarding our epistemic modalities, we use distinct S5 systems,
complete with respect to the the class of frames in which the relation is an
equivalence over worlds (c.f. [3]). These two well known results do imme-
diately transfer if we do not have any interaction between modal operators,
but it is uncertain whether it holds true in case such interaction happens.
In these circumstances, a specific investigation is needed and this may turn
out not to be trivial. Nevertheless, despite such difficulties, interaction be-
tween modalities is necessary to exploit the power of multi-modal languages.
Scheme and Methodology. This Chapter aims at providing the multi-
modal logic LTK (formerly introduced in Chapter 2) with a finite, sound and
complete axiomatisation with interacting modalities.
In Section 4.1 we introduce a set of axiom schemata and inference rules.
The axioms involved are the classic axioms for the calculi S4.3 (temporal
operator), S5 (epistemic modalities) and a few axioms governing the inter-
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action between modalities. The most peculiar axiom in the latter set is our
multi-modal version of the famous one introduced by Dummett and Lem-
mon [16]. After providing few basic syntactical definitions, we proceed by
providing the reader with a justification and an interpretation of the axioms
chosen.
In Section 4.2 we prove our system to be sound with respect to the class
of LTK-frames, meaning that the theorems generated by the system are
valid in every frame of the class. We carry on this relatively easy proof by
by induction on the length of any deduction in the system.
Section 4.3 is devoted to show our completeness results. Due to its
length, this section is divided in four subsections:
4.3.1 We define and construct an n-canonical model for LTKax in which
all the theorems of LTK built up from letters p1, . . . , pn hold true, whereas a
formula B 6∈ LTKax is false. The frame of such model is not an LTK-frame,
the required type, but it is, nevertheless, our starting point.
4.3.2 Here we apply the truth preserving operation of taking a generated
submodel of the canonical model formerly defined. The resulting model is
linear with respect to the temporal relation R4, although not yet of the
sought kind.
4.3.3 We use the technique of filtration to reduce the number of worlds in
our linear model. This is a technique developed by Segerberg [65]. Further
we prove Lemma 4.3.16, which is the core of the whole work (cf. Goldblatt
[26]) and makes a substancial use of our multi-modal version of the axiom
presented by Dummett and Lemmon [16].
4.3.4 After having proved Lemma 4.3.16, it is possible to apply a variant
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of the well known technique of unraveling. This will generate the intended
frame, namely a finite LTK-frame, which enables us to show our result of
completeness: the logic LTKax is characterised by the class of LTK-frames
and thus it coincides with LTK.
Finally, Section 4.4 presents a generalised case of our logic and axiomatic
system. The idea is that if the multi-modal Dummett Axiom is removed
from our system, the logic generated is a general version of LTK, useful to
describe situations in which more than one environment is possible at each
moment in the time line.
As usual, all the results concerning the logic LTK can be transfered to
the systems LTK1, LTK− and LTK−− too.
4.1 Axioms and Rules of ASLTK (Schemata)
The number of axiom schemata we present is not fixed and depends on the
number of agents operating in the system one is to use. In particular al-
though we have a fixed number of axioms regulating the behaviour of the
temporal operator 24, we have as many groups of axioms for the operators
Ki as many the agents operating in the system are. The same holds for the
axioms regulating the interactions between modalities.
Axioms (Schemata)
Axioms of CPC (classical propositional calculus)
K24 : 24(A→ B)→ (24A→ 24B)
T24 : 24A→ A
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424 : 24A→ 2424A
324 : 24(A ∧24A→ B) ∨24(B ∧24B→ A)
KKξ : Kξ(A→ B)→ (KξA→ KξB), ξ ∈ {e, 1, . . . , k}
TKξ : KξA→ A, ξ ∈ {e, 1, . . . , k}
4Kξ : KξA→ KξKξA, ξ ∈ {e, 1, . . . , k}
5Kξ : ¬KξA→ Kξ¬KξA, ξ ∈ {e, 1, . . . , k}
M.1: 24A→ KeA
M.2: KeA→ KiA, 1 ≤ i ≤ k
Dum24 : 24(24(KeA→ 24A)→ KeA)→ (3424A→ 24A)
Inference Rules of ASLTK :
MP :
A, A→ B
B
Nec :
A
24A
It is easy to notice that we can derive a necessitation rule for the modal-
ities Ke,K1, . . . ,Kk by means of the axioms M.1 - M.2 and the rule Nec.
Definition 4.1.1 (Derivation, Deduction, Theoremhood) A deriva-
tion of a formula α from the premises β1, . . . , βj, in symbols β1, . . . , βj `AS
α in an axiomatic system AS is a finite sequence of formulae α1, . . . , αn, α
s.t. each αi is either a premise, or an instance of an axiom schema from AS
or it has been obtained from a sequence of formulae αk1 , . . . , αkm occurring
before αi via application of an inference rule from AS.
A deduction in AS is a derivation with the empty set of premises.
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A formula α is a theorem in AS, denoted by `AS α, if there is a deduction
of α in AS.
Definition 4.1.2 LTKax := {A ∈ Fma(LLTK) | `ASLTK A}.
LTK−ax := LTKax ∩ Fma(L−LTK).
The Meaning of the Axioms. Our axioms for the time modality24 give
rise to an S4.3 modal system, known to be sound and complete with respect
to the class of linear orders (see [3]). Formerly we stated that each agent
operating in the system is provided with a a certain knowledge background.
In order to give a simple account of it, we associate each agent to an S5-
modal system. The assumptions we make are the usual ones:
- Agent i knows A whenever the fact A is provided by all the resources
she/he can access. Thus agents may know only those facts which are pro-
vided by all the sources they have access to;
- Positive Introspection: if someone knows something, she/he is also
aware of it;
- Negative Introspection: if someone ignores something, she/he is aware
of it.
Moreover, we assume each agent to be logicallly omniscient (knowing
both all the tautologies and all the consequences implicit in her/his knowl-
edge base).
The same assumptions appear to be more natural when it comes to model
the behaviour of the environment. In our system, the axioms involving
the environment modality play a central role. In the interaction between
different modalities, the operator Ke works like a bridge connecting the
others, which otherwise would not interact at all. The axioms M.1 and
M.2 state that if something is always true toward the future, then it is also
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true at the current moment/environment (M.1) and hence each agent knows
it (M.2).
More specifically, Axiom M.1 aims at achieving property PM.1, whereas
Axiom M.2 is responsable for PM.2. Axiom Dum24 entails the property
PM.3 in a less evident and straightforward way. However, this is probably
the most interesting one, for it is the one regulating the peculiar relation
linking 24 to Ke. Indeed, as it is made clear by Lemma 4.2.1, axiomDum24
achieves two things:
(i) making temporal and environmental clusters coincide;
(ii) ensuring a discrete order of temporal clusters.
4.2 Soundness
The first thing to verify is to check whether our axiomatic system produces
formulae which are actually true in every LTK-frame. Any axiomatic system
enjoying such property with respect to a class of frames is said to be sound
with respect to the specified class of frames. Thus we start by proving that
the system LTKax is a sound system with respect to the class of LTK-frames:
Theorem 4.2.1 (Soundness) ∀A ∈ Fma(LLTK) (A ∈ LTKax ⇒ A ∈ LTK)
Proof. (by induction on the length of the deduction D = D1, . . . ,Dj of a
theorem A ∈ LTKax). Suppose j = 1, then A is an axiom from ASLTK. We
provide a proof only for the axioms M.1 , M.2 and Dum24 . (a) Suppose
there are an LTK-frame F, a valuation V for F, and a world v ∈ WF such
that (F, v) 1V 24A→ KeA. Then (F, v) V 24A and (F, v) 1V KeA. Hence
for each world z ∈ {t | vR4t}, z V A but there is a world u ∈ {t | vRet}
such that u 1 A. Since by definition {t | vR4t} ⊇ {t | vRet}, this leads to a
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contradiction. Using a similar argument, it can be easily seen that Axiom
M.2 is valid too.
(b) Suppose that Axiom Dum24 is not valid. Then there are an LTK-
frame F, a valuation V for F, and a world v ∈ WF such that (F, v) 1V
24(24(KeA→ 24A)→ KeA)→ (3424A→ 24A), and hence:
(F, v) V 24(24(KeA→ 24A)→ KeA) (4.1)
and
(F, v) 1V (3424A→ 24A) (4.2)
Condition (4.1) implies that ∀z ∈ WF (vR4z ⇒ (F, z) V 24(KeA →
24A)→ KeA). This means that for each R4-successor z of v, at least one of
the following conditions should hold:
(4.1.1): (F, z) 1V 24(KeA → 24A), then there is a world t such that
zR4t & (F, t) V KeA & (F, t) 1V 24A;
(4.1.2): (F, z) V KeA.
Let us analise condition (4.2): if (F, v) 1V (3424A→ 24A), we have that
both of the following conditions (4.2.1) and (4.2.2) must hold:
(4.2.1): (F, v) V 3424A;
(4.2.2): (F, v) 1V 24A;
From condition (4.2.1) and (4.2.2) it follows that there is a world R4-
accessible from v in which A is not true, while there is another point R4-
accessible from v starting from which A holds true everywhere toward the
future. Since each LTK-frame is a linear and discrete order with respect
to R4-clusters, there is a world v2 such that vR4v2 and (F, v2) 1V A and
for each world z2 such that v2R4z2 & ¬(z2R4v2), (F, z2)  A, and hence
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(F, z2)  24A. Trivially, condition (4.1.2) does not hold at v2, for Re is
reflexive.
Then condition (4.1.1) should hold. This implies that there is a world t2 such
that v2R4t2, (F, t2) V KeA and (F, t2) 1V 24A. Hence t2R4v2 (for, by the
way we chose v2, if v2R4t2 and ¬(t2R4v2), we should have (F, t2) V 24A).
Moreover ¬(t2Rev2). However, this is in contradiction with Definition 2.2.3,
for in LTK-frames R4-clusters and Re-clusters should coincide.
Thus, if lg(D) = n+ 1, it can be easily shown that each inference rule pre-
serves validity.
4.3 Semantic Completeness
We now know that any formula generated by LTKax is valid in the class of
LTK-frames. Our goal is thus to show that if a formula B is valid in such
class, then it ought to be generated by the axiomatic system as well. An
achievement of this kind would tell us that the axiomatic system we have
described generates all and only the theorems of LTK: in two words, the
system is sound and complete. In order to achieve this task, we use many
well known techniques such as canonical models, generated subframes and
filtration.
4.3.1 Canonical Models
It is a well known result that any consistent normal k-modal logic L has a
model, called its canonical model, which is characterising for L in the sense
that:
Definition 4.3.1 A model M := 〈W,R1, . . . ,Rk, V 〉 is characterising for a
logic L on a lanaguage L if for any formula A ∈ L (A ∈ L⇔ ∀w ∈W (w V
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A)).
Let us briefly sketch few standard definitions and results.
Definition 4.3.2 Given an axiomatic system AS on a language L, a set
∆ ⊂ Fma(L) is:
(i) AS-consistent iff ∆ 0AS ⊥;
(ii) L-complete iff ∀A ∈ Fma(L) A ∈ ∆ or ¬A ∈ ∆;
(iii) AS-maximal iff ∆ is AS-consistent and L-complete.
Definition 4.3.3 Let L be a consistent normal k-modal logic on a lan-
guage L containing the modal operators 21, . . . ,2k. An n-canonical model
Mcn = 〈W cn,Rc1, . . . ,Rck, V cn 〉 for L is such that:
(i) W cn is the set of all the possible L-maximal sets w.r.t. those formulae
built up from the propositional letters p1, . . . , pn;
(ii) ∀v, z ∈W cn, vRciz ⇐⇒ {A | 2iA ∈ v} ⊆ z, 1 ≤ i ≤ k;
(iii) V cn (pi) = {v ∈W cn | pi ∈ v}, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Lemma 4.3.4 Let L be a consistent normal k-modal logic and let Mcn =
〈W cn,Rc1, . . . ,Rck, V cn 〉 be an n-canonical model for L. Then ∀v ∈W cn, ∀A(p1, . . . , pn) ∈
Fma(L) (2iA ∈ v ⇐⇒ ∀z ∈W cn(vRciz ⇒ A ∈ z)).
Lemma 4.3.5 (Truth Lemma) Let L be a consistent normal k-modal logic
and let Mcn = 〈W cn,Rc1, . . . ,Rck, V cn 〉 be an n-canonical model for L. Then
∀v ∈W cn, ∀A(p1, . . . , pn) ∈ Fma(L)
(Fcn, v) V cn A ⇐⇒ A ∈ v
where Fcn denotes the n-canonical frame on which M
c
n is built.
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Take and fix for the rest of this Chapter a formula B(p1, . . . , pn) 6∈ LTKax.
Hence the set {¬B} is ASLTK-consistent and it follows that there exists an
ASLTK-maximal set w w.r.t. all the formulae built up from p1, . . . , pn such
that B 6∈ w. Therefore there is an n-canonical model Mc := 〈Fcn, V cn 〉 for
LTKax (where Fcn = 〈W cn,Rc4,Rce,Rc1, . . . ,Rck〉) such that w ∈ W cn and, by
Lemma 4.3.5, (Fcn, w) 1V cn B. Although this model shows some interesting
properties, it is not built on an LTK-frame.
However, the binary relations in the n-canonical frame have the following
properties:
(i) Rce, R
c
i are reflexive, symmetric and transitive.
(ii) Rc4 is reflexive, transitive and weakly connected.
(iii) ∀v, z ∈W cn (vRciz ⇒ vRcez).
(iv) ∀v, z ∈ W cn (vRcez ⇒ (vRc4z & zRc4v)). Notice that the opposite
direction does not hold.
In the following sections, we shall apply several truth preserving oper-
ation in order to transform the canonical model we defined into a model
based on an LTK-frame.
4.3.2 Generated Subframes and Models
The first truth operation we apply to our canonical model is taking a gener-
ated submodel. The idea is to consider the world w which we have formerly
isolated as one world in which B is false and reduce the canonical model to
only those worlds which are related to w by means of any relation. The
resulting model would therefore be rooted in the sense that there would be
a first set of worlds, namely the Rc4-cluster to which the world w belongs.
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Let us define the operation of taking subframes and submodels more
formally:
Definition 4.3.6 (Subframe) An n-modal K-frame F = 〈WF,R1, . . . ,Rn〉
is a subframe of an m-modal K-frame S = 〈WS,S1, . . . ,Sm〉 if n = m,
WF ⊆WS and each Ri is the restriction of Si to WF, i.e. Ri = Si WF.
Definition 4.3.7 (Generated subframes and models) An n-modal K-
frame F = 〈WF,R1, . . . ,Rn〉 is a generated subframe of an m-modal K-
frame S = 〈WS,S1, . . . ,Sm〉 (notation F v S) if F is a subframe of S and
∀v ∈ WF ∀z ∈ WS if there is a relation Sj such that vSjz in S, then
z ∈ WF. A model 〈F, V 〉 is a generated submodel of 〈S, S〉 if F v S and V
is the restriction of S to WF (i.e. V = S WF).
Lemma 4.3.8 (Generated subframes) IfM = 〈F, V 〉 is a generated sub-
model of M2 = 〈F2, V2〉, then ∀v ∈WF, (F, v) V A ⇐⇒ (F2, v) V2 A.
Definition 4.3.9 Let F be a Kripke-frame F = 〈WF,S1, . . . ,Sk〉, w a world
w in WF, and Si a partial order on WF. Then the set wSi≤ is the set of all
the worlds Si-accessible from w, i.e. wSi≤ := {z | wSiz}. Likewise the set
wSi< is defined as the set of all the strict successors of w, i.e. wSi< := {z |
wSiz & ¬(zSiw)}.
Given a Si-cluster C, the set of all the Si-clusters it has access to is defined
as CSi≤ := {Cj | CSiCj}. Likewise CSi< := {Cj | CSiCj & ¬(CjSiC)} is the
set of all those Si-clusters which are strictly above with respect to C.
The sets wR4≤ and CR4≤ shall henceforth be referred to as w4 and C4
respectively.
Consider the generated submodel of 〈Fcn, V cn 〉 generated by w4 (recall
that w is that world refuting B in the n-canonical model) and denote it by
4.3. SEMANTIC COMPLETENESS 95
〈Fw4 , V cn 〉. Hence (Fw4 , w) 1V cn B which entails Fw4 1 B. As some formerly
observed facts (items iii and iv in Section 4.3.1) make clear, the base set of
w4 contains also all those worlds which are both Rce- and R
c
i -related to w.
Being then a real generated submodel of the canonical one, all the general
results concerning generated submodels do apply.
As the following lemma will clarify, the generated submodel 〈Fw4 , V cn 〉
shows some interesting properties shared with LTK-frames:
Lemma 4.3.10 Fw4 has the following properties:
(i) The relations Rce,R
c
1, . . . ,R
c
k are equivalence relations;
(ii) The relation Rc4 is reflexive, transitive and connected;
(iii) ∀v, z ∈WF vRcez ⇒ (vRc4z & zRc4v);
(iv) ∀v, z ∈WF vRciz ⇒ vRcez;
Proof. (iii) Suppose ¬(vRc4z). Then there is a formula 24D ∈ v s.t. D 6∈ z.
By Axiom M.1 it follows KeD ∈ v and hence ¬(vRcez). The same case arises if
we assume ¬(zRc4v). (iv) Suppose ¬(vRcez). Then there is a formula KeD ∈ v
s.t. D 6∈ z. By Axiom M.2 it follows KiD ∈ v for each i and hence ¬(vRciz)
4.3.3 Filtration
A good way to achieve the required property of discreteness (i.e. given
any two disctint worlds in a model, there could be only a finite amount of
moments between them) is to make a filtration of the base set of the model
in order to have it finite. This technique can be dated back to the work by
Scott and further developed by Segerberg [65]. Although it is a standard
technique, it requires a careful and appropriate selection of the filtration set.
The well known results concerning this method are recalled below and they
would allow us to show the following:
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Lemma 4.3.11 (Filtration Lemma) ∀D ∈ Γ ∀v ∈W cn (v V cn D ⇔ [v] V Γ
D)
We start by defining the filtration set Γ as the union of several sets:
- Γ0 := Sub(B), where Sub(B) is the set of all the subformulae of B
- Γ1 := Sub{Dum24(D) | D ∈ Γ0} (where the notation Dum24(D) is
intended to denote the instance of the axiom Dum24 by the formula D)
- Γ2 := {Ke24D | 24D ∈ Γ0 ∪ Γ1}
- Γ3 := {KiKeD | KeD ∈ Γ0 ∪ Γ1 ∪ Γ2} for 1 ≤ i ≤ k
Let the filtration set Γ be the union of the formerly defined sets:
Γ := Γ0 ∪ Γ1 ∪ Γ2 ∪ Γ3
Then we define a new relation between worlds as:
∀v, z ∈W cn (v ∼ z ⇔ ∀D ∈ Γ(v V cn D ⇔ z V cn D))
and we generate equivalence classes with respect to the relation ∼:
[v] := {z | v ∼ z}
The Γ-filtered modelMΓ is defined as 〈FΓ, V Γ〉 where FΓ = 〈WΓ,RΓ4,RΓe ,RΓ1 , . . . ,RΓk 〉
and:
(i) WΓ := {[v] | v ∈W cn}
(ii) RΓe and each R
Γ
i are standard S5 filtration relations, i.e.:
[v]RΓξ [z] ⇔ ∀KξD ∈ Γ((Fcn, v) V cn KξD ⇔ (Fcn, z) V cn KξD) for ξ ∈
{e, 1, . . . , k}
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(iii) RΓ4 is a standard S4.3 filtration relation, namely:
[v]RΓ4[z] ⇔ ∀24D ∈ Γ((Fcn, v) V cn 24D ⇒ (Fcn, z) V cn 24D)
(iv) ∀pi ∈ {p1, . . . , pn} V Γ(pi) := {[v] | v ∈ V cn (pi)}
It remains only to show that such model satisfies the two filtration condi-
tions for each binary relation RΓξ :
F1 vRcξz ⇒ [v]RΓξ [z], where ξ ∈ {4, e, 1 . . . k};
F2.1 [v]RΓξ [z] ⇒ ∀KξD ∈ Γ(v V cn KξD ⇒ z V cn D), for ξ ∈ {e, 1 . . . k};
F2.2 [v]RΓ4[z] ⇒ ∀24D ∈ Γ(v V cn 24D ⇒ z V cn D)
Lemma 4.3.12 The following properties hold true in the model MΓ:
(i) The relation RΓe satisfies F1 and F2.1.
(ii) Each relation RΓi satisfies F1 and F2.1.
(iii) The relation RΓ4 satisfies F1 and F2.2.
Proof. (i). F1. Suppose there are two worlds v and z such that vRcez.
Then v V cn KeD ⇒ z V cn D. Since v V cn KeD → KeKeD we have (v V cn
KeD) ⇒ (v V cn KeKeD) ⇒ (z V cn KeD). Suppose (z V cn KeD). Then
(z V cn KeKeD). Since Rce is symmetric by Lemma 4.3.10, we have zRcev and
hence (v V cn KeD). Therefore, by our definition of RΓe , it follows vRΓe z.
F2.1. Suppose [v]RΓe [z]. Then ∀KeD ∈ Γ (v V cn KeD ⇔ z V cn KeD). Since
z V cn KeD→ D we have z V cn D.
The proof of cases (ii) and (iii) is similar.
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Hence by the standard results concerning filtrations, we can state the
following:
Lemma 4.3.13 ∀D ∈ Γ ∀v ∈W cn ((Fcn, v) V cn D ⇔ (FΓ, [v]) V Γ D).
Corollary 4.3.14 (FΓ, [w]) 1V Γ B.
Once more again, we can show that our current Γ-filtered model MΓ is
conservative with respect to the properties stated by Lemma 4.3.10.
Lemma 4.3.15 In the model MΓ the following holds:
(i) RΓe and each R
Γ
i are reflexive, symmetric and transitive.
(ii) RΓ4 is reflexive, transitive and connected.
(iii) ∀[v], [z] ∈WΓ ([v]RΓe [z] ⇒ ([v]RΓ4[z] & [z]RΓ4[v])).
(iv) ∀[v], [z] ∈WΓ ([v]RΓi [z] ⇒ [v]RΓe [z]).
Proof. (i) Trivially (v V cn KeD) ⇔ (v V cn KeD). Hence [v]RΓe [v] and RΓe
is reflexive.
Suppose [v]RΓe [z] and [z]R
Γ
e [u]. Hence (v V cn KeD) ⇔ (z V cn KeD) and
(z V cn KeD) ⇔ (u V cn KeD), which entails (v V cn KeD) ⇔ (u V cn KeD).
Hence [v]RΓe [u].
Suppose [v]RΓe [z]. Then (v V cn KeD) ⇔ (z V cn KeD) and hence (z V cn
KeD) ⇔ (v V cn KeD) which means [z]RΓe [v].
(ii) For the properties of reflexivity and transitivity see the previous case.
Since by F1 (vRc4z) implies ([v]R
Γ
4[z]) and R
c
4 is connected (see Lemma
4.3.15), it follows that RΓ4 is connected.
(iii) Suppose [v]RΓe [z] and either ¬([v]RΓ4[z]) or ¬([z]RΓ4[v]). If ¬([v]RΓ4[z]),
then there is a formula 24D ∈ Γ such that v V cn 24D and z 1V cn 24D.
By Axiom 424 it follows v V cn 2424D, hence by Axiom M.1 we have
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v V cn Ke24D. But Ke24D ∈ Γ by construction1, therefore since [v]RΓe [z] we
have z V cn Ke24D and, by reflexivity, z V cn 24D, which is a contradiction.
We reach a similar contradiction if we assume ¬([z]RΓ4[v]).
(iv) Suppose [v]RΓi [z] for some i and ¬([v]RΓe [z]). Then there is a formula
KeD ∈ Γ s.t. v V cn KeD and z 1V cn KeD. Again, by the axioms 4Ke and M.2
we obtain v V cn KiKeD. The formula KiKeD belongs to Γ by construction2,
therefore, given [v]RΓi [z], we have z V cn KiKeD and, by reflexivity, z V cn KeD,
which gives rise to a contradiction.
Properties of filtered relations. From Lemma 4.3.15 follows that the
new binary relations possess certain properties, namely all the knowledge
modalities are reflexive, symmetric and transitive, whereas the time relation
is connected as well as reflexive and transitive.
Both properties PM.1 and PM.2 hold true:
∀v, z ∈WΓ (vRΓe z ⇒ (vRΓ4z & zRΓ4v))
which means that two information points (worlds) are simultaneous when-
ever they are from the same environment. But this is something we were
able to state even in the previous stages of our construction. The main
achievement is that now we have a very important property. In fact, since
the base set of the filtered frame is finite, trivially the time relation RΓ4 gives
rise to a discrete linear order of temporal (RΓ4-) clusters, which in this con-
text means that given any two distinct worlds, there is only a finite number
1 Indeed if 24D ∈ Γ, then there are only two possibilities: either 24D ∈ Γ0 or 24D ∈ Γ1
and in both cases Ke24D ∈ Γ2 and hence it belongs to Γ as well.
2 IIn fact if KeD ∈ Γ, then either KeD ∈ Γ0 or KeD ∈ Γ1 or else KeD ∈ Γ2; hence
KiKeD ∈ Γ3 and it belongs to Γ as well.
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of moments between them.
However we do not have the property PM.3 yet:
∀v, z ∈WΓ ((vRΓ4z & zRΓ4v) ⇒ vRΓe z)
In other words in this frame we may have RΓ4-proper clusters of R
Γ
e -clusters,
which in our intended interpretation means that it can be the case that
two points, though at the same moment of the flow of time could belong
to different environments (see Figure 4.1). Unfortunately, this is not the
case for LTK-frames, therefore another transformation seems to be neces-
sary to prove our axiomatic system to be complete with respect to these
structures. To achieve this goal, we will construct another frame. The idea
is to unravel each RΓ4-proper cluster, without using the standard technique
of bulldozing, which would give rise to an infinite, but not discrete (with
respect to temporal clusters) frame (cf. Blackburn et al. [3], pages 220–222
and Segerberg [65]). In other words we will define a well ordering on RΓe -
clusters inside each RΓ4-proper cluster, in order to construct a new frame.
Such frame will be obtained by substituting each RΓ4-proper cluster with the
finite ordered line formerly defined. The only troubling case is for formulae
of the form 24D from Sub(B). There could be, for example, a world v in an
RΓ4-proper cluster such that it falsifies 24D and another world, say z which
is the only point RΓ4-accessible from v falsifying D. If such world z belonged
to the same RΓ4-proper cluster as v and it were not R
Γ
4-accessible from v
in the new unravelled frame, then we would have a lack of truth values for
formulae from Sub(B). However this situation is made impossible by the
subsequent lemma, stating that whenever a world v in an RΓ4-proper cluster
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falsifies 24D, D is falsified either in the same environment-cluster to which
v belongs, or in another world z which is strictly above with respect to v,
i.e. vRΓ4z & ¬(zRΓ4v).
Lemma 4.3.16 ∀24D ∈ Sub(B)∀v ∈ WΓ if v 1V Γ 24D and v is not final,
then there is a world z ∈ WΓ s.t. vRΓ4z, z 1V Γ D and either vRΓe z or
¬(zRΓ4v).
Proof. Suppose there are a formula 24D ∈ Sub(B) and a non final world
v such that v 1V Γ 24D. There are only two possible cases.
Case 1. v V Γ 3424D. Hence, since the instance of Axiom Dum24
with respect to the formula D is true in the modelMΓ (for the way we defined
Γ, and in particular Γ1), we have v 1V Γ 24(24(KeD→ 24D)→ KeD), and
then v V Γ 34(24(KeD→ 24D) ∧3e¬D).
Therefore there exists a world z such that:
(vRΓ4z) & (z V Γ 24(KeD→ 24D) ∧3e¬D) (4.3)
Let us suppose by contradiction that
(i) The formula D is true in each world from the RΓe -cluster of v, i.e.
∀t ∈WΓ (vRΓe t ⇒ t V Γ D).
(ii) There is not any world strictly above w.r.t. v in which D is false, i.e.
∀t ∈WΓ (vRΓ4t & ¬(tRΓ4v) ⇒ t V Γ D).
From (b) and (4.3) follows that zRΓ4v. By (4.3) we also have z V Γ
24(KeD → 24D), hence v V Γ KeD → 24D. But from (a) follows that
v V Γ KeD, therefore v V Γ 24D, which is a contradiction.
Case 2. v 1V Γ 3424D. Hence v V Γ 2434¬D. This implies that D
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Figure 4.1: Scheme of the structure of the frame FΓ: a finite generalised
reflexive LTK-balloon.
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is false at least in some world from the final RΓ4-cluster and such world is
strictly above w.r.t. v, which is non final by assumption.
4.3.4 Completeness
We are now approaching the final step of our proof. Consider the frame FΓ.
(i) Fix a well ordering C1, . . . ,Cf among RΓ4-clusters such that i < l if
and only if (CiRΓ4Cm)&¬(CmRΓ4Ci).
(ii) Fix some well ordering among RΓe -clusters inside any R
Γ
4-cluster, so
that each RΓe -cluster would be taken once and only once.
Hence each single world from the base set of FΓ would be displayed as 〈vj , i〉,
meaning that v belongs to the j-th RΓe -cluster inside the i-th R
Γ
4-cluster.
Given that the number of RΓ4-clusters is f , we stipulate that the index f
denotes that a world 〈vj , f〉 belongs to the final RΓ4-cluster Cf .
(iii) Define a new frame S = 〈WS,S4,Se,S1, . . . ,Sk〉 in the following
way:
- WS =
⋃
v∈WΓ〈vj , i〉;
- 〈vj , i〉Sξ〈zm, l〉 ⇐⇒ vRΓξ z, for 1 ≤ ξ ≤ k;
- 〈vj , i〉Se〈zm, l〉 ⇐⇒ i = l & j = m;
- 〈vj , i〉S4〈zm, l〉 ⇐⇒ (j ≤ m & i = l) or i < l or l = f, i.e. z is RΓ4-final;
(iv) Let MS = 〈S, V S〉 be a model such that ∀p ∈ {p1, . . . , pn} V S(p) =
{〈vj , i〉 | v ∈ V Γ(p)}. Then clearly the following holds:
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Lemma 4.3.17 ∀D ∈ Sub(B)∀v ∈WΓ ((FΓ, v) V Γ D ⇔ (S, 〈vj , i〉) V S
D).
Proof. (i) (By induction on the length of D). Trivially, if lg(D) = 1, D
has the form p, v ∈ V Γ(p) and hence 〈vj , i〉 ∈ V S(p). Therefore 〈vj , i〉 V S p.
Suppose D has the form KeA. Then v V Γ KeA if and only if ∀z ∈WΓ (vRΓe z ⇒ z V Γ
A). By inductive hypothesis (IH) for any z such that vRΓe z we have 〈zm, l〉 V S
A. Since vRΓe z implies that both v and z belong to the same R
Γ
4- and R
Γ
e -
clusters, it follows i = l and j = m, and hence 〈vj , i〉Se〈zm, l〉, which means
〈vj , i〉 V S KeA.
Suppose 〈vj , i〉 1V S 24A. Then there is a world 〈zm, l〉 such that 〈vj , i〉S4〈zm, l〉
and 〈zm, l〉 1V S A. This means that either i < l, or (i = l & j ≤ m) or
else l = f. Each of these cases implies vRΓ4z. By IH we have z 1V Γ A and
therefore v 1V Γ 24A.
(ii) Assume v 1V Γ 24A. Suppose v is not RΓ4-final. Then, by lemma
4.3.16, there is a world z such that vRΓ4z, z 1V Γ A and either vRΓe z or
¬(zRΓ4v). If vRΓe z, it follows that both v and z have the same indices for
the RΓ4- and R
Γ
e -clusters they belong to, i.e. they are displayed as 〈vi, j〉 and
〈zi, j〉. Hence 〈vi, j〉S4〈zi, j〉. By IH 〈zi, j〉 1V S A and therefore 〈vi, j〉 1V S
24A. Else if ¬(zRΓ4v), given that the worlds v and z are displayed as 〈vj , i〉
and 〈zm, l〉, it follows that i < l, and hence 〈vj , i〉S4〈zm, l〉. Again, by IH
we have 〈zm, l〉 1V S A and therefore 〈vj , i〉 1V S 24A. Finally suppose v is
RΓ4-final. Then there is a world z which is R
Γ
4-final as well and it is such
that vRΓ4z and z 1V Γ A. Since z is displayed as 〈zm, f〉, it follows that
〈vj , f〉S4〈zm, f〉. By IH 〈zm, f〉 1V S A and therefore 〈vj , f〉 1V S 24A.
4.3. SEMANTIC COMPLETENESS 105
Corollary 4.3.18 S 1V S B
The frame S has the structure depicted in Figure 4.2. This frame has
the structure of a reflexive LTK-balloon.
Whenever the S4-final cluster of our model is an S4-proper cluster of
Se-clusters (i.e. not simple), the frame we have obtained is not an LTK-
frame. We recall that these frames have no S4-proper clusters of Se-clusters
inside, and hence our final construction cannot be considered as a member
of such class. However, this is not a problem, for it follows from [4] and [9]
that these structures are nothing but p-morphic images of LTK-frames.
Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, we present an explicit way
to turn our formerly obtained frame to an LTK-frame. This will be done
by applying a variant of the well known bulldozing technique developed by
Segerberg in [65]. We aim at substituting the final S4-proper cluster with
an infinite, linear and discrete sequence of Se-clusters in a truth preserving
way.
We proceed as follows:
(i) Define for each world 〈vj , i〉 a new collection of worlds as follows,
where Ci denotes the S4-cluster generated by 〈vj , i〉:
〈vj , i〉+ :=
 {〈vj , i, ∅〉} if Ci is simple w.r.t. Se-clusters{〈vj , i, h〉 | h = 1, 2, . . .} otherwise
Notice that if if Ci is simple w.r.t. Se-clusters, it contains at most 1 Se-
cluster and hence it is not S4-final.
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Figure 4.2: Scheme of the structure of S: a case of reflexive LTK-balloon.
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(ii) Define a new frame F := 〈WF,R4,Re,R1, . . . ,Rk〉 as:
- WF :=
⋃
〈vj ,i〉∈WS ∪〈vj , i〉+
- 〈vj , i, h〉Rξ〈zm, l〉 ⇐⇒ (j = m) & (i = l) & (h = o) & 〈vj , i〉Sξ〈zm, l〉,
for 1 ≤ ξ ≤ k
- 〈vj , i, h〉Re〈zm, l, o〉 ⇐⇒ (j = m) & (i = l) & (h = o)
- 〈vj , i, h〉R4〈zm, l, o〉 ⇐⇒

(j ≤ m) & (i = l) & (h = o) or
(h, o 6= ∅) & (h < o) or
(h = o = ∅) & (i < l) or
(h = ∅) & (o 6= ∅)
(iii) Define a new model M := 〈F, V 〉 with the following valuation V :
∀p ∈ {p1, . . . , pn} V (p) := {〈vj , i, h〉 | 〈vj , i〉 ∈ V S(p)}.
This operation is clearly truth preserving, and therefore we can state the
following:
Theorem 4.3.19 ∀B ∈ Fma(LLTK) if B 6∈ LTKax then there is an LTK-
frame F such that F 1 B.
Corollary 4.3.20 (Soundness and Completeness, C. and Rybakov [11])
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(i) LTKax = LTK
(ii) LTK−ax = LTK
−
(iii) LTK−−ax = LTK
−−
Corollary 4.3.21 LTK1ax (the version of LTKax with only one agent operat-
ing in the system) has the effective finite model property and it is decidable
w.r.t. admissible inference rules.
4.4 A General Case: GLTK
So far we have presented a semantic framework for reasoning about time and
knowledge which can be useful whenever the flow of time is considered as
linear and discrete and only one situation (environment) is possible at each
moment. However, we might be interested in generalising such an approach
and presenting a system based on more general theoretical assumptions. A
generalised LTK-frame can be thought as a structure which is identical to an
LTK-frame except for the fact that it allows distinct environment-clusters to
be concurrent (see Figure 4.3)3. This aspect may result of use whenever we
aim at reasoning about simultaneous alternatives to a given state of affairs
without assuming the time as branching.
The logic GLTK generated by this class of generalised frames can be
easily proven to be decidable with respect to its theorems.
To prove this claim it is sufficient merely to modify our previous proof
in the following way:
(i) Let ASGLTK be an axiomatic system obtained by deleting Axiom
Dum24 from ASLTK and let GLTKax be the set of theorems generated by
3Following the terminology previously used, a generalized LTK-frame can be under-
stood as an LTK-frame lacking the property PM.3.
4.4. A GENERAL CASE: GLTK 109
ASGLTK.
(ii) Trivially, delete part (b) from Theorem 4.2.1;
(iii) Change the filtration set Γ to Γ− := Γ0 ∪ Γ−2 ∪ Γ−3 where:
- Γ0 := Sub(B)
- Γ−2 := {Ke24D | 24D ∈ Γ0}
- Γ−3 := {KiKeD | KeD ∈ Γ0 ∪ Γ−2 } for 1 ≤ i ≤ k
At the end of the process of filtration, we obtain a model based on a
finite generalised LTK-frame.
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Figure 4.3: Scheme of the structure of a generalized LTK-frame.
Chapter 5
Rules in LTK1: Structural
Incompleteness
In this last Chapter we shall analyse both syntactical and semantic aspects
of inference rules. From the results presented in the previous chapters, it
follows that we are now able to recognise both theorems and admissible in-
ference rules for the logic LTK1. In this Chapter we shall describe our last
result, namely that the logic LTK1 is not structurally complete. Intuitively
this means that there are rules which are not syntactically derivable, but
these same rules are, nevertheless, admissible. Thus, there are rules which
are valid in LTK1 even though it is not possible to derive them in its ax-
iomatic system. Moreover, there is an infinite number of these rules. We
shall define an infinite class of admissible and not derivable rules. This re-
sult is important in order to shorten derivations in LTK1ax. In fact since all
these rules are valid, they may be applied in syntactical derivations without
altering the set of theorems of LTK1.
In the previous chapters, we used only Kripke (or Relational) Semantics.
As we have pointed out in Chapter 2, however, this is not the only semantic
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tool developed for modal logics. Historically it is Algebraic Semantics, in
fact, the first semantic framework which has been introduced. The algebraic
analysis of modal logics provides many well known results which can be
also applied to our specific case. We shall therefore introduce algebraic
semantics tools in order to translate the results we have obtained in this
new framework. Moreover we shall clarify all the links which occur between
Algebraic and Relational semantics. This shall put our results on a wider
framework.
In this Chapter we shall use all the results described in the previous
chapters, which are briefly summarised below:
- Chapter 2. The logic LTK has the effective finite model property (cf.
Theorem 2.3.2). This means that both LTK and LTK1 are decidable with
respect to their theorems. In fact, given any formula in the language of these
two logics, if this formula is not a theorem, then this formula is not valid in
some finite model whose size is computable. As we shall see further in this
Chapter, this result shall be used in order to check whether some rules are
derivable in LTK1ax.
- Chapter 3. We designed an algorithm to recognise admissible inference
rules. In particular for any inference rule which is not admissible for LTK1
there is a finite and computable counter-model (Theorem 3.3.6). We shall
use this result in order to check whether some of the rules we shall introduce
in this Chapter are admissible or not.
- Chapter 4. We provided a sound and complete axiomatic system for
both LTK and LTK1 (Theorem 4.3.19). This result shall be always used in
this Chapter, as we shall describe the links occurring between syntax and
semantics concerning inference rules.
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Summary and Methodology. This Chapter is divided in three sections.
Section 5.1 Derivable and Admissible rules. Here we formally de-
fine the notion of derivability related to inference rules. A rule is derivable
inside an axiomatic system whenever one can derive its conclusion assuming
its premisses. For any logic, derivability implies admissibility, whereas the
converse does not always apply. We shall define an infinite class of admis-
sible though not derivable rules for our logic LTK1. Thus in our case the
set of derivable rules is a proper subset of the one of admissible rules. This
implies that LTK1 is structurally incomplete. In order to show this result we
shall first define recursively an infinite class of rules. Then, in Lemma 5.1.4,
we show that all the rules just introduced are admissible for LTK1. We show
this by using the results provided in Chapter 3, Theorem 3.3.6. Further, we
define a specific reflexive LTK1-balloon. We use this model to prove all the
lemmas which follow. In particular, in Lemma 5.1.8 we show that none of
the rules introduced is derivable on LTK1ax. From this Lemma and Lemma
5.1.4 we can conclude that LTK1 is not structurally complete.
Section 5.2 Algebraic Semantics. Since Algebraic Semantics is his-
torically the first type of semantics which has been developed to deal with
modal logics, this Section is devoted to the analysis of the tools and results
it provides.
- We shall first touch upon the basic concepts of algebraic semantics for
propositional multi-modal logics by providing the basics of algebraic seman-
tics, as the concepts of algebra, matrixes, valuations et c..
- We turn then our attention to the definition of the so called Tarski-
Lindenbaum algebras, special algebraic constructions which play a role anal-
ogous to canonical models in Kripke Semantics. In order to do so, we start
by giving definitions and defining truth preserving operations on algebras,
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i.e. homomorphisms, isomorphisms, generated subalgebras and the relations
occurring between such constructs.
- Here we introduce the Stone’s Representation theorems which link Kripke-
frames to algebraic structures and vice versa. In order to do so the definitions
of lattices, filters and ultrafilters plus some additional well known results are
needed.
- Finally we introduce some well known results which link inference rules to
quasi-identities and we apply these results to our case.
Section 5.3 Further work. We shall describe here the piece of re-
search we are currently working on. We start to investigate the problem of
finding a finite basis for admissible inference rules. In fact, we aim at find-
ing a set of rules to axiomatise all the inference rules admissible for LTK1,
i.e. the smallest set of rules starting from which one can derive all the ad-
missible rules for LTK1. This topic, as we shall see, is rather problematic
and it is currently an open research field. We introduce the reader to the
problems related to such investigation and we show our attempts to solve
these problems.
5.1 Derivable and Admissible Rules
When facing an axiomatic system, one is usually interested in varying either
its axioms or its inference rules while keeping the set of generated theorems
consistent. The problem of how to vary the set of inference rules, however,
does not admit a general and straightforward solution. Nevertheless having
a larger number of applicable inference rules is extremely useful in order to
shorten derivations.
In Chapter 3 we have designed an algorithm which recognises admissible
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rules for the logic LTK1. In this Chapter we would rather turn our attention
to some syntactic aspects related to the study of inference rules. As we
have already seen in Chapter 3, the class of admissible rules is the set of
all those inferences under which a logic is closed, i.e. the set of all those
rules which can be implemented for a given logic without altering its set
of theorems. Thus the notion of admissible rules of a logic is invariant in
the sense that it does not depend on the choice of the axiomatic system one
uses. This notion is extremely general and comprehensive and should not be
confused with the syntactical concept of derivable rules. From an intuitive
point of view, a rule is derivable in an axiomatic system whenever there is a
derivation of its conclusions given its premisses as assumptions. This means
that a rule is derivable in the axiomatic system AS of a logic L if:
(i) there is a derivation of its conclusion assuming its premisses
(ii) the derivation is carried out using only axioms and rules from the
axiomatic system itself. More formally this is:
Definition 5.1.1 (Derivability) Given a logic L generated by the axiomatic
system AS, an inference rule r = A1, . . . , An/B is derivable in AS (in symbols
`AS r) if A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An `AS B.
The collection of all the rules derivable in a logic depends on the choice
of the axiomatic system one uses. In fact the set of derivable rules of a
logic changes according to which axiomatic system one choses in order to
axiomatise the logic itself. Clearly each derivable rule is also admissible by
definition. On the other hand the set of admissible rules for a logic contains
all the rules under which the logic itself is closed. The set of derivable rules
of a logic is, therefore, a subset of the class of all the rules admitted by the
logic itself. Hence derivability implies admissibility, whereas the converse
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might not apply.
In some systems the set of derivable rules and the one of admissible rules
coincide. We call these logics structurally complete as they are, in some
sense, self contained. If a logic is structurally complete, then any admissible
rule can be derived in its axiomatic system. More formally this is:
Definition 5.1.2 A logic L generated by an axiomatic system AS is struc-
turally complete if and only if for any inference rule r which is admissible
for L, `AS r.
For many logics, however, the set of derivable rules is a proper subset
of the class of admissible rules. These logics admit rules which are not
syntactically derivable. For instance Harrop (see [32]) discovered that the
Intuitionistic Propositional Calculus IPC admits rules which are not deriv-
able in the system itself: this system is not structurally complete. This
extremely interesting result led a great deal of research in the area.
In this Chapter we shall give an answer to the question whether LTK1 is
structurally complete.
As we have anticipated, many well known logics admit rules which are
not derivable in their axiomatic systems. We shall show that the system
LTK1 is no exception and that it actually admits an infinite number of
rules which are not derivable in its axiomatic system. Before turning our
attention to the analysis of these rules, however, we would provide some
technical details we shall use in what follows. The following Lemma shows
that if a rule has the specific structure described below, than such a rule is
admissible for LTK1.
Lemma 5.1.3 Any inference rule with a structure as 34x→ (3ey∧3e¬y)/¬x
is admissible for LTK1.
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Proof. Suppose by contradiction that a rule r := 34x→ (3ey∧3e¬y)/¬x
is not admissible for LTK1. Then by Theorem 3.3.6 there is a finite LSP-
frame F (cf. Definition 3.3.5), a valuation V for F and a world v such that
F V 34A → (3eB ∧ 3e¬B) and (F, v) 6 ¬A, i.e. (F, v)  A. Since the
dot-world d associated to v is R4-related to v, it follows that (F, d) V 34A
and therefore (F, d)  3eB ∧3e¬B. Since, by definition of F, the world d is
a single element Re-cluster, we reach a contradiction.
We shall now recursively define an infinite class of rules in the language
of LTK1. For any n ∈ N, let φ(n) be the following formula:
1. φ1 := x1 ∧34(24¬x1)
2. φn+1 := xn+1 ∧34(24¬xn+1 ∧ φn)
Let
r0 :=
24(34Kex0 ∧34Ke¬x0)→ (3ey ∧3e¬y)
¬24(34Kex0 ∧34Ke¬x0)
rn :=
34φn → (3ey ∧3e¬y)
¬φn
Let R := {r0} ∪ {rn | n ∈ N}.
Lemma 5.1.4 Any inference rule from the set R is admissible in LTK1.
Proof. According to Theorem 3.3.6 (page 73), an inference rule r = A1, . . . , An/B
is admissible in LTK1 if and only if for any model M based on a finite LSP-
frame the following implication holds: if M  A1, . . . , An then M  B.
(i) Suppose by contradiction that r0 is not admissible for LTK1. From
Theorem 3.3.6 it follows that there are a finite LSP-frame F, a valuation V for
F and a world v such that F V 24(34Kep0 ∧34Ke¬p0)→ (3et ∧3e¬t)
and (F, v) 6 ¬24(34Kep0 ∧ 34Ke¬p0). The last condition implies that
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(F, v)  24(34Kep0 ∧34Ke¬p0). In particular in the maximal R4-cluster
(of depth 1) there ought to be two Re-clusters C1 and C2 such that C1 
Kep0 and C2  Ke¬p0. If d is the name of the dot-world associated to v
(i.e. that single element Re-cluster which is an immediate R4-predecessor of
v), it follows that (F, d) V 24(34Kep0 ∧ 34Ke¬p0) and since (F, d) V
24(34Kep0∧34Ke¬p0)→ (3et∧3e¬t) we obtain (F, d) V (3et∧3e¬t),
which is contradictory to the fact that d is a single-element Re-cluster.
(ii) Any rule rn ∈ R has a structure like the one described in Lemma
5.1.3 and it is, therefore, admissible for LTK1.
We shall now construct a specific LTK1-balloon we shall use in the fol-
lowing lemmas. Let F be any finite LTK1-balloon such that:
(i) dp(F) = 2n+ 1 for some n ≥ 1;
(ii) ∀w ∈ |F| if dp(w) is EVEN, then Ce(w) := {w};
(iii) ∀w ∈ |F| if dp(w) is ODD, then ‖⋃Ce(w)‖ ≥ 2;
(iv) There are at least 2 Re-clusters of depth 1.
Let C11, . . . ,C
1
m be an enumeration of all the Re-cluster of depth 1. For
each Re-cluster C1i of depth 1, let wi(1, 1), . . . , wi(1, l) be an enumeration of
all the worlds it contains.
For any Re-cluster whose depth is i, where i ≥ 2, define a well ordering of
the worlds it contains. Display any world as w(i,m), meaning that w(i,m)
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is the m-th world of depth i.
Let t, p0, p1, . . . , pn be some propositional letters.
Define a model on F as follows:
• V (t) := {w(i,m) | i and m are ODD }
• V (p0) := {w | dp(w) = 1 & w ∈ C11}
• ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n V (pi) := {w | dp(w) = 2i+ 1}
The variable occurring in the rule rn from R are exactly y, x0, x1, . . . , xn.
Fix a mapping f : V ar(rn) 7→ {t, p0, p1, . . . , pn} such that:
• f(y) = t
• f(xi) = pi for 0 ≤ i ≤ n.
Please refer to Figure 5.1 for a graphical representation of this model.
Lemma 5.1.5 In the model 〈F, V 〉 as depicted in Figure 5.1 the following
holds:
∀m∀w w V φm ⇔ dp(w) = 2m+ 1
Proof. (i) The right direction of the implication is easy. Suppose w V
φm; it follows that w V pm ∧ 34(24¬pm ∧ φm−1). This implies that
w ∈ V (pm) and hence dp(w) = 2m+ 1 by definition of V .
(ii) Suppose dp(w) = 2m+ 1. By induction on m:
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Figure 5.1: Scheme of the model 〈F, V 〉 based on a LTK1-balloon used in Lemmas 5.1.5,
5.1.6, 5.1.8 and 5.1.7.
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(a) m = 1. Then dp(w) = 3 and w V p1. Moreover, by construction,
w V 3424¬p1 and therefore w V φ1.
(b) m = j + 1. Then dp(w) = 2(j + 1) + 1 = 2j + 3. By definition of
V we get w V pj+1 and for any world v such that wR4v and ¬(vR4w)
(i.e. dp(w) > dp(v)) we have v V 24¬pj+1. By assumption we have that
dp(w) ≥ 5 and then by IH there is a world z such that dp(z) = 2j + 1,
dp(z) ≥ 3 and z V φj . Since dp(z) < dp(w) (i.e. wR4z) it follows that
z V φj ∧ 24¬pj+1 and hence w V 34(φj ∧ 24¬pj+1). Therefore w V
φj+1
Lemma 5.1.6 In the model 〈F, V 〉 as depicted in Figure 5.1 the following
holds: ∀w∀z if dp(w) = 2m+ 1 and dp(z) ≥ 2m+ 1 then z V 34φm.
Lemma 5.1.7 In the model 〈F, V 〉 as depicted in Figure 5.1 the following
holds: for any subframe Fi generated by a world w such that dp(w) = i and
i is even Fi  I(σ(rm)) for any m.
Proof. By induction on n.
(i) n = 1, then the depth of Fi is 3. Hence the only possible case is the
frame F2 generated by a world w of depth 2. By induction on m.
(a) m = 1. Suppose F2 6 I(σ(r1)), then there are a valuation S and a world
w such that F2 S 24(34φ1 → (3et ∧ 3e¬t)) and (F2, w) 6S ¬φ1. Then
w S φ1 and by Lemma 5.1.5 we have dp(w) = 3 which is in contradiction
with the assumption that F has depth 2.
(b) m = k+ 1. Suppose F2 6 I(σ(rk+1)). Again this implies that there are
a valuation S and a world w such that F2 S 24(34φk+1 → (3et∧3e¬t))
and (F2, w) 6S ¬φk+1. Then w S φk+1 and by Lemma 5.1.5 we have
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dp(w) = 2k+3. Since 2k+3 ≥ 5, this is in contradiction with the assumption
that F has depth 2.
(ii) n = j+1. We consider here only the subframe generated by a world
w of depth 2j+2 as the other cases can be easily shown using our inductive
hypothesis.
By induction on m.
(a) m = 1. Suppose F2j+2 6 I(σ(r1)), then there are a valuation S and a
world w such that F2j+2 S 24(34φ1 → (3et∧3e¬t)) and (F2, w) 6S ¬φ1.
Then w S φ1 and by Lemma 5.1.5 we have dp(w) = 3. Since F2j+2 is
deep at least 4, there is a world v of depth 4 wich is, by construction,
a single element Re-cluster. Clearly v S 34φ1 and v 6S (3et ∧ 3e¬t)
which is in contradiction with the assumption that F2j+2 S 24(34φ1 →
(3et ∧3e¬t)).
(b) m = k + 1. Suppose F2j+2 6 I(σ(rk+1)), then there are a valuation
S and a world w such that F2j+2 S 24(34φk+1 → (3et ∧ 3e¬t)) and
(F2, w) 6S ¬φk+1. Then w S φk+1 and by Lemma 5.1.5 we have dp(w) =
2k+3, meaning that w is odd. Since F2j+2 is generated by an even world, this
means that there must be a world of depth 2k + 4 which is an immediate
R4-predecessor of w and whose depth is even. Again, consider such v:
this world generates, by construction, a single element Re-cluster. Clearly
v S 34φk+1 and v 6S (3et ∧ 3e¬t) which is in contradiction with the
assumption that F2j+2 S 24(34φk+1 → (3et ∧3e¬t)).
Remark. In the light of Definition 5.1.1, we can derive the following dou-
ble implication: for any inference rule r := A1, . . . , An/B, for any logic L
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generated by the axiomatic system AS,
`AS r ⇔ (A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An) `AS B
In any normal modal logic, this means that r is derivable if and only if the
implication 2(A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An) → B is a theorem of the logic itself1. In the
case of LTK1, this implication would be just 24(A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An) → B as the
modal operator 24 is the strongest modality as defined by the axioms2.
Given a rule r := A1, . . . , An/B, we shall henceforth refer to the implication
24(A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An) → B as I(r)3. The implication I(r) is hence the implica-
tion associated to r. This implies that in LTK1 in order to prove that an
inference rule is derivable it is sufficient to show that the implication I(r) is
a theorem of LTK1. As LTK1 has the efmp (see Chapter 2, Theorem 2.3.2),
it is enough to show that the assumption that I(r) is falsified by some finite
reflexive LTK1-balloon leads to a contradiction.
Lemma 5.1.8 In the model 〈F, V 〉 as depicted in Figure 5.1 the following
holds: for any submodel 〈Fi, V 〉 generated by a world w such that dp(w) = i
and i is odd, (Fi, w) 6V I(σ(rm)) for m = i−12 .
Proof. By induction on n where 2n+ 1 is the depth of the frame F.
(i) n = 1, then F has depth 3. We can have only two cases: the submodel
generated by a world of depth 1 and the one generated by a world of depth
3. For both cases we should show that Fi 6V I(σ(rm)) for m = i−12 .
1cf. Troelstra and Schwichtenberg [68], page 285.
2As we have stated in Chapter 4, page 87, necessitation rules for the modal operators
Ke,Ka can be derived by means of the necessitation rule for 24 and the axioms M.1 and
M.3.
3Notice that in following lemmas we might sometimes use I(σ(r)). This means that
we take under consideration the implication associated to the inference rule r under the
substitution σ.
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(a) dp(F1) = 1. Clearly we only have to show that I(σ(r0)) := 24(24(34Kep0∧
34Ke¬p0) → (3et ∧ 34¬t) → ¬24(34Kep0 ∧ 34Ke¬p0)) does not hold.
Notice that 〈F1, V 〉 is the R4-maximal part of 〈F, V 〉. Trivially F1 V
3et ∧ 34¬t by construction, then F1 V 24(24(34Kep0 ∧ 34Ke¬p0) →
(3et ∧ 34¬t)) holds. Moreover F1 V 34Kep0 ∧ 34Ke¬p0, then F1 V
24(34Kep0∧34Ke¬p0) and hence F1 6V ¬24(34Kep0∧34Ke¬p0); there-
fore F1 6V I(σ(r0)).
(b) dp(F3) = 3. We should now show that I(σ(r1)) does not hold in the
model, where I(σ(r1)) := 24(34φ1 → (3et ∧ 3e¬t)) → ¬φ1. By Lemma
5.1.5 it follows that for any world w in the base set of F3, dp(w) = 3 ⇔ w V
φ1. Consider a world w of depth 3, clearly w 6V ¬φ1 and hence, by reflexiv-
ity, w V 34φ1. Moreover dp(w) is odd, and then by construction we have
w V 3et∧3e¬t and for any world v such that wRev (i.e. w, v have the same
depth) we have v V 3et∧3e¬t and hence v V 34φ1 → (3et∧3e¬t). Con-
sider now any world z such that dp(z) < dp(w) (i.e. wR4z and ¬(zR4w));
clearly z 6V 34φ1 and hence z V 34φ1 → (3et∧3e¬t) holds true. From
these observations it follows that w V 24(34φ1 → (3et ∧ 3e¬t)) which
with w 6V ¬φ1 implies w 6V I(σ(r1)).
(ii) n = j+1, then the depth of F is 2(j+1)+1 = 2j+3. We should show
that for any submodel of 〈F2j+3, V 〉 generated by an odd world w of depth
i, Fi 6V I(σ(rm)) for m = i−12 . By induction hypothesis we can state that
the claim holds for any submodel generated by an odd world from 〈Fi, V 〉
where i ≤ 2j + 1 i.e. n ≤ j. Hence we must show only that in the model
〈F2j+3, V 〉 the implication I(σ(rm)) is not true, where m = 2j+3−12 = j + 1.
Recall that I(σ(rj+1)) := 24(34φj+1 → (3et∧3e¬t))→ ¬φj+1. Consider
a root-world, i.e. a world w such that dp(w) = 2j + 3; by Lemma 5.1.5 we
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have w 6V ¬φj+1. Although by reflexivity we have that w V 34φj+1,
by construction it holds w V 3et ∧ 3e¬t and hence w V 34φj+1 →
(3et∧3e¬t). For any world v such that wRev (i.e. w, v have the same depth)
we have v V 3et∧3e¬t and hence v V 34φj+1 → (3et∧3e¬t). Consider
now any world z such that dp(z) < dp(w) (i.e. wR4z and ¬(zR4w)); clearly
z 6V 34φj+1 and hence z V 34φj+1 → (3et ∧ 3e¬t) holds true. From
these observations it follows that w V 24(34φj+1 → (3et∧3e¬t)) which
with w 6V ¬φj+1 implies w 6V I(σ(rj+1)).
The structure depicted in Figure 5.1 is a case of reflexive LTK1-balloon.
In Lemma 5.1.8 we have showed that for any rule rn in the class R there
is a finite reflexive LTK1-balloon in which the antecedent of I(rn) is valid
whereas the consequent is not. From this observation and the Remark on
page 122 it follows that none of the rules in R is derivable in LTK1ax.
Corollary 5.1.9 (Structural Incompleteness) All the rules from R are
admissible but not derivable in LTK1, therefore the logic LTK1ax is not struc-
turally complete.
5.2 Algebraic semantics for LTK1
The Possible Worlds Framework, or Kripke Semantics, provide intuitive
tools and it is widely adopted. Nevertheless, as we highlighted in Chapter
??, Section 2.2.1, Algebraic Semantics is historically the first type of se-
mantics which has been developed to deal with modal logics (cf. Goldblatt
[27]). Understanding algebraic semantics and its links with Kripke Seman-
tics can give a wider perspective on the topic. We have therefore decided
to dedicate this Section to the analysis of Algebraic Semantics and to some
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results which are of use in our research. Moreover, Algebraic structures shall
prove themselves of use in order to highlight the semantic counterpart of the
notion of derivability. All the standard results and definitions presented in
this Section are taken from Blackburn et al. [3], Chapter 5, Rybakov [55],
Chagrov and Zakharyaschev [72].
5.2.1 Basic Definitions
In order to define Algebraic Semantics for LTK1, we need some basic defini-
tions and Lemmas.
Definition 5.2.1 (Algebra) An algebra is a structure of the form A =
〈A, f1, . . . , fn〉 where A is a set, called base set or universe, and f1, . . . , fn
are operations on A.
An algebra is finite if its universe contains a finite number of elements.
Given a propositional language L, an L-algebra is an algebra A =
〈A, f1, . . . , fn〉 such that the operations f1, . . . , fn correspond to the logi-
cal connectives in L.
Given an L-algebra A = 〈A, f1, . . . , fn〉, a valuation (assignment)
is a mapping V : Fma(L) 7→ A such that for each propositional letter
p ∈ P , V (p) ∈ A and, given a formula A(p1, . . . , pn), V (A(p1, . . . , pn)) =
A(V (p1), . . . , V (pn)).
Given an L-algebra A = 〈A, f1, . . . , fn〉 and a non-empty subset ∆ of
A, the pair 〈A,∆〉 is called an L-matrix and ∆ is the set of distinguished
elements. Less formally, the universe A is the set of all the possible truth
values, whereas ∆ is the set of all the true, or designated, truth values.
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Given an L-matrix 〈A,∆〉, a formula A ∈ Fma(L) is:
true in 〈A,∆〉 under the valuation V , in symbols 〈A,∆〉 V A(p1, . . . , pn),
iff V (A(p1, . . . , pn)) ∈ ∆;
valid in 〈A,∆〉, in symbols 〈A,∆〉  A(p1, . . . , pn) iff for each valuation V ,
〈A,∆〉 V A(p1, . . . , pn).
In what follows, we shall always be dealing with algebras with only one
designated truth value, i.e. the element >, and we will denote an L-matrix
simply as A = 〈A, f1, . . . , fn,>〉. We shall also use the abbreviation A V A
instead of 〈A,>〉 V A. Clearly for any formula A, A V A if and only if
A = > holds under V .
Definition 5.2.2 Given a logic L on a language L, an L-matrix, or just an
L-algebra A for simplicity, is characterising for L if and only if for any
formula A, A ∈ L iff A  A.
Definition 5.2.3 (Variety) Given a logic L on the language L, the va-
riety generated by L is the set: V ar(L) := {A | ∀A ∈ L A  A =
> & ∀A∀B ∈ Fma(L)(L ` A↔ B⇒ A  A = B)}.
Definition 5.2.4 Given an inference rule r = A1(pj), . . . , An(pj)/B(pj) in
the language of a logic L:
- r is valid in an algebra A ∈ V ar(L), in symbols A  r, if and only if
for every valuation V of variables from r in A, A  V (B) = > provided that
∀i A  V (Ai) = >;
- r is a semantic corollary of (or it follows semanticly from) a set of
inference rules R, R L r, if and only if for any algebra A ∈ V ar(L) if
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∀ri ∈ R A L ri then A L r.
The following result clarifys the link occurring between the concept of
being derivable and the one of following semanticly from a set of inference
rules: the two notions actually coincide.
Theorem 5.2.5 Let R be a collection of inference rules in the language of
a logic L. Then for any rule r, R `L r if and only if R L r.
5.2.2 The Tarski-Lindenbaum Construction
In this section we shall introduce special algebraic sructures which play a
key role when dealing with admissible inference rules. These systems are
called free algebras and we shall define them starting from the so called
Tarski-Lindenbaum matrixes.
Let L be a propositional logic in the language L. The Tarski-Lindenbaum
matrix for L is given by: M(L) := 〈Fma(L), Con(L), L〉, where Con(L) is
simply the set of all the logical connectives from L. Clearly the Tarski-
Lindenbaum matrix is characterising for L. Since this kind of semantics
is too general, we shall define another characteristic matrix for L with only
one designated element. Let F(L) := 〈[Fma(L)], Con(L),>〉 be an L-matrix
where:
(i) [A] := {B ∈ Fma(L) | A↔ B ∈ L}
(ii) [Fma(L)] := {[A] | A ∈ Fma(L)}
(iii) for any n-ary connective¯ from Con(L) (¯([A]1, . . . , [A]n) = [¯(A1, . . . , An)])
(iv) > := [>] (Recall that > := ⊥ → ⊥).
This definition is correct due to the equivalent replacement theorem.
Theorem 5.2.6 For any algebraic logic L, the algebra F(L) with the single
designated element > is characterising for L.
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Two algebras A = 〈A, f1, . . . , fn〉 and B = 〈B, f ′1, . . . , f ′m〉 are similar if
n = m and the operations fi and f ′i are of the same arity. In what follows,
when dealing with similar algebras, we shall often denote the operations in
both algebras with the same symbols.
Definition 5.2.7 (Homomorphisms, Isomorphisms, Embeddings) Let
A = 〈A, f1, . . . , fn〉 and B = 〈B, f1, . . . , fn〉 be two similar L-algebras and
let h be a mapping h : A 7→ B into. Then h is a homomorphism if and only
if the following condition holds: for any n-ary operation f from A, for any
n-tuple of elements a1, . . . , an from A
h(f(a1, . . . , an)) = f(h(a1), . . . h(an))
If the homomorphism h is surjective (onto), then h is an embedding;
If h is injective (one-to-one), then h is an isomorphism and B is
an isomorphic image of A;
if h is a bijection (isomorphism onto), then A and B are isomor-
phic, in symbols A ∼= B.
Definition 5.2.8 (subalgebra) Let A = 〈A, f1, . . . , fn〉 andB = 〈B, f1, . . . , fn〉
be two similar L-algebras. We say that A is a subalgebra of B, in symbols
A v B, if the following conditions hold true:
(i) A ⊆ B
(ii) For any n-ary operation f from A and for any n+1-tuple a1, . . . , an, b
of elements from A, A  f(a1, . . . , an) = b ⇔ B  f(a1, . . . , an) = b
Definition 5.2.9 (Generated subalgebras ) Given an algebra A = 〈A, I〉,
the sub-algebra generated by B, A[B] is the smallest subalgebra of A contain-
ing B. The set B is the set of generators of A[B].
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Theorem 5.2.10 Given two algebras A1 and A2, if A1 v A2 then ∀A (A2 
A⇒ A1  A).
Definition 5.2.11 (Free Algebras) Given a class of algebras K, Fd is a
free algebra in K if and only if Fd ∈ K and Fd = A[B] for some B such that
for any Ai ∈ K, for any mapping f : B 7→ |Ai|, f can be extended to an
homomorphism |Fd| 7→ |Ai| into.
If A[B] is a free algebra with ‖B‖ = d, then A[B] is of rank d.
Theorem 5.2.12 Given an algebraic logic L, the algebra F(L) is a free al-
gebra of countable rank from the variety V ar(L) with the set {[p1], [p2], . . .}
as the set of generators, where each pi belongs to the set of propositional
letters.
The free algebra of infinite countable rank ω for an algebraic logic L will
henceforth be referred to as Fω(L).
5.2.3 Algebras with operators, Filters and Ultrafilters
The algebraic constructions known as boolean algebras play a central role in
providing multi-modal propositional logics with suitable algebraic semantics.
More specifically, we shall use boolean algebras with operators. In order to
define these systems we need to introduce lattices and distributive lattices:
Definition 5.2.13 (Lattice) A lattice is an algebra A = 〈A,∧,∨〉 where
∧ (meet) and ∨ (join) are two binary operations satisfying the following
conditions. For each element a, b, c from A:
(i) a ∧ a = a; a ∨ a = a (idempotency)
(ii) a ∧ b = b ∧ a; a ∨ b = b ∨ a (commutativity)
(iii) a ∨ (b ∨ c) = (a ∨ b) ∨ c; a ∧ (b ∧ c) = (a ∧ b) ∧ c (associativity)
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(iv) a ∧ (a ∨ b) = a; a ∨ (a ∧ b) = a (absorption)
A lattice is said distributive if a∨ (b∧ c) = (a∨ b)∧ (a∨ c) holds for each
triple of elements.
Definition 5.2.14 (Boolean Algebras) A boolean algebra is an algebra
A = 〈A,∧,∨,¬,⊥,>〉 where:
(i) 〈A,∧,∨〉 is a distributive lattice;
(ii) ⊥ and > are nullary operations on A, i.e. ⊥,> ∈ A;
(iii) ∀a ∈ A ⊥ ∨ a = a and > ∧ a = a;
(iv) ¬ is a unary operation on A;
(v) ∀a ∈ A a ∨ ¬a = > and a ∧ ¬a = ⊥
Definition 5.2.15 An algebra A = 〈A,¬,∧,∨,21, . . . ,2k,>〉 is called a k-
modal algebra if 〈A,¬,∧,∨,>〉 is a Boolean algebra and each 2i is a unary
operation on A satisfying the following conditions:
(i) 2i(a→ b)→ (2ia→ 2ib) = >;
(ii) 2i> = >, 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Definition 5.2.16 Given a lattice A = 〈A,∧,∨〉, a subset ∇ of A is a filter
on A provided that:
(i) ∀a ∈ A ∀d ∈ ∇ (a ∧ d = d⇒ a ∈ ∇)
(ii) ∀d1, d2 ∈ ∇ (d1 ∧ d2 ∈ ∇)
A filter ∇ is proper if ⊥ 6∈ ∇. A filter ∇ is maximal if it is proper and
for any proper filter ∇2 on A if ∇ ⊆ ∇2 then ∇ = ∇2.
An ultrafilter on A is a proper filter ∇ such that for each element a ∈ A
either a or ¬a belongs to ∇.
Lemma 5.2.17 Given a boolean lattice A = 〈A,∧,∨〉 the following holds:
(i) Each maximal filter is an ultrafilter and vice versa.
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(ii) If A is either finite or finitely generated, each ultrafilter ∇ has the
form a≤, where a is an element of A.
(iii) (Zorn Lemma) If ∇ is a proper filter on A, then ∇ can be extended
to an ultrafilter ∇∗ on A.
5.2.4 Stone’s Theorems
We are now able to introduce the kind of systems whose definition is due to
Stone. We shall then state few important results linking Kripke-semantics
to algebraic semantics. The main idea is to associate each Kripke-frame
with a special wrapping algebra. Then it can be easily proved that in this al-
gebra the only true formulae are exactly those which are true in the original
Kripke-frame. Likewise one could take any multi-modal algebra and con-
struct its Stone’s representation frame. Again the same result holds: these
two structures share the same set of true formulae. But let us analise these
constructions in more detail.
Definition 5.2.18 (Wrapping Algebras) Given a k-modal Kripke-frame
F = 〈F,R1, . . . ,Rk〉, its Stone’s wrapping algebra is the k-modal algebra
F+ = 〈F+,∨,∧,¬,21, . . . ,2k,⊥,>〉 where F+ = P(F ) (the power set of F ,
i.e. the set of all the subsets of F ), 〈F+,∨,∧,¬,⊥,>〉 is the boolean algebra
of all the subsets of F and 2iA := {v | v ∈ F & ∀x ∈ F (vRix⇒ x ∈ A)}.
If 〈F, V 〉 is a k-modal Kripke-model with Dom(V ) = P , its wrapping alge-
bra is the algebra F+[{V (p) | p ∈ P}], i.e. the smallest subsystem of F+
containing {V (p) | p ∈ P}.
Definition 5.2.19 (Stone’s Frames) Given a multi-modal algebra A =
〈A,∧,∨,¬,21, . . . ,2k,>〉 its Stone’s representation frame is the k-modal
Kripke-frame A+ = 〈A+,R1, . . . ,Rk〉 where A+ := {∇ | ∇ is an ultrafilter
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on A} and ∇1Ri∇2 iff ∀x ∈ A(2ix ∈ ∇1 ⇒ x ∈ ∇2).
Moreover its Stone’s representation model is given by 〈A+, V 〉 where Dom(V ) =
A and ∀a ∈ A V (a) := {∇ | a ∈ ∇}.
Theorem 5.2.20 (Stone’s Representation Theorem) For any k-modal
algebra A = 〈A,∧,∨,¬,21, . . . ,2k,>〉 the mapping i : A 7→ A++ where
i(a) := {∇ | a ∈ ∇} is an isomorphism, i.e. A v A++. If A is finite, then
A ∼= A++ and for any finite k-modal Kripke-frame F, F ∼= F++.
Notice that given a Kripke-model 〈F, V 〉, by Definition 2.2.1 we know
that V is a mapping which associates to each propositional letter from the set
P a subset of worlds from the universe of F, i.e. V : P 7→ P(WF). Therefore
such valuation V is also a valuation in F+. Moreover when dealing with
Kripke-frames, we say a formula A to be true under a valuation V whenever
A is true in each single world from WF. In algebraic terms this means
that V (A) = F and in F+ we have F = >. This observation plus an easy
induction on the length of the formula A leads to state the following:
Corollary 5.2.21 Given a Kripke-model 〈F, V 〉, for each formula A, F V
A iff F+ V A = >.
The following well known Lemma concerning the interactions between
Kripke-frames and Stone’s algebras will be useful in what follows (cf. Ry-
bakov [55], Lemma 2.5.9):
Lemma 5.2.22 If a frame F1 is a generated subframe of a frame F2, then
there is a homomorphism h from F+2 onto F
+
1 such that ∀A ∈ P(|F2|),
h(A) := A ∩ |F1|.
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5.2.5 Quasi-identities and Inference Rules
We have already provided the necessary tools in order to analyse the concept
of derivability from an algebraic perspective. In particular we shall now
define special algebraic structures, called free algebras.In this Section we
shall clarify the link occurring between free algebras and inference rules. In
order to do so, we need some preliminar definitions.
Definition 5.2.23 (Identities, Quasi-identities)
- A quasi-identity is an expression of the form f1 = g1∧ . . .∧fn = gn ⇒
f = g;
- An identity is a quasi-identity whose set of premisses is empty, i.e.
f = g;
- FmaQ(L), FmaI(L) are the sets of all the quasi-identities, identities
on the language L.
- A variety (quasi-variety) for a set of identities (quasi-identities) Γ on
L is the set V ar(Γ) = {A | ∀A ∈ Γ, A  A}.
Definition 5.2.24 Given a class of algebras K on L
- The elementary theory of K is the set Th(K) = {A ∈ Fma(L) | ∀A ∈
K, A  A}.
- The equational theory of K is ThI(K) = {A ∈ FmaI(L) | ∀A ∈ K, A 
A}.
- The quasi-equational theory of K is ThQ(K) = {A ∈ FmaQ(L) | ∀A ∈
K, A  A}.
Definition 5.2.25 Given a set of quasi-identities Q, a quasi-identity q is
a semantic corollary of Q, in symbols Q  q, if and only if for any algebra
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A the following implication holds: (A  Q⇒ A  q).
Given a set of quasi-identities Q closed under semantic corollaries, a set of
quasi-identities B is a basis for Q if and only if for any quasi-identity q,
q ∈ Q⇔ B  q.
Definition 5.2.26 Given an inference rule r = A1(pj), . . . , An(pj)/B(pj) the
quasi-identity associated with it is q(r) := (A1 = > & . . .& An = >)⇒ (B =
>).
Given a quasi-identity q := f1 = g1 ∧ . . . ∧ fi = gi ⇒ f = g, the rule
associated with it is r(q) := f1 ↔ g1 ∧ . . . ∧ fi ↔ gi/f ↔ g.
The following important results state the link occurring between admis-
sible rules for a given logic and quasi-identities in free algebras: an inference
rules is, in fact, admissible in a logic L exactly when the quasi-identity as-
sociated to it is valid in the Tarski-Lindenbaum algebra of the logic itself.
Likewise a quasi-identity q is valid in the Tarski-Lindenbaum algebra Fω(L)
if and only if the rule associated to it is admissible for L (Please refer to
Rybakkov [55]).
Theorem 5.2.27 For any inference rule r, any quasi-identity q and any
logic L on L:
(i) r ∈ Adm(L) iff Fω(L)  q(r)
(ii) Fω(L)  q iff r(q) ∈ Adm(L).
In the light of this well known Theorem and the results provided in
Chapter 3 we can now state the following:
Corollary 5.2.28 The quasi-equational theory ThQ(LTK1) is decidable.
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5.3 Further work: the research of a finite Basis
In Chapter 3 we designed an algorithm to check whether a given rule is
admissible for LTK1. Nevertheless the set of admissible rules might contain
an infinite number of elements and it could be too complicated for a direct
description. In other words we already have a tool which tells us, given a
rule, if it is admissible or not, but we are still unable to generate the set
of all the admissible inference rules for LTK1. This is the topic on which
our interest is currently focused on and this last Section is devoted to the
analysis of the methodology we are using in order to give this problem an
answer.
Any Hilbert-style axiomatic system usually contains both axiom schemata
and inference rules. As we have seen, there are many cases of axiomatic sys-
tems which are not structurally complete: these system admit rules which
are, nevertheless, not derivable on the system itself. A basis of admissible
rules is nothing but a set of rules which enables the derivation of all the
admissible rules for a given logic. If we add a basis of rules to an axiomatic
system, this would immediately become structurally complete. In fact, a
basis of rules is the smallest set containing those rules which are necessary
in order to derive all the admissible rules for a system.
A formal definition of what we mean by basis of inference rules is the
following:
Definition 5.3.1 Given a set of rules R for a logic generated by a system
AS:
- a rule r = A1(pj), . . . , An(pj)/B(pj) is derivable in AS from R (in sym-
bols R `AS r) if r is derivable in AS⊕R, i.e. if there is a derivation in AS
of B(pj) having Ai(pj) as premisses and using the rules from AS as well as
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the ones from R;
- a set of rules B is a basis for R provided that B ⊆ R and each rule r
in R is derivable from B in AS, i.e. ∀r ∈ R B `AS r.
Definition 5.3.2 (Basis of Inference Rules) A collection of admissible
rules B for a logic L is a basis for all the rules admitted by L if and only if
for every rule r, r ∈ Adm(L) iff B `L r.
We shall now analyse the case of our logic LTK1. As we have anticipated,
we shall not present any result here, but we shall only analyse the track we
are following in order to find a finite basis of rules.
In Chapter 3 we introduced some special n-characterising models called
ChLTK1(n) (see the construction in Section 3.1). In the following Lemma, we
shall use the wrapping algebras associated to these models. We consider for
each natural number n, the particular wrapping algebra generated by the
valuation of the propositional letters p1, . . . , pn in the model 〈ChLTK1(n), V 〉
as defined in Section 3.1 and we prove it to be a free algebra of rank n from
the variety of LTK1.
Theorem 5.3.3 For each n, ChLTK1(n)
+[V (p1), . . . , V (pn)] is a free-algebra
of rank n in V ar(LTK1) generated by V (p1), . . . , V (pn).
Proof. Consider ChLTK1(n)
+[V (p1), . . . , V (pn)] for some n and some A ∈
V ar(LTK1) and define a mapping h : {V (p1), . . . , V (pn)} 7→ |A| such that
h(V (pi)) = ai for some ai ∈ |A|. We extend such mapping to a homomor-
phism from |ChLTK1(n)+| into A in the following way: for each multi-modal
term t, h(t(V (p1), . . . , V (pn))) = t(h(V (p1)), . . . , h(V (pn))). In order to
prove this definition to be correct (i.e. h is indeed a homomorphism) we want
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to show that given two elements a, b ∈ |ChLTK1(n)+|, h(a) = h(b) whenever
a = b. Suppose that there are two terms t1 and t2 denoting the same element
in ChLTK1(n)
+, t1(V (p1), . . . , V (pn)) = t2(V (p1), . . . , V (pn)). Since V is a
valuation on ChLTK1(n)
+ as well as the valuation of the model ChLTK1(n), by
definition of valuation, it follows that V (t1(p1, . . . , pn)) = V (t2(p1, . . . , pn)),
thus ChLTK1(n) V t1(p1, . . . , pn) ↔ t2(p1, . . . , pn) holds. Since the model
ChLTK1(n) is n-characterising for LTK1, t1(p1, . . . , pn) ↔ t2(p1, . . . , pn) ∈
LTK1. On the other hand, A ∈ V ar(LTK1), therefore A  t1(x1, . . . , xn) =
t2(x1, . . . , xn). In particular this holds for xi = ai, hence
A  t1(h(V (p1)), . . . , h(V (pn))) = t2(h(V (p1)), . . . , h(V (pn))) which by defi-
nition of h means A  h(t1(V (p1), . . . , V (pn))) = h(t2(V (p1), . . . , V (pn))).
Consider now the of Kripke-structures we have introduced in Chapter
3, in Definition 3.3.5. We introduce now some new Kripke-frames which
are very similar to LSP-frames. In fact, they are LSP-frames without the
Point-component (see Figure 5.2).
Definition 5.3.4 Let FL and FS be Kripke-frames with the following struc-
ture:
(i) The frame FL = 〈WFL ,RL4,RLe ,RLa〉 (LOOP-component) is as follows:
WFL is a nonempty set of worlds; R
L
4 = WFL ×WFL; RLe is an equivalence
relation on WFL; R
L
a is some equivalence relation on R
L
e -clusters;
(ii) Let F = 〈WF,R4,Re,Ra〉 be a finite LTK-frame (i.e. it is an LTK-
frame with a finite base set of worlds. See Definition 2.2.3); let C1, . . . ,Ci
be an enumeration of all the RS4-clusters of worlds from WF; let Dots :=
{w1, . . . , wi} be a set of worlds such that ∀wj , 1 ≤ j ≤ i(wj 6∈ WF). The
frame FS = 〈WFS ,RS4,RSe ,RSa〉 (STRING-component) has the following struc-
ture: WFS = WF ∪ Dots; RS4 = R4 ∪ {〈wj , z〉 | wj ∈ Dots & z ∈ Cj} ∪
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{〈wj , wj〉 | wj ∈ Dots}; RSe = Re ∪ {〈wj , wj〉 | wj ∈ Dots}; RSa = Ra ∪
{〈wj , wj〉 | wj ∈ Dots}.
An LS-frame (loop-string frame) is a tuple Fls = 〈Wls,Rls4,Rlse ,Rlsa 〉 where
WFls = WFL ∪ WFS; Rls4 = RL4 ∪ RS4 ∪ {〈w, z〉 | w ∈ WFS & z ∈ WFL};
Rlse = R
L
e ∪ RSe ; Rlsa = RLa ∪ RSa (See Figure 5.2).
In the following Lemma we consider a family of LS-frames such that
each of them is a generated subframe of the frame of ChLTK1(n). Then we
prove that the wrapping algebra of their disjoint union is a subalgebra of
ChLTK1(n)
+[V (p1), . . . , V (pn)].
Lemma 5.3.5 For each family of LS-frames (Fi)i∈I such that for each i,
Fi v ChLTK1(n), the following holds: (
⊔
i∈I Fi◦@)+ v ChLTK1(n)+[V (p1), . . . , V (pn)]
(where @ is a single element R4-cluster disjoint from each Fi).
Proof. Let Cj1 , . . . ,Cjm be an enumeration of each R4-cluster from the lin-
ear part of each Fj such that CjlR4Cik iff j = 1 and l ≤ k. Let dj1 , . . . , djm−1
be an enumeration of all the dots from Fj where for each k, djkR4Cjk ,
¬(CjkR4djk) and if l < k then ¬(djkR4Cjl).
(1) By Lemma 3.2 each world v from the base set of the model ChLTK1(n)
is definable by a formula β(v). We display each world v from any LS-frame
Fj as vjk , meaning that v belongs to the k-th R4-cluster of the frame Fj .
For each frame Fj and each dot-world djk we define a formula γ(djk) :=
γ1(djk) ∧ γ2(djk) ∧ γ3(djk) where:
(i) γ1(djk) :=
∧
k<i34β(vji)
(ii) γ2(djk) :=
∧
k>i ¬34β(vji)
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Figure 5.2: Scheme of the structure of an LS-frame.
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(iii) γ3(djk) :=
∧
v∈Cjk ¬β(v)
Notice that for each world v ∈ |ChLTK1(n)|, (Ch(n), v) V γ(djk) whenever
vR4Cjk and ¬(vR4Cjk−1).
(2) Since (
⊔
i∈I Fi ◦@) < Ch(n)4, by Lemma 5.2.22 it follows that there
is a homomorphism ChLTK1(n)
+ 7→ (⊔i∈I Fi ◦ @)+ onto where h(A) :=
A ∩ |(⊔i∈I Fi ◦@)+|.
(3) Let B be a generated subalgebra of ChLTK1(n)
+ with generators
[{V (γ(dik)) | dik ∈ Dotsi, i ∈ I}, {V (β(z)) | z ∈ |
⊔
i∈I Fi| & z 6∈ Dotsi, i ∈
I}]. Clearly the restriction of the homorphism h to |B| is into. We shall show
that it is also both onto and one to one, i.e. the two algebras are isomorphic.
(4) We start by showing that the homomorphism h is onto. In order to
achieve this we show that each singleton {z} in |(⊔i∈I Fi ◦ @)+| has a pro-
image in |B|, i.e. for each world z ∈ |(⊔i∈I Fi ◦@)| there is a set of worlds
A ∈ |B| such that h(A) = {z}, which means that A ∩ |(⊔i∈I Fi ◦@)| = {z}.
Consider any singleton {z} in |(⊔i∈I Fi ◦@)+|. The world z must fulfill one
of the following requirements:
(i) z ∈ Fj for some j and z 6∈ Dotsj ;
(ii) z = @;
(iii) z = djk for some j and k.
(i) Suppose z ∈ Fj for some j and z 6∈ Dotsj . By definition, V (β(z)) is a
4recall that Ch(n) is the frame on which the model ChLTK1(n) is built
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generator of B and since V (β(z)) = {z} it follows that h(V (β(z))) = {z}.
(ii) Suppose z = @. Since (Ch(n),@) 6V β(v), for all worlds v 6= @ and
(Ch(n),@) 6V γ(djk) for each djk ∈ Dotsj and for each j ∈ I, it follows that
@ ∈ V (∧v 6=@ ¬β(v)∧∧j∈I ¬γ(djk)). It is easy to verify that the intersection
of this set and |⊔i∈I Fi ◦@| is {@}.
(iii) z = djk for some j and k. Clearly (Ch(n), djk) V γ(djk), but for any
world v ∈ |⊔i∈I Fi ◦@| such that v 6= djk , (Ch(n), v) 6V γ(djk). Therefore
V (γ(djk)) ∩ |
⊔
i∈I Fi ◦@| = {djk}.
(5) We shall prove now that the homomorphism h is one-to-one, by
showing that given any A ∈ |B|, if A 6= ∅, then h(A) 6= ∅.
Each set A ∈ |B| can be represented as t(V (γ(dijk)), V (β(ul))) where t is
a multi-modal term applied to the generators V (γ(dijk)), V (β(u
l)). The set
A is non-empty by assumption and therefore, by definition of valuation,
it follows that V (t((γ(dijk)), β(u
l))) 6= ∅. Therefore there is a world v ∈
|ChLTK1(n)| such that: (Ch(n), v) V t((γ(dijk)), β(ul)). Such world v must
satisfy one of the following conditions:
(i) v ∈ |⊔i∈I Fi ◦@|;
(ii) v 6∈ |⊔i∈I Fi ◦@| and ∀z ∈ |⊔i∈I Fi ◦@| (vR4z ⇒ z = @);
(iii) v 6∈ |⊔i∈I Fi ◦@| and ∃z ∈ |⊔i∈I Fi| vR4z.
(i) If v ∈ |⊔i∈I Fi ◦@| then clearly h(A) 6= ∅.
(ii) Suppose that v 6∈ |⊔i∈I Fi◦@| and ∀z ∈ |⊔i∈I Fi◦@| (vR4z ⇒ z = @).
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Notice that (Ch(n),@) 6V
∨
j∈I γ(djk) and (Ch(n),@) 6V
∨
z∈|⊔i∈I Fi| β(z).
Moreover ∀y (@R4y ⇒ ((Ch(n), y) 6V
∨
j∈I γ(djk) & (Ch(n), y) 6V∨
z∈|⊔i∈I Fi| β(z))). Since this holds true for v as well, it is easy to verify
that for each multi-modal term t′:
(Ch(n),@) V t′((γ(dijk)), β(u
l)) iff (Ch(n), v) V t′((γ(dijk)), β(u
l)). Hence
@ ∈ V (t((γ(dijk)), β(ul))) and h(A) 6= ∅.
(iii) Assume v 6∈ |⊔i∈I Fi ◦ @| and ∃z ∈ |⊔i∈I Fi| vR4z. Let z be the
R4-deepest world R4-seen by v; then z is not R4-final by construction of
ChLTK1(n) and it belongs to some R4-cluster Cjm . This cluster is associated
to a dot-world djm . The following statements hold true both for v and djm :
(Ch(n), v) V γ(djm);
(Ch(n), v) 6V
∨
u∈|⊔i∈I Fi| β(u);
If there is a world y such that either vRey or vRay or else vR4y and
yR4Cjm but y is not in Cjm , then (Ch(n), y) V γ(djm) and (Ch(n), y) 6V∨
u∈|⊔i∈I Fi| β(u). Moreover starting from Cjm on, both v and djm have ex-
actly the same R4-successors, therefore for each multi-modal term t′:
(Ch(n), v) V t′((γ(dijk)), β(u
l)) iff (Ch(n), djm) V t′((γ(dijk)), β(u
l)). Hence
djm ∈ V (t((γ(dijk)), β(ul))) and h(A) 6= ∅.
Any algebra as the one introduced in Lemma 5.3.6 shows, therefore, an
interesting property: it is the subalgebra of ChLTK1(n)
+[V (p1), . . . , V (pn)]
for some finite n. Moreover in the following Lemma we prove such algebras
to have another interesting property, namely that all those formulae which
are valid in all the algebras of kind (
⊔
i∈I Fi ◦@)+ are exactly those which
are valid in the free algebra of infinite countable rank Fω(LTK1).
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Lemma 5.3.6 For any formula A, Fω(LTK1)  A if and only if for any
algebra A of type (
⊔
i∈I Fi ◦@)+ as introduced in Lemma ??, A  A.
Proof. 1. Suppose there is an algebra of kind (
⊔
i∈I Fi ◦ @)+ such that
(
⊔
i∈I Fi ◦@)+ 6 A = > for some formula A. By Lemma 5.3.5 it follows that
for some natural number n, (
⊔
i∈I Fi◦@)+ v ChLTK1(n)+[V (p1), . . . , V (pn)].
Thus, by Lemma 5.2.10, we get ChLTK1(n)
+[V (p1), . . . , V (pn)] 6 A and
since ChLTK1(n)
+[V (p1), . . . , V (pn)] ∼= Fn(LTK1), we have Fn(LTK1) 6 A
and therefore Fω(LTK1) 6 A.
2. Suppose there is a formula A such that Fω(LTK1) 6 A = >. Such A
can be represented as:
A :=
∧
k
fk = > →
∨
m
24gm = >
Since there is a finite d such that
Fd(LTK1) 6 A = > and Fd(LTK1) ∼= ChLTK1(d)+[V (p1), . . . , V (pd)], it fol-
lows that Ch(d) V
∧
k fk and there is a world z ∈ |Ch(d)| such that
(Ch(d), z) 6V
∨
m24gm.
Moreover there is by construction a world @ ∈ |Ch(d)| that is a single
element R4-maximal cluster and clearly (Ch(d),@) V
∧
k fk.
Take the model 〈(z4◦@), V 〉 (where V is an abbreviation for V  |z4◦@|).
Consider any non final R4-cluster from this model and define a well ordering
where m ≤ n iff CmR4Cn.
For each non-final R4-cluster Cj consider a new world dj and join such
dj to the model 〈(z4 ◦ @), V 〉 as follows: ∀v ∈ C4j (djR4v & ¬(vR4dj)),
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djR4dj , djRedj and djRadj .
Extend the valuation V to any new world dj in an arbitrary way and
call the resulting model 〈F, V 〉.
Notice that for each world dj , the frame of d
4
j is a frame for LTK1 and
moreover the truth value of formulae of type 24B at any world v would not
be affected by the presence of the new worlds dj . The conjunction
∧
k fk
belongs to LTK1 (recall that such formula is true in Fω(LTK1)), therefore it
is also true at each world dj . Hence F V
∧
k fk and (F, z) 6V
∨
m24gm.
Clearly F belongs to the class of frames introduced in Lemma ??, therefore
(F)+ 6 A = >.
Lemma 5.3.7 Let A[a1, . . . , an] be a finitely generated algebra from V ar(LTK1)
such that ‖A‖ > 1. Let q := 34x ∧34¬x = > ⇒ y = >. If A  q then A+
has a single element R4-maximal cluster.
Proof. Consider the Stone’s representation frame of A, A+ := 〈A+,R4,Re,Ra〉
as in Definition 5.2.19 and define a valuation V such that Dom(V ) =
{p1, . . . , pn} and V (pi) := {∇ | ai ∈ ∇}. We start by showing that
∀A(p1, . . . , pn),∀∇ ∈ A+ ∇ V A(p1, . . . , pn)⇔ A(a1, . . . , an) ∈ ∇ (5.1)
In fact suppose (by induction on the length of A(p1, . . . , pn)) that A(p1, . . . , pn) =
pi. Then ∇ V pi if and only if ∇ ∈ V (pi), which means ai ∈ ∇.
Supose A(p1, . . . , pn) = 24B(p1, . . . , pn). Then ∇ V 24B(p1, . . . , pn) if and
only if ∀∇2 ∈ A+(∇R4∇2 ⇒ ∇2 V B(p1, . . . , pn)). By Inductive Hypoth-
esis (IH henceforth) we have ∀∇2 ∈ A+(∇R4∇2 ⇒ B(a1, . . . , an) ∈ ∇2).
Recall that the mapping i : A 7→ A++ where i(a) = {∇ | a ∈ ∇} is
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an isomorphism from A into A++, therefore B(a1, . . . , an) ∈ ∇2 iff ∇2 ∈
i(B(a1, . . . , an)). Since i(B(a1, . . . , an)) ∈ A++, by Definition 5.2.18 we get
∇ ∈ 24i(B(a1, . . . , an)), and hence ∇ ∈ i(24B(a1, . . . , an)) which implies
24B(a1, . . . , an) ∈ ∇. Clearly the same holds for the modal operators Ke,Ka.
Consider any R4-chain of R4-clusters C := C1R4C2R4 . . .. Since S424 ⊂
LTK1, it follows that ∀∇1∀∇2(∇1R4∇2 ⇒ (24A ∈ ∇1 ⇒ 24A ∈ ∇2)). Let
24Ci := {24A | 24A ∈ ∇, ∀∇ ∈ Ci}, then clearly 24Ci ⊆ {A | Cj V A}
whenever CiR4Cj . Let 24C :=
⋃
Ci∈C24Ci be the union of all the 24Ci
such that Ci is in the chain C. Clearly 24C is consistent and it is also a
subset of the carrier of the algebra A, therefore
∧
24C 6= ∅ in A. The filter
24C≤ is proper and hence by Lemma 5.2.17, (iii) it can be extended to an
ultrafilter ∇∗, which belongs to the base set of A+. Since ∀∇ ∈ C we have
that for any 24A if 24A ∈ ∇, then 24A ∈ ∇∗, it follows that each single
ultrafilter ∇ in C is R4-related to C(∇∗) i.e. the R4-cluster containing ∇∗,
which is, therefore, R4-maximal in C. Hence each R4-chain in A+ has an
R4-maximal cluster.
Since the algebra A is finitely generated by the elements a1, . . . , an,
there are at most 2n ultrafilters on A and then 22
n
possible R4-maximal
R4-clusters (i.e. subsets of ultrafilters) in A+. Let C1, . . . ,Ck be all the
R4-maximal R4-clusters in A+ and suppose by contradiction the each Ci
contains more than one ultrafilter, i.e. there are no R4-maximal single-
element R4-clusters.
Take for each cluster Ci a representative ultrafilter ∇i from it and let let
at(∇i) be that element a such that ∇i = a≤ (clearly this elements does not
belong to any other member of Ci). Moreover take for each cluster Cj 6= Ci
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an element 24a(i, j) such that 24a(i, j) ∈
⋃
Ci and 24a(i, j) 6∈
⋃
Cj
5.
Now consider the element b :=
∨
1≤i≤k(at(∇i) ∧
∧
i6=j 24a(i, j)). Suppose
24b 6= ⊥ in A, then there is some ultrafilter ∇ ∈ A+ such that 24b ∈ ∇.
Moreover such ∇ R4-sees some R4-maximal cluster Cm. By assumption
the cluster Cm contains more than one ultrafilter, so there is an ultrafilter
∇l 6= ∇m such that 24b ∈ ∇l. This entails that b ∈ ∇l and hence for some
i (at(∇i)∧
∧
i≤j 24a(i, j)) ∈ ∇l, which means that i = m, at(∇m) ∈ ∇l and
since by assumption ∇m 6= ∇l this leads to a contradiction and 24b = ⊥.
Suppose now that 24¬b 6= ⊥. Again there is some ultrafilter ∇ ∈
A+ such that 24¬b ∈ ∇ and ∇ R4-sees some R4-maximal cluster Cm.
This implies that 24¬b ∈ ∇m as well as ¬b ∈ ∇m. Nevertheless since
at(∇m) ∧m6=j a(m, j), it follows that b ∈ ∇m and then ⊥ ∈ ∇m which is a
contradiction. Therefore 24¬b = ⊥.
From this facts it follows that 34b ∧34¬b = > in A. But A  34x ∧
34¬x = > ⇒ y = >, hence even in the case y = ⊥, A  y = > holds,
and this is a contradiction. Therefore the frame A+ has at least one single
element R4-maximal R4-cluster.
Our first hypothesis was to show the following:
Conjecture 5.3.8 The set of all the quasi-identities valid in the variety
generated by LTK1, ThQ(V ar(LTK1)) has a finite basis Q∗ which is a basis
for all the axioms from ASLTK1 (i.e. a basis for {A = > | A is an axiom of
LTK1}) plus the quasi-identity q := 34x ∧34¬x = > ⇒ y = >.
5Notice that both these elements do exist for each cluster Ci. In fact any R4-cluster
does not contain duplicate ultrafilters and each ultrafilter ∇ has the form a≤ for some
atom a. Moreover if two clusters are distinct from each other and not related there must
be at least one element 24a which belongs to the intersection of the first cluster but not
to the one of the other.
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We have, however, encountered several difficulties while attempting to
prove this conjecture. The details of the proof we have attempted to provide
follow below.
Recall that the set Q∗ is a basis for ThQ(Fω(LTK1)) if and only if ∀qi(qi ∈
ThQ(Fω(LTK1))⇔ Q∗  qi). This means that we attempt to prove that for
any quasi-identity qi the following holds:
Fω(LTK1)  qi ⇔ ∀A ∈ V ar(LTK1)(A  Q∗ ⇒ A  qi)
Clearly for the left part of the implication above there are no problems.
In fact suppose that ∀A ∈ V ar(LTK1)(A  Q∗ ⇒ A  qi).
Clearly Fω(LTK1)  ThI(Fω(LTK1)). Consider any frame with the same
structure as (
⊔
i∈I Fi◦@) as defined in Lemma ??. Then ((
⊔
i∈I Fi◦@),@) 6
34A∧34¬A for any formula A and any valuation. This implies that for any
algebra of type (
⊔
i∈I Fi ◦ @)+, (
⊔
i∈I Fi ◦ @)+  34x ∧ 34¬x 6= > holds
for any value assigned to x. Therefore it follows that (
⊔
i∈I Fi ◦ @)+  q.
By Lemma 5.3.6, Fω(LTK1)  q. This means that Fω(LTK1)  Q∗, thus
Fω(LTK1)  qi for any qi.
Proving that the right arrow of the implication above holds true shows,
however, several difficulties. We shall sketch the track we have been following
below.
Suppose that there is an algebra A in the variety of LTK1 such that
A  Q∗ and A 6 qi for some quasi-identity qi. The quasi-identity qi can be
represented as
∧
k(fk(x1, . . . , xn) = >)⇒ g(x1, . . . , xn) = >.
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We should show that Fω(LTK1) 6 qi. In order to do this, we could
proceed as follows:
(i) Find a model based on a finite LTK1-reflexive balloon (as introduced
in Theorem 2.3.2). In this model any formula fi(p1, . . . , pn) from the con-
junction
∧
k(fk(x1, . . . , xn)) in qi is true, whereas the formula g is not;
(ii) Join to such model a single world @ so that in the resulting model
any formula fi(p1, . . . , pn) from qi is still true;
(iii) Join a set of dot-worlds to our latest model keeping the truth value of
any fi(p1, . . . , pn) from qi true. The resulting model would then be based on
an LSP-frame F in which the formula 24
∧
i(fi(p1, . . . , pn)) is true whereas
g is not. Therefore in the algebra F+ the quasi-identity qi would be false
and therefore it would also be falsified by Fω(LTK1).
As it will be clear in the further development of this argument, item (iii)
cannot be easily fulfilled. Let us see why it is so.
(i) We start by finding a model 〈F, V 〉 based on a finite LTK1-reflexive
balloon frame for LTK1 as introduced in Theorem 2.3.2 such that F V
24(
∧
k(fk(p1, . . . , pn)) = >) and F 6V g(p1, . . . , pn) for some n-tuple of
propositional letters p1, . . . , pn.
Clearly the implication 24
∧
f(x1, . . . , xn)→ g(x1, . . . , xn) does not belong
to LTK1. Indeed suppose 24
∧
f(x1, . . . , xn) → g(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ LTK1. In
the algebra A from V ar(LTK1) there is by assumption an n-tuple of elements
a1, . . . , an such that A 
∧
k fk(a1, . . . , an) = > and A  g(a1, . . . , an) 6= >.
Since A is a modal algebra, A  24> = > and therefore we have A 
24
∧
k fk(a1, . . . , an) = > and hence, since the implication24
∧
k fk(x1, . . . , xn)→
g(x1, . . . , xn) belongs to LTK1 by hypothesis, it follows A  g(a1, . . . , an) =
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> which is, clearly, a contradiction.
By Theorem 2.3.2 the logic LTK1 has the finite model property, there-
fore there is a finite model 〈F, V 〉 where F has the form z4 for some
world z such that (F, z) 6V 24
∧
k fk(p1, . . . , pn) → g(p1, . . . , pn). Clearly
F V 24
∧
k fk(p1, . . . , pn).
(ii) Now we want to join to the formerly defined model 〈F, V 〉 a sin-
gle world @ so that the resulting disjoint union 〈F ◦ @, V 〉 is such that
F ◦@ V 24
∧
k fk(p1, . . . , pn) and (F ◦@, z) 6V g(p1, . . . , pn).
Consider the algebra A from V ar(LTK1) and suppose it is finitely gener-
ated by the elements a1, . . . , an. Take its Stone’s representation model
A+ := 〈A+,R4,Re,Ra, V +〉 where A+ is the set of all the ultrafilters on
|A|, Dom(V +) := {pi | i ∈ I} and for each pi, V +(pi) := {∇ | ai ∈ ∇}.
From Lemma 5.3.7, 5.1, it follows that ∀A(p1, . . . , pn)∀∇ ∈ A+ (∇ V
A(p1, . . . , pn)⇔ A(a1, . . . , an) ∈ ∇). Since A 
∧
f(a1, . . . , an) = >, we have
A+ V +
∧
k fk(p1, . . . , pn).
Since by assumption A+  q, by Lemma 5.3.7 it follows that A+ has a single
element R4-maximal cluster @ and clearly @ V +
∧
f(p1, . . . , pn).
Take the submodel of A+ generated by the set {@}6 and take the disjoint
union model 〈F, V 〉 unionsq 〈@4, V +〉 and denote it by 〈F ◦ @, V 〉 for simplicity.
Clearly (F ◦@) V
∧
k fk(p1, . . . , pn) whereas (F ◦@, z) 6V g(p1, . . . , pn).
6Notice that the universe of this model is just the set {@}.
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(iii) Since the component F of the model we defined formerly is not an
LS-frame (it is just an LTK1-reflexive balloon), our first guess was to join to
F as many dot-worlds as the number of R4-clusters in the frame. This means
that if in the frame there are C1, . . . ,Cn R4-cluster, we would add some new
single element R4-clusters d1, . . . , dn assuming that for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
d1 is the immediate R4-predecessor of Ci and for each Cj such that j < i,
¬(diR4Cj) and ¬(CjR4di). This turns out, however, to be impossible.
Consider in fact any non final R4-cluster from F and define a well ordering
where m ≤ n iff CmR4Cn. For each non-final R4-cluster Cj consider a new
world dj and join such dj to F◦@ as follows: ∀v ∈ C4j (djR4v & ¬(vR4dj)),
djR4dj , djRedj and djRadj .
Extend the valuation V to any new world dj in the following way: for any
propositional letter pi, dj ∈ V (pi) if and only if @ ∈ V (pi).
Denote this model by 〈F′ ◦@, S〉. The frame on which this model is built on
has the same form as the one defined in Lemma 5.3.5. Clearly in the result-
ing model it is still true that z 6S g(p1, . . . , pn). It is problematic, however,
to show that for any world v ∈ |F′ ◦@| the statement v S
∧
k fk(p1, . . . , pn)
holds true.
The presence of the newly added dot-worlds, however, does indeed affect the
truth value of any formula in 〈F ◦@, V 〉. It is therefore impossible to show
the following, i.e. that for any formula fi from
∧
k fk(p1, . . . , pn) and for any
dot-world dj : dj S fi ⇔ @ V fi.
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Our guess is that we need something more than this set of rules to provide
a basis, namely some quasi-identities Q which can guarantee the property
that given a finitely generated algebra A[a1, . . . , an] from V ar(LTK1) such
that ‖A‖ > 1, there is a quasi-identity q such that if A  q then in A+
each R4-cluster has a single element R4-cluster which is its R4-immediate
predecessor.
Chapter 6
Conclusions
6.1 Summary of the Thesis
In order to have a clear and systematic view of the results provided in the
previous chapters, we would like to provide a summary of our research as
well as to highlight our contributions to common knowledge.
Chapter 1. Introduction. We introduced our research topic and clar-
ified the reasons that led us to work with multi-modal logics. We explained
why we decided to adopt multi-modal languages and logics in order to deal
with multi-agent reasoning. We surveyed briefly some major contributions
in the field and then turned our attention to the problem of inference rules,
which are the core of our whole research.
Chapter 2. A Semantic Definition of LTK. We provided a seman-
tic definition of some multi-modal propositional systems. In particular we
introduced the logic LTK. We used a semantic approach. In fact we have
started our research by defining a set of Kripke frames. These structures are
useful whenever one is to model the behaviour of a set of agents operating
on a temporal framework. Thus we defined our logics as the set of all those
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formulae which are valid in this class of frames. We made a substantial use
of the so called Possible World Semantics or Kripke-semantics. Further,
we showed that the logic LTK has the effective finite model property and it
is hence decidable with respect to its theorems. This means that for each
formula A which is not a theorem of L we can build a model M whose size
is finite and computable from the size of A such that it verifies all theorems
of L and falsifies A. Hence the logic LTK is decidable with respect to its
theorems. In fact in order to check whether a formula is a theorem it is
enough to check only those models which are smaller than a certain finite
number n which can be calculated from the size of the formula itself.
Chapter 3. Admissible Rules in LTK1: Decidability. In Chapter 3
we started our semantic analysis of logical consequences. We defined the set
of admissible inference rules as the class containing all those rules which can
be applied to a given logic without altering its set of theorems. We designed
an algorithm which can check, given any inference rule, if this rule is or is
not admissible for LTK1.
Chapter 4. The Axiomatic System ASLTK. In Chapter 4 we pro-
vided some axiom schemata and rules which allow the interaction between
modalities. As we saw, this is a useful tool in order to deal with the concepts
of learning and forgetting. A language that lacks the power to combine dif-
ferent modalities is, in fact, useless in order to deal with both learning and
forgetting and it cannot handle, therefore, changing knowledge bases. On
the other hand, proving that an axiomatic system with combined modalities
is sound and complete with respect to a class of frames is neither easy, nor
straightforward. Nevertheless we provided a sound and complete axiomati-
sation with combined modalities.
Chapter 5. Rules in LTK1: Structural Incompleteness. Finally,
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in Chapter 5 we presented both our latest results and our current research
topic. We started by proving that the logic LTK1 is not structurally com-
plete. This means that there are inference rules which are not derivable on
the axiomatic system which generates LTK1. These rules, are, nevertheless,
admissible for LTK1. In this Chapter we define an infinite set of rules with
this property. Since all admissible rules can be applied in derivations with-
out altering the set of theorems of a logic, the class of admissible and not
derivable rules we present here adds new syntactical tools which can be used
in derivations.
Then we provided Algebraic Semantics for LTK1 and, finally, we introduced
the further work and the piece of research we are currently working on. We
started to investigate the problem of finding a finite basis for admissible in-
ference rules. We aim at finding a set of rules to axiomatise all the inference
rules admissible for LTK1, i.e. the smallest set of rules starting from which
one can derive all the admissible rules for LTK1.
6.2 Contributions
We have introduced some new logical systems which are useful whenever
one is to model a situation with several agents operating in a temporal
framework. As we have seen in Chapter 1, typical agents may be computer
programs running in parallel on some platform or buffers and other devices.
Nevertheless, agents may also be seen as players in some strategic game,
human beings operating and co-operating in a social environment in order
to reach a common goal. Our results can hence provide analytical tools to
be used in several fields. Besides Computer Science and Artificial Intelli-
gence, one may apply our logics to the study of social-economic phenomena
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(e.g. game theory, economical analysis of markets, local and global social
interactions).
Besides the interpretation provided and the possible contingent applica-
tions, however, we want to highlight the theoretical relevance of our research.
We have analysed some logical systems and we have provided some intended
models, as the multi-agent framework and the temporal multi-epistemic ap-
proach. On the theoretical side, however, we have described some new logics
and we have analysed them from a perspective that, as far as we are con-
cerned, has never been considered before. In particular we have built a
multi-modal system with combined modalities, LTK1, which is the result of
the fusion and the interaction of three distinct modal systems, namely two
S5 systems and one S4.3. We have showed that this logic is:
(i) Decidable with respect to its theorems;
(ii) Decidable with respect to its inference rules;
(iii) Generated by a finite axiomatic system;
(iv) Structurally incomplete.
Thus, these results are available to any researcher willing to model a logical
system with the properties we have described. Anyone can chose both the
interpretation of the modal operators and the intended models most suitable
for his/her purposes.
Moreover, we have analysed our systems from the point of view of in-
ference rules, contributing our decidability results to the field. The study
of inference rules applied to multi-modal logics has, in fact, started only
recently and there is still much work to be done. Our decidability results
are, therefore, a further step towards a systematic and complete analysis of
the wide field of inference rules applied to multi-modal propositional logics.
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Semantic Approach
Abstract
The paper investigates a semantic approach for combining
knowledge and time. We introduce a multi-modal logic L(TK)
containing modalities for knowledge and time in a semantic way,
as the set of all TK-valid formulae for a class of special frames
TK. The main result of our paper is the theorem stating that
L(TK) is decidable and giving a resolving algorithm. The result
is proven by using standard tools: filtration, bulldozing and
contracting p-morphisms.
1 Introduction
The paper is devoted to study a semantic approach to model knowl-
edge and time. Study of time and knowledge within framework of
modal logic is an active area nowadays (cf. [2, 3, 4, 6] and references
therein). Sound and complete axiomatizations for a number of different
logics involving modalities for knowledge and time are found in [4]. Our
approach, in a sense, is from an opposite site: we generate a logic com-
bining knowledge and time in a semantic manner, via a class of frames
which defines such a logic. Our aim is to study the question about
decidability. We would like to investigate to which extend a standard
technique of modal logic works, we like to construct a deciding algo-
rithm using only standard technique of modal logics without involving
heavy technique as automatons or the Rabin theorem.
We model the time as a linear discrete sequence of time states, and
the knowledge is represented by a tuple of modal-like operations Ki
(imitating knowledge of agents) which operates in time states contain-
ing a set of information nodes. We start by introduction of a certain
class of multi-modal Kripke frames which have the structure described
above and generate the logic L(TK) as the set of all formulae which are
1
true in these frames. We assume time flow to be linear and discrete and
agents operating synchronously: they have access to a sort of shared
clock 1, each agent knowing what time it is and distinguishing present
from future time. The main result of our paper is the theorem stating
that L(TK) is decidable and giving a resolving algorithm.
2 Notation, Definitions
General notation and definitions concerning modal logics which we will
use can be found, or instance, in [1, 5]. To study the combination
of knowledge and time we will use the language of multi-modal logic.
Our language LTK is chosen as follows: the alphabet of LTK contains
propositional letters P := {p1, ..., pn, ...}, round brackets (, ), standard
boolean operations, and the set of modal operations {24,2∼, {Ki | i ∈
I := {1, ..., k}}. Well formed formulae (wff) are defined in the standard
way, in particular, if A is a wff, than 24A, 2∼A, KiA, for all i ∈ I, are
wff. Fma(L) is the set of all well formed formulae of LTK . The informal
meaning of the modal operations is as follows. The set I := {1, ..., k}
indicates k distinct agents. 24A means: the formula A always will
be true; KiA: the agent i knows A in the current time state and the
current information node; 2∼A: the wise agent knows A in the current
time state and current information node.
Semantics for this language is based on linear and discrete time
flow, associating a time point with any natural number n. As se-
mantic tools we will use the following Kripke-Hintikka frames: TK :=
〈WTK , R4, R∼, R1, ..., Rk〉, where the base set of TK is the disjoint union
of sets Cn, WTK :=
⋃
n∈N Cn,. Binary relations R4, R∼, and R1, ..., Rk
are as follows: R4 is the following linear, reflexive and transitive rela-
tion on WTK ×WTK :
∀x, y ∈ WTK(xR4y iff ∃n1, n2 ∈ N ((x ∈ Cn1)&
& (y ∈ Cn2) & (n1 ≤ n2)));
R∼ is the equivalence relation on any Cn ∈ WTK :
∀x, y ∈ WTK(xR∼y iff ∃n ∈ N (x ∈ Cn & y ∈ Cn);
Any Ri is some equivalence relation on any Cn.
1See Fagin et al., [2], pp. 127-128.
2
The informal meaning of these frames is as follows. Any cluster Cn
contains a set of information nodes available at the time point n. The
relation R4 is the connection of the information nodes by time current:
xR4y indicates that the node y is a node available in the same time
as x, or y is an information node in a future time point. xR∼y says
that x and y are nodes in the same time point, and xRiy indicates
that in the current time point y is accessible from x by of the agent i
authorities. A model MTK on TK is a tuple MTK = 〈TK, V 〉 where V
is a valuation of a set P of propositional letters in TK. That is, for any
pi ∈ P V (pi) ⊆ WTK .
The valuation V can be extended from the set P onto all wff’s
constructed from P in the standard way. In particular, ∀x ∈ WTK ,
x V 24A iff ∀y ∈ WTK (xR4y =⇒ y V A);
x V 2∼A iff ∀y ∈ WTK (xR∼y =⇒ y V A);
x V KiA iff ∀y ∈ WTK (xRiy =⇒ y V A).
Let MTK := 〈TK, V 〉 be a model on a frame TK; a formula A ∈
Fma(LTK) is said to be true in MTK at the point a ∈ WTK if a V A.
A formula A is true in the model MTK , notation MTK  A, if ∀a ∈
WTK , a V A. A is valid in the frame TK, notation TK  A, if, for
any model MTK on TK, MTK  A.
Definition 2.1 The logic L(TK) is the set of all TK-valid formulae:
L(TK) := {A ∈ Fma(LTK) | TK  A, ∀ TK-frame}
3 Decidability
The aim of our paper is to prove that the logic L(TK) is decidable.
Initially we will show that any formula A which is not a theorem of
L(TK) can be refused by a frame similar to f TK but of a finite size
computable from the length of A. Consider and fix for the rest of this
paper a formula A such that A 6∈ L(TK). Then there is a frame TK and
a model MTK := 〈TK, V 〉 based on this frame such that, ∃a ∈ WTK ,
(MTK , a) 6V A. Firstly we reduce the number of elements in any Cn
to a finite number of ones effectively bounded from size of A. This
can be easy done by a standard filtration on any separate Cn. Below
we briefly sketch this technique. Let Sub(A) be the set of all the sub-
formulae of A. Define the equivalence relation ≈ on WTK as follows:
∀a, b ∈ WTK [a ≈ b iff ∃n ∈ N (a, b ∈ Cn & ∀β ∈ Sub(A) (a V
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β iff b V β))]. Next, define the quotient set of the original model:
∀a ∈ WTK [a]≈ := {b | a ≈ b}, ∀n ∈ N Cn≈ := {[a]≈ | a ∈ Cn},
W≈TK :=
⋃
n∈NC
n
≈.
The model resulting from this filtration is based on this quotient
set and looks as follows: M≈TK := 〈W≈TK , R≈4, R≈∼, R≈1 , ..., R≈k , V ≈〉 where:∀p ∈ Sub(A), V ≈(p) := {[a]≈ | a ∈ V (p)}; ∀[a]≈, [b]≈ ∈ W≈TK ,
[a]≈R≈4[b]≈ iff ∃n,m ∈ N ([a]≈ ∈ Cn≈ & |b|≈∈ Cm≈ & n ≤ m);
[a]≈R≈∼[b]≈ iff ∃n,m ∈ N ([a]≈ ∈ Cn≈ & [b]≈ ∈ Cm≈ & n = m);
∀i ∈ I [a]≈R≈i [b]≈ iff ∃n ∈ N ([a]≈, [b]≈ ∈ Cn≈ &
&∀Kiβ ∈ Sub(A) ((MTK , a) V Kiβ iff (MTK , b) V Kiβ)).
Since the model described is a result of filtration the standard
filtration-lemma holds:
Lemma 3.1 For any formula β ∈ Sub(A), for any element a ∈ WTK
(MTK , a) V β ⇔ (M≈TK , [a]≈) V ≈ β.
Corollary 3.2 M≈TK 6 A.
Lemma 3.3 If ‖Sub(A)‖ := m, then ∀n ∈ N, ‖Cn≈‖ is at most 2m.
Thus the model M≈TK refutes A and has clusters Cn of effectively
bounded size. Using M≈TK we will construct a finite model refusing A.
The clusters Cn≈ and C
j
≈ are isomorphic (we will use in the sequel nota-
tion: Cn≈ ∼= Cj≈) if and only if there is a function f s.t.: f : Cn≈ −→ Cj≈,
(1) f is a bijection, (2) ∀ξ ∈ {4,∼, 1, ..., k}, ∀a, b ∈ Cn≈ (aR≈ξ b
iff f(a)R≈ξ f(b)), (3) ∀p ∈ Sub(A), ∀a ∈ Cn≈ (a ∈ V ≈(p) iff
f(a) ∈ V ≈(p)). By Lemma 3.3 we conclude
Proposition 3.4 There is only a finite, computable from A, number
of non-isomorphic time-clusters Cn≈ ∈ W≈TK.
For any time cluster Cn≈, C
n4
≈ is the set of all the4-successor clusters
of Cn≈ : ∀ Cn≈ ∈ W≈TK , Cn4≈ := {Cj≈ | n ≤ j}, and Cn+≈ :=
⋃
Cn4≈ . In
the sequel, Cn+≈ (M) or C
n4
≈ (M) are described sets from a frame M (we
will alter these frames M).
Definition 3.5 The time-cluster Cn≈ is a stabilizing cluster if and only
if for any Cj≈, where n ≤ j, the sets Cn4≈ and Cj4≈ coincide up to
isomorphism of clusters.
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Lemma 3.6 The model M≈TK has a stabilizing cluster Cs.
Proof. By Proposition 3.4 the number of non-isomorphic time-
clusters Cn≈ ∈ W≈TK is finite. The following also holds: ∀n, j ∈ N, n ≤
j =⇒ Cn4≈ ⊇ Cj4≈ . Consider the sequence of all the time-clusters
C1≈, C
2
≈, ... . We construct a subsequence C
n′
≈ of the sequence C
n
≈, n ∈ N
as follows. Take C1≈; if C
1
≈ is a stabilizing cluster, then we stop, and the
subsequence is chosen. Assume a subsequence C1
′
≈ , ..., C
n′
≈ is chosen. If
Cn
′
≈ is not a stabilizing cluster, then there is a cluster C
k
≈, where, up to
isomorphism, Cn
′4
≈ ⊃ Ck4≈ . Take the 4-smallest Ck≈ with this property
and set C
(n+1)′
≈ := Ck≈. Since C
n′4
≈ ⊃ C(n+1)
′4
≈ , this procedure must
terminate, and it terminates at a stabilizing cluster. 
We denote by Cs the 4-smallest stabilizing cluster.
Lemma 3.7 If Cs is a stabilizing cluster, then ∀n, j ∈ N, where
n, j ≥ s, the following holds. If Cn≈ is isomorphic to Cj≈ by a mapping
f , then ∀β ∈ Sub(A), ∀a ∈ Cn≈
((Cn+≈ , a) V ≈ β iff (Cj+≈ , f(a)) V ≈ β).
Proof may be given by induction on the length of β. The only non-
trivial steps are the ones for the modal operations. If β is 2∼B or KiB
for i ∈ I the claim holds by the induction hypotheses and the definition
of isomorphism. Let β be 24B. Assume (Cn+≈ , a) V ≈ 24B. We can
have 3 cases: (i) n = j where the proof is trivial, (ii) n < j, and (iii) n >
j. If n < j, (Cn+≈ , a) V ≈ 24B implies that for any b ∈ Cn+≈ (b V ≈ B).
Since n < j, Cn+≈ ⊇ Cj+≈ holds and ∀c ∈ Cj+≈ , (M≈TK , c) V ≈ B.
Consequently (M≈TK , f(a)) V ≈ 24B and (Cj+≈ , f(a)) V ≈ 24B. The
proof of the converse is similar to the case (iii) below. Consider the
case (iii) when n > j. Assume (Cn+≈ , a) V ≈ 24B. This implies
that, for any b ∈ Cn+≈ , ((M≈TK , b) V ≈ B). Since n, j ≥ s and Cs is
the stabilizing cluster, for any Cm≈ ∈ Cj4≈ there is some Cm′≈ ∈ Cn4≈
such that Cm≈ ∼= Cm′≈ . Therefore by induction hypothesis we conclude
∀Cm≈ ∈ Cj4≈ , ∀c ∈ Cm≈ (Cm+≈ , c) V ≈ B. Then (M≈TK , f(a)) V ≈ 24B
and (Cj+≈ , f(a)) V ≈ 24B. The proof of the converse is similar to the
previous case. 
For any time-cluster Cn≈, where n ≥ s, [Cn≈]∼= is the set of all the
time-clusters isomorphic to Cn≈: ∀n, j ≥ s [Cn≈]∼= := {Cj≈ | Cn≈ ∼= Cj≈}.
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Take and fix, for any [Cn≈]∼= a unique representative cluster C
∗
n. Let
St :=
⋃
n≥sC
∗
n be the set of all the elements of such clusters. We define
a new finite model as follows: MBTK := 〈WBTK , RB4, RB∼, RB1 , ..., RBk , V B〉,
where WBTK := {C1≈, C1≈, ..., Cs, St}, ∀p ∈ Sub(A) V B(p) := {a ∈ WBTK |
a ∈ V ≈(p)}, ∀a, b ∈ WBTK ∀n, j ≤ s ((a ∈ Cn≈ & b ∈ Cj≈) =⇒ (aRB4b
iff aR≈4b)), otherwise, if n, j > s, R
B
4 is a universal relation on St:
∀a, b ∈ St (aRB4b). And aRB∼b iff aR≈∼b, ∀i ∈ I aRBi b iff aR≈i b.
Lemma 3.8 For any formula β ∈ Sub(A) and, for any a ∈ WBTK,
(M≈TK , a) V ≈ β iff (MBTK , a) V B β.
Proof is given by induction on the length of β. The steps for the
boolean operations are standard. Let β be24B. Assume (M≈TK , a) V ≈
24B. Since a ∈ Cn≈ for some n ∈ N, we have 2 cases: (A): n ≤ s and
(B): n > s.
Consider (A). Then (M≈TK , a) V ≈ 24B implies that for all elements
b ∈ Cn+≈ (M≈TK , b) V ≈ B. Cn≈ belongs to MBTK by assumption. Let
Cn+≈ (M≈TK) be the set of all 4-successors of Cn≈ inM≈TK and Cn+≈ (MBTK)
be the set of all 4-successors of Cn≈ in MBTK . Then Cn+≈ (M≈TK) ⊇
Cn+≈ (MBTK)). Therefore by IH we have ∀c ∈ Cn+≈ (MBTK), (MBTK , c) V B
B, and so it follows (MBTK , a) V B 24B.
Consider the case (B): n > s. Then (M≈TK , a) V ≈ 24B implies that∀b ∈ Cn+≈ (M≈TK , b) V ≈ B. Consider all the clusters between Cs and
C≈n : by the definition of stabilizing cluster, each of them is isomorphic
to some cluster belonging to Cn4≈ . Therefore, by Lemma 3.7 we have
that ∀c ∈ Cj≈ (s ≤ j ≤ n =⇒ (M≈TK , c) V ≈ B). So we have ∀b ∈
Cs4 ((M≈TK , b) V ≈ B). Since St ⊆ Cs+, ∀c ∈ St ((M≈TK , b) V ≈ B)
holds. Applying IH we conclude ∀c ∈ St (MBTK , b) V B B and it follows
(MBTK , a) V B 24B.
Assume now that (MBTK , a) V B 24B. Since a ∈ Cn for some
n ∈ N, we still have 2 cases: (C): n ≤ s and (D): n > s. In
the case (C), when n ≤ s, (MBTK , a) V B 24B implies that ∀b ∈
Cn+≈ (MBTK), (MBTK , b) V B B. Since up to the stabilizing cluster Cs,M≈TK and MBTK have exactly the same clusters, applying the induction
hypotheses we have ∀c ∈ Cm≈ (n ≤ m ≤ s =⇒ (M≈TK , c) V ≈ B).
We have now to analyze the case when c ∈ St. First, B is true
w.r.t. V B in any element C∗j ∈ St. Any C∗j belongs to M≈TK as well,
and applying the induction hypotheses we conclude: ∀C∗j ∈ St ∀b ∈
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C∗j (M≈TK , b) V ≈ B. By Lemma 3.7, we have ∀Cm≈ ∈ [C∗j ]∼= ∀c ∈
Cm≈ , (M≈TK , c) V ≈ B and so we can conclude ∀c ∈ Cs+, (M≈TK , c) V ≈
B. Consequently (M≈TK , a) V ≈ 24B.
Consider now the case (D): n > s. (MBTK , a) V B 24B implies that∀b ∈ St (MBTK , b) V B B, because RB4 is an equivalence relation on
St × St. The rest of the proof for this case is similar to the final part
of the case (C).
The inductive step for the case when β is 2∼B or β is KiB , i ∈ I
is immediate because the relations R≈∼ (R
≈
i ) and R
B
∼ (R
B
i ) are the same
in M≈TK and MBTK . 
Thus, by this lemma, the model, MBTK , is finite and refuses the
formula A. Since the number of elements in this model is not effectively
bounded, we do not have yet decidability of the logic L(TK). Below we
will construct a new model by dropping some 4-clusters from MBTK .
For any sub-formula β of A, Cβ is the 4-maximal 4-cluster among
C1≈, C
2
≈, ..., C
s
≈ s.t. ∃b ∈ Cβ(MBTK , b) V B β, if such clusters exists. C¬β
is the analogous cluster for ¬β. The new model is as follows:
WFTK :=
⋃
β∈Sub(A)
Cβ ∪
⋃
β∈Sub(A)
C¬β ∪ St,
MFTK := 〈WFTK , RF4, RF∼, RF1 , ..., RFk , V F〉
where: ∀p ∈ Sub(A) V F(p) := {a ∈ WFTK | a ∈ V B(p)}, ∀a, b ∈
WFTK , ∀Rξ ∈ {R4, R∼, R1, ..., Rk}, aRFξ b iff aRBξ b.
Lemma 3.9 For any formula β ∈ Sub(A), for any element a ∈ WFTK,
(MFTK , a) V F β iff (MBTK , a) V B β.
Proof is by induction on the length of β. Evidently we only need
to consider the steps for modal operations. If β is 2≈B or β is KiB,
the steps are evident because all the relations RF∼ and R
F
i are the same
inMFTK andMBTK . Consider the case when β is 24B. If (MBTK , a) V B
24B then ∀b ∈ WBTK (aR4b =⇒ (MBTK , b) V B B). Since WFTK ⊆ WBTK ,
by induction hypothesis we have ∀c ∈ WFTK (aR4b =⇒ (MFTK , b) V F
B) and so (MFTK , a) V F 24B.
If (MBTK , a) 6V F 24B then there is an element b ∈ WBTK such that
aR4b and (MBTK , b) 6V B B.
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If b ∈ St, then clearly (MFTK , b) 6V F B and (MFTK , a) 6V F 24B.
Otherwise there is an R4-maximal cluster C¬B among C1≈, C
2
≈, ..., C
s
≈
and a c ∈ C¬B s.t. (MBTK , c) 6V B B. Since C¬B belongs to WFTK by
IH we conclude (MFTK , c) 6V F B. Since aR4b, it follows (MFTK , a) 6V F
24B. 
So, by this lemma A is refused by the model MFTK with effectively
bounded size. Take an arbitrary frame F with the structure as the
frame of a modelMFTK . It is easy to show that F is a p-morphic image
of a frame TK based on ∼-clusters from the 4-linear part of F which
4-followed by infinite chain of ∼-clusters subsequently doubling the
remaining part of ∼-clusters from F . Therefore all theorems of L(TK)
are true in F , and we have the following
Theorem 3.10 The logic L(TK) has the finite model property with
computable size of refusing models, and hence L(TK) is decidable.
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Abstract
The paper investigates admissible inference rules for the multi-modal logic LTK, which describes a
combination of linear time and knowledge. This logic is semantically defined as the set of all LT K-
valid formulae, where LT K-frames are multi-modal Kripke-frames combining a linear and discrete
representation of the flow of time with special S5-like modalities, defined at each time cluster and
representing knowledge. We start by revising the effective finite model property in this particular
case, while the central part of the paper is devoted to constructing special n-characterising models
for LTK. Such structeres allow us to find an algorithm determining admissible inference rules in LTK;
the main result of this work is that LTK is decidable with respect to inference rules.
Keywords: Modal logic, Multi-modal logic, Epistemic logic, Tense logic, Inference rules, Admissible
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1 Introduction
Modal and multi-modal propositional logics are among the most promising
tools that have been developed so far to describe human reasoning. Modalities
have been investigated since the dawn of philosophical and logical research.
They are flexible by nature: modal operators can be interpreted in many ways.
Depending on the chosen interpretation, we can generate different languages
which are useful to describe distinct aspects of human reasoning. It is well
known that the combination of temporal and knowledge modalities provides an
highly expressive language, (cf. Fagin et al. [3], Thomason [23]). Multi-modal
logics generated by adjoining operators representing time and knowledge to the
classical propositional calculus PC are particularly effective for representing a
state in which agents, who possess a certain knowledge, are operating in the
flow of time (see for instance Dixon et al. [2], Fagin et al. [3], Gabbay et al.
[5], Halpern et al. [12], Thomason [23], Wooldridge and Lomuscio [24]). These
logics have many applications both in AI and in CS.
Although such techniques work fine in numerous applications, it is reason-
able to ask whether and how the inference machinery could be enlarged. Many
variations of axiomatic systems have been presented so far (see for instance
1L. J. of the IGPL, Vol. 0 No. 0, pp. 1–21 0000 c© Oxford University Press
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Halpern et al. [12]). But there are also other important components in deriva-
tions: inference rules.
Inference rules, or logical consecutions, are an important instrument of non-
standard logics. For instance, rules can describe properties of modal frames
in some cases in which using formulae may be difficult. A good example is
Gabbay’s irreflexive rule (cf. [6]):
ir :=
¬(p→ ♦p)→ A
A
(where p does not occur in the formula A). This rule states that each world of a
model, where A is not valid, should be irreflexive. Admissible consecutions have
been deeply investigated for many modal and superintuitionistic logics (see, for
instance, Ghilardi [7, 8, 9], Golovanov et al. [11], Iemhoff [15, 16], Jerˆa´bek [17],
Rybakov [20, 21, 22]). Their investigation began with Harrop’s observation
(cf. [13]) that we can enlarge an axiomatic system by adding admissible,
though not derivable, inference rules.This approach led Friedman (see [4]) to
ask whether there is an algorithm to recognise the rules admissible in IPC, the
intuitionistic propositional calculus. This question and its analogues for modal
logic has been solved by Rybakov [18, 19, 22], and a robust mathematical
theory has been developed1.
However, for the case of multi-modal logics, not much is known concerning
admissible inference rules, though there have been some attempts to approach
the problem (cf. for instance Golovanov et al. [10]). Nowadays, logics of this
kind are an active research area and the axiomatic systems that have been
constructed and examined are numerous (cf. Halpern et al. [12]). In our
paper, we extend the investigation of this area to a multi-modal logic, LTK
(Linear Time and Knowledge), which combines tense and knowledge modali-
ties. This logic is semantically defined as the set of all LT K-valid formulae,
where LT K-frames are multi-modal Kripke-frames combining a linear and dis-
crete representation of the flow of time with special S5-like modalities, defined
at each time cluster and representing knowledge.
The aim of this paper is to show that LTK is decidable with respect to
admissible inference rules, i.e. to find an algorithm which recognises, given a
rule r, if r is admissible for LTK. We start by proving that LTK has the effective
finite model property and hence it is decidable with respect to theorems (cf.
Section 3). Although this result follows from Calardo and Rybakov [1], we
will briefly sketch the proof in Section 3, because in the sequel we will need
the techniques used. Section 4 is the core of this work and it is devoted to the
construction of special countable n-characterising models for LTK. In Section
1For a more detailed historical account see Rybakov [22], Iemhoff [14].
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5 we prove several technical lemmas. Finally, in Section 6, we present the main
contribution of this paper. We show that an inference rule r is admissible in
LTK if and only if it is valid in all the frames of a special kind, whose size
is computable and bounded by the size of r. Hence, we prove that LTK is
decidable w.r.t. inference rules.
2 Preliminaries
Before presenting our account of the semantic tools we will use in this paper,
we recall some necessary basic definitions, so that this paper will be largely
self contained.
The language LLTK is as follows: its alphabet consists of a countable set of
propositional letters P := {p1, . . . , pn, . . .}, round brackets (, ), the standard
boolean operations and the set of modal operations {4,Ke,Ka}. Well formed
formulae (wff’s) are defined in the standard way, in particular, if A is a wff,
than 4A, KeA, KaA are wff’s; Fma(LLTK) is the set of all the wff’s of LLTK
(in the rest of the paper, by the expression formula we always refer to a
formula from Fma(LLTK)). The intended meaning of the modal operations is:
(a) 4A means that the formula A will always be true; (b) KaA stands for the
agent operating in the system knows A in the current moment ; (c) KeA means
that A is known everywhere in the present time-cluster (i.e. A is part of the
environmental knowledge).
Definition 2.1
A k-modal Kripke-frame is a tuple F = 〈WF ,R1, . . . ,Rk〉 where WF is a non-
empty set of worlds and each Ri is some binary relation on WF . Given a frame
F , by WF we denote its base set.
Definition 2.2
Given a Kripke-frame F := 〈WF ,R1, . . . ,Rk〉, for any Ri, an Ri-cluster of
worlds is a subset CRi of WF s.t.: ∀w∀z ∈ CRi(wRiz & zRiw) and ∀z ∈
WF∀w ∈ CRi((wRiz & zRiw)⇒ z ∈ CRi). For any Ri, CRi(w) is the Ri-cluster
s.t. w ∈ CRi(w). Given two Ri-clusters Cm and Cj the expression CmRiCj is an
abbreviation for ∀w ∈ Cm∀z ∈ Cj(wRiz).
Semantics for the language LLTK is based on a linear and discrete flow of
time, associating a time point with any natural number n. The semantic tools
we will use are a particular kind of 3-modal Kripke-frames:
Definition 2.3
An LT K-frame (Linear Time and Knowledge frame) is a 3-modal Kripke-
frame F := 〈WF ,R4,Re,Ra〉, where WF is the disjoint union of certain non
empty sets Cn, for n ∈ N: WF :=
⋃
n∈N Cn. The binary relations R4, Re, and
Ra are as follows:
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(a) R4 is the linear, reflexive and transitive relation on WF such that:
∀w∀z ∈WF (wR4z iff ∃i, j ∈ N ((w ∈ Ci) & (z ∈ Cj) & (i ≤ j)))
(b) Re is a universal relation on any Ci ∈WF :
∀w∀z ∈WF (wRez ⇔ ∃i ∈ N (w ∈ Ci & z ∈ Ci));
(c) for all i, Ra is some equivalence relation on Ci.
The number of sets Cn can be either finite or infinite. The intended meaning
of these frames is to represent a situation in which one agent, having a certain
knowledge background at any moment, is operating in the linear flow of time.
Each time-cluster (i.e. an R4-cluster) Cn consists of a set of information points
that are available at the moment n. The relation R4 is the connection of such
information points by the flow of time, that is, given two information points
w and z, the expression wR4z means either that w and z are both available
at a moment n, or that z will be available in the future with respect to w.
Since the relation Re connects all the information-points available at the same
moment, it is intended to represent a sort of environmental knowledge, that
is the whole information potentially available for the agent at a given time.
Moreover Ra says which information points are effectively available for the
agent: it specifies the piece of information the agent has access to at any given
moment.
Definition 2.4
Given a Kripke-frame F , a model MF on F is a tuple MF = 〈F , V 〉 where V
is a valuation of a set P of propositional letters in F . That is, for any p ∈ P
(V (p) ⊆WF ).
Given a model M = 〈F , V 〉, where F is an LT K-frame, the valuation V can
be extended in the standard way from the set P onto all well formed formulae
constructed from P . In particular, ∀w ∈WF ,
(a) (F , w) V p ⇔ w ∈ V (p);
(b) (F , w) V 4A ⇔ ∀z ∈WF (wR4z ⇒ (F , z) V A);
(c) (F , w) V KeA ⇔ ∀z ∈WF (wRez ⇒ (F , z) V A);
(d) (F , w) V KaA ⇔ ∀z ∈WF (wRaz ⇒ (F , z) V A).
Definition 2.5
If M = 〈F , V 〉 is a model on a frame F , a formula A is said to be true in
the model M at the world w if (F , w) V A; A is true in the model M,
notation F V A, if ∀w ∈ WF , (F , w) V A; A is valid in the frame F , no-
tation F  A, if, for any valuation V for F (that is for any model MF on
F), F V A. Given a class of frames F, A is valid on F (and we say A to be
F-valid) if ∀F ∈ F, F  A. The expression V (A) is an abbreviation for the set
{w | w V A}.
Definition 2.6
Let LT K be the class of all LT K-frames. The logic LTK is the set of all LT K-
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valid formulae: LTK := {A ∈ Fma(LLTK) | F  A & F ∈ LT K}. If A belongs
to LTK, then A is a theorem of LTK.
3 Effective finite model property for LTK
The first question we will give an answer to is whether LTK has the effective
finite model property (efmp). A logic L has the efmp if for every formula A 6∈ L
there is a finite model 〈F , V 〉 such that F V B for each B ∈ L, F 6V A and
‖WF‖ ≤ f(‖A‖), where f is computable. We will prove below that LTK has
the efmp and hence it is decidable. Though this result follows from Calardo
and Rybakov [1], we will give an enlightened version of the proof, because we
will need such technique in the sequel.
Definition 3.1
Given a Kripke-frame F = 〈W,R1, . . . ,Rk〉 and a world w in WF , wRi≤ :=
{z | wRiz} and wRi< := {z | wRiz & ¬(zRiw)}. Given a Ri-cluster C, CRi≤ :=
{Cj | CRiCj} and CRi< := {Cj | CRiCj & ¬(CjRiC)} (In what follows we will
always use the expression w4 and C4 as abbreviations for wR4≤ and CR4≤
respectively. We will also use w< and C< instead of wR4< and CR4<).
Theorem 3.2
The logic LTK has the efmp and hence it is decidable.
Proof. Take a formula A such that A 6∈ LTK; then there are an LT K-frame
F1 := 〈WF1 ,R14,R1e .R1a〉, a model M1 := 〈F1, V1〉 and a world w ∈ WF1 such
that (F1, w) 6V1 A. Suppose F1 is infinite.
Step 1. We start by reducing the number of worlds belonging to each R14-
cluster C of worlds from WF1 using the standard filtration technique, briefly
sketched below. Let Sub(A) be the set of all the sub-formulae of A. Define the
equivalence relation ≈ on WF1 as follows:
∀w∀z ∈ WF1(w ≈ z ⇔ wR14z & zR14w & ∀B ∈ Sub(A) ((F1, w) V1 B ⇔
(F1, z) V1 B))) (Recall that the condition wR14z & zR14w is equivalent to
∃i(w ∈ Ci & z ∈ Ci), that is the worlds w and z belong to the same time-
cluster and hence wR1ez).
Next, define the quotient set of the original model: ∀w ∈ WF1 [w] := {z |
w ≈ z}, ∀n ∈ N [Cn] := {[w] | w ∈ Cn}. Let F2 := 〈WF2 ,R24,R2e ,R2a〉 be a
frame where:
(a) WF2 :=
⋃
n∈N[Cn];
(b) [w]R24[z]⇔ wR14z;
(c) [w]R2e [z]⇔ wR1ez;
(d) [w]R2a[z] ⇔ ([w] ∈ [Cn] & [z] ∈ [Cn] & ∀B ∈ Sub(A)((F1, w) V1 KaB ⇔
(F1, z) V1 KaB)).
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Let M2 := 〈F2, V2〉 be a model on F2 where V2 is defined as:
∀p ∈ Sub(A) V2(p) := {[w] | w ∈ V1(p)}
Since the model described is the result of a filtration, the standard filtration-
lemma holds:
Lemma 3.3
For any formula B ∈ Sub(A), for any world w ∈ W1, (F1, w) V1 B ⇔
(F2, [w]) V2 B.
Corollary 3.4
F2 6V2 A.
Thus the model M2 refutes A as well. Moreover, each R24-cluster contains a
finite number of worlds, bounded by the size of A, namely ‖C‖ ≤ 2‖Sub(A)‖ for
each R24-cluster C.
Step 2. We will reduce, now, the amount of time-clusters (i.e. R24-clusters)
to a finite one. We need few preliminary facts. Evidently, the following holds:
Proposition 3.5
There is only a finite, computable from the size of A, number of non-isomorphic
w.r.t. Sub(A) time-clusters C from WF2.
Definition 3.6
Given an LT K-frame F := 〈WF ,R4,Re,Ra〉 and a model M := 〈F , V 〉, an
R4-cluster Cs is a stabilizing cluster if and only if for any R4-cluster Ci ∈ C4s ,
for any R4-cluster Cj ∈ C4s there is an R4-cluster Ck ∈ C4i such that Cj ∼= Ck,
i.e. the sets C4s and C4i coincide up to isomorphism between R4-clusters.
Lemma 3.7
The model M2 has a stabilizing R24-cluster Cs.
Proof. By Proposition 3.5 the number of non-isomorphic R24-clusters C is
finite. Moreover, we have that for all the R24-clusters Ci, Cj from WF2 ,
CiR24Cj ⇒ C4i ⊇ C4j . Consider the sequence of all the time-clusters C1, C2, . . ..
We construct a subsequence C′n of the sequence Cn, n ∈ N as follows. Take
C1; if C1 is a stabilizing cluster, then we stop, and the subsequence is cho-
sen. Otherwise, assume that a subsequence C′1, . . . , C′n is chosen. If C′n is not
a stabilizing cluster, then there is a cluster Ck, where, up to isomorphism,
C′4n ⊃ C4k . Take the R24-smallest Ck with this property and set C′(n+1) := Ck.
Since C′4n ⊃ C′4(n+1), this procedure must terminate, and it stops at a stabilizing
cluster.
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Lemma 3.8
If Cs is a stabilizing cluster, then, for all the R24-clusters Ci, Cj of worlds from
WF2 such that CsR24Ci and CsR24Cj, if Ci is isomorphic to Cj by a mapping f ,
then ∀B ∈ Sub(A), ∀w ∈ Ci (F2, w) V2 B ⇔ (F2, f(w)) V2 B.
Proof. It may be given by an easy induction on the length of B. Both the
basis of the induction and the inductive steps regarding the boolean opera-
tions and the modal operators Ke and Ka are evident. Hence, we turn our
attention only to the case B is 4D, (F2, w) V2 4D and w4 ⊂ f(w)4. It
follows that ∀z ∈ w4, (F2, z) V2 D. Since each R24-cluster from f(w)4 is
isomorphic to some R24-cluster from w
4, by Inductive Hypothesis, we have
∀v ∈ f(w)4, (F2, v) V2 D, therefore (F2, f(w)) V2 4D.
Step 3. Consider the set C4s . We want to reduce the number of its elements
to a finite one. Firstly, we make a partition of this set into equivalence classes.
We take each time-cluster of worlds from C4s and we define its equivalence
class w.r.t. isomorphic time-clusters [C]∼= := {Cj | CsR24Cj & C ∼= Cj}. We take
and fix, for each R24-cluster C from C4s , a representative R24-cluster Rep(C) ∈
[C]∼=. Next we set REP :=
⋃
C∈C4s Rep(C). Now we introduce a new frame
St := 〈WSt,RSt4 ,RSte ,RSta 〉 where:
(a) WSt :=
⋃
C∈REP C
(b) RSt4 := WSt ×WSt
(c) RSte := R
2
e WSt (i.e. RSte is the restriction of R2e on WSt.)
(d) RSta := R
2
a WSt
We consider, now, the linear part of M2 up to the stabilising cluster Cs and
we define a subframe Fl v F2, Fl := 〈Wl,Rl4,Rle,Rla〉, where WFl := WF2 −⋃ C4s . The LT K-frame F3 := 〈WF3 ,R34,R3e ,R3a〉 has the following structure
(see Figure 1):
(a) WF3 := WSt ∪WFl
(b) R34 := R
St
4 ∪ Rl4 ∪ {〈w, z〉 | w ∈WFl & z ∈WSt}
(c) R3e := R
St
e ∪ Rle
(d) R3a := R
St
a ∪ Rla
LetMF3 := 〈F3, V3〉 be the model in which V3 is the restriction of V2 on WF3 .
Lemma 3.9
For any formula B ∈ Sub(A), for any world w ∈ WF3, (F3, w) V3 B ⇔
(F2, w) V2 B.
Proof. The proof can be given by induction on the lenght of B. We consider
only the case in which B is 4D, (F3, w) V3 4D and w ∈ WSt. This means
that D is true at all those worlds z ∈ WF3 s.t. wR34z, i.e. all the worlds
belonging to WSt (recall that RSt4 is an equivalence relation on WSt). By
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Fig. 1. Scheme of the structure of the frame F3.
Inductive Hypothesis we have that (F2, z) V2 D for any z belonging both
to WF3 and to WF2 . Consider a world v ∈ WF2 such that v ∈ C4s . We
can have two cases: either v belongs to WSt or v does not. In the former
case (F2, v) V2 D holds by Inductive Hypothesis, while in the latter, since v
belongs to an R24-cluster isomorphic to an R
St
e -cluster from WSt, (F2, v) V2 D
holds by Lemma 3.8. Therefore (F2, w) V2 4D.
The base set of MF3 contains a finite number of worlds, but, since we do not
know how many they are, we need to contract it again.
Step 4. For each B ∈ Sub(A), we consider the R34-maximal R3e-cluster C of
worlds from WF3 such that ∃w ∈ C, (F3, w) V3 B and we denote it by CB.
Likewise, by C¬B we denote the R34-maximal R3e-cluster containing a world z
refuting B. Then we introduce a new frame F4 := 〈WF4 ,R44,R4e ,R4a〉 where:
WF4 :=
⋃
B∈Sub(A)
CB ∪
⋃
B∈Sub(A)
C¬B ∪ WSt
and all the binary relations are the restriction of the ones from F3 on WF4 .
LetM4 := 〈WF4 , V4〉 be a model on F4 where V4 is nothing but the restriction
of V3 on WF4 .
Lemma 3.10
For any formula B ∈ Sub(A), for any world w ∈ W4, (F4, w) V4 B ⇔
(F3, w) V3 B.
Proof. We conduct an easy induction on the length of B, and we illustrate
only the case B is 4D, (F4, w) V4 4D and w 6∈ WSt. Suppose (F3, w) 6V3
4D. Then there is a world z ∈ WF3 such that wR34z, (F3, z) 6V3 D and
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z 6∈ WF4 . By construction of MF4 , there must be an R44-maximal R4e-cluster
C¬D in F4 such that there exists a world v ∈ C¬D, (F4, v) 6V4 D. Since C¬D is R44-
maximal, we also have wR44v. This is a contradiction, hence (F3, w) V3 4D.
Now the number of worlds from WF4 is finite and it is f(‖A‖), where f is a
computable function and f(‖A‖) ≤ (2‖Sub(A)‖(2‖Sub(A)‖+ 22‖Sub(A)‖)).
Step 5. Our next step is to show that F4 is the p-morphic image of an
LT K-frame and hence ∀B ∈ LTK, F4  B. Let CSt1 , . . . , CSti be an enumeration
of all the R4e-clusters of worlds from WSt and let F5 := 〈WF5 ,R54,R5e ,R5a〉 be a
frame such that:
(a) WF5 :=
⋃
1≤j≤i CStj
(b) ∀w∀z ∈WF5 (wR54z ⇔ (w ∈ CStj & z ∈ CStk & j ≤ k))
(c) ∀w∀z ∈WF5 (wR5ez ⇔ wR4ez)
(d) ∀w∀z ∈WF5 (wR5az ⇔ wR4az)
Let F∞ = 〈WF∞ ,R∞4 ,R∞e ,R∞a 〉 be an LT K-frame consisting of an infinite
repetition of F5 and let F6 = 〈WF6 ,R64,R6e ,R6a〉 be a subframe of F4 such
that WF6 = WF4 −
⋃ C<s (recall that Cs is the stabilizing cluster of F4). Let
F = 〈WF ,R4,Re,Ra〉 be an LT K-frame such that:
(a) W = WF∞ ∪W6
(b) R4 = R∞4 ∪ R64 ∪ {〈w, z〉 | w ∈WF6 & z ∈WF∞}
(c) Re = R∞e ∪ R6e
(d) Ra = R∞a ∪ R6a.
It is easy to see that F4 is a p-morphic image of F .
Notice that in this proof we have examined only the general case in which
the formula A is not valid in an infinite LT K-frame. If such frame is a finite
one, we do not need to go through steps 2, 3 and 5.
4 Construction of ChLTK(n)
In this section we will construct special countable n-characterizing models for
the logic LTK (see Definition 4.2) based on the tecniques presented in Rybakov
[22]. This construction is the ground on which we will base our main result.
Given an LT K-frame F := 〈WF ,R4,Re,Ra〉, a world w (or an R4-cluster
C) from WF has R4-depth n, in symbols depthR4(w) = n, if the number of
R4-clusters in CR4(w)4 is n (in what follows, we will always use the expression
depth instead of R4-depth or depthR4). The expression Sln(F) denotes the
n-slice of F , i.e. the family of all the elements of depth n from WF . Sn(F)
is the set of all the elements from WF with depth at most n. Given a model
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M := 〈F , V 〉 and a world w ∈ WF , by V alV (w) we will denote the set
{pi | w V pi}. For any valuation V , Dom(V ) denotes the domain of V .
Definition 4.1
Let Fi = 〈WFi ,Ri1, . . . ,Rik〉, for i ∈ I, be a family of k-modal Kripke-frames
with pairwise disjoint base sets, i.e. WFi ∩WFj = ∅ for each i, j ∈ I. The
disjoint union of Fi is the frame:⊔
i∈I
Fi = 〈
⋃
i∈I
WFi ,
⋃
i∈I
Ri1, . . . ,
⋃
i∈I
Rik〉
Given a family Mi = 〈Fi, Vi〉 of Kripke-models on the family of frames Fi,
the disjoint union of Mi is the model:⊔
i∈I
Mi = 〈
⊔
i∈I
Fi,
⋃
i∈I
Vi〉
Definition 4.2
Given a logic L, a Kripke-model M := 〈F , V 〉 is an n-characterizing model
for L iff: (a) Dom(V ) := {p1, . . . , pn} (b) for any formula A built up from
Dom(V ), F V A ⇔ A ∈ L.
Let F be a class of finite LT K-frames (i.e. LT K-frames whose base sets are
finite) such that, for any frame F ∈ F, ∀w∀z ∈WF (wR4z & wRez). Let C(F)n
be the class of all the possible different, non isomorphic models C := 〈F , V 〉,
where:
(a) F ∈ F;
(b) Dom(V ) = {p1, . . . , pn};
(c) ∀w∀z ∈WF
(
((V alV (w) = V alV (z))&({V alV (w′) | wRaw′} = {V alV (z′) |
zRaz
′}))⇒ (w = z)
)
.
It is easy to notice that the size of C(F)n is computable and bounded by n.
Step 1. Let P(C(F)n) be the set of all the subsets of C(F)n.
Given a set S = {C1, . . . , Cj} from P(C(F)n), for each Ci ∈ S, we display the
model Ci as Ci := 〈Wi,Ri4,Rie,Ria, Vi〉.
For any set S = {C1, . . . , Cj} from P(C(F)n), TS is the Kripke-model TS :=
〈WS,R4,Re,Ra, V 〉, where:
(a) WS :=
⋃
1≤i≤j Wi
(b) R4 := WS ×WS
(c) Re :=
⋃
1≤i≤j R
i
e
(d) Ra :=
⋃
1≤i≤j R
i
a
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(e) Dom(V ) := {p1, . . . , pn}
(f) ∀p ∈ Dom(V )(V (p) := ⋃1≤i≤j Vi(p))
Since the temporal relation R4 is universal, each TS is an R4-cluster of
Re-clusters.
Let S1(ChLTK(n)) :=
⊔
S∈P(C(F)n) TS.
Hence the first slice contains a finite number of pairwise disjoint models,
where each model is an R4-cluster of Re-clusters.
Step 2. Consider any TS from S1(ChLTK(n)), and any Re-cluster Ci from
C(F)n s.t. ∀C ∈ TS, Ci is not isomorphic to a submodel of C.
We adjoin all such models Ci to S1(ChLTK(n)) assuming Ci to be the im-
mediate R4-predecessor of all the Re-clusters from TS. The resulting model is
defined as S2(ChLTK(n)).
Step 3. Suppose we have already constructed the model Si(ChLTK(n)) for
i ≥ 2 such that its frame is an LT K-frame and given two different R4-clusters
Cj , Ck from this frame, if Cj is an immediate R4-predecessor of Ck, then Cj
is not isomorphic to a submodel of Ck. To construct Sli+1(ChLTK(n)) we add
Re-clusters from C(F)n in the following way. We take each Re-cluster C of
depth i and we add as its immediate R4-predecessors all the possible different
Re-clusters Cj from C(F)n, but only provided that Cj is not isomorphic to a
submodel of C.
Let Si+1(ChLTK(n)) be the model resulting from all such additions.
The final model ChLTK(n) := 〈WCh(n),R4,Re,Ra, V 〉 is given by⋃
i∈N
Si(ChLTK(n))
Let Ch(n) be the name for the frame on which ChLTK(n) is based.
Lemma 4.3
The model ChLTK(n) = 〈Ch(n), V 〉 is n-characterizing for LTK.
Proof. Since Ch(n)  LTK by construction, the claim A ∈ LTK ⇒ Ch(n) V
A, for any formula A built up from the propositional letters p1, . . . , pn, follows
immediately.
Suppose there is a formula A built up from p1, . . . , pn s.t. A 6∈ LTK. In order
to prove that A is not true in ChLTK(n), we will construct a model refuting A,
which is isomorphic to an open submodel of ChLTK(n).
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By Theorem 3.2, there are a finite frame F1 = 〈WF1 ,R14,R1e ,R1a〉 (whose size
is computable and bounded by the size of A) and a modelM1 := 〈F1, V1〉 such
that F1 6V1 A. ∀w, z ∈ C, if the following two conditions hold:
(a) V alV1(w) = V alV1(z)
(b) {V alV1(w′) | wR1aw′} = {V alV1(z′) | zR1az′}
then we glue w and z together. The resulting model M2 := 〈F2, V2〉 is a
p-morphic image of M1 := 〈F1, V1〉, thus it still refutes A.
Let St1 be the set of R1e-clusters of depth 1 from F1, and let St2 be the set
of R2e-clusters of depth 1 from F2 (cf. Section 3 and Figure 1). We delete
R2e-clusters from St2 as follows: for any C1, C2 from St2 s.t. C1 6= C2, if C1 is a
submodel of C2, then we delete C1. Let M∗1 be the resulting model. Clearly,
M∗1 is a p-morphic image of St1 and it is also isomorphic to an open submodel
of ChLTK(n).
Suppose we have already constructed the model M∗i := 〈F∗i , V ∗i 〉 s.t.:
(a) ∀w ∈WF∗i , depth(w) ≤ i
(b) M∗i is a p-morphic image of the open submodel ofM2 generated by the
set
⋃ C4, where C is an R24-cluster of depth i.
(c) M∗i is isomorphic to some open submodel of ChLTK(n).
The following procedure will explain how to obtain the model M∗i+1. Let C
be the R∗4-deepest R
∗
4-cluster in M∗i . Consider the R24-cluster Ci+1 in M2 of
depth i+1. If Ci+1 is not a submodel of C, then we adjoin Ci+1 as the immediate
R∗4-predecessor of C, otherwise we do not add anything. This procedure ends
when we reach the R24-deepest R
2
4-cluster C in M2. We denote the resulting
model by M∗. Clearly, M∗ is a p-morphic image of the original model M1,
therefore it refutes A. Since M∗ is also isomorphic to some open submodel of
ChLTK(n), it follows Ch(n) 6V A.
5 Definability of worlds
Definition 5.1
Given a model M = 〈F , V 〉, a world w ∈ WF is definable if and only if there
is a formula β(w) such that ∀z ∈WF ((F , z) V β(w) ⇔ w = z).
Lemma 5.2
For any n-characterising model ChLTK(n), each world w from WCh(n) is de-
finable.
Proof. We will use the following abbreviations: Si for Si(ChLTK(n)); ♦4
for ¬4¬ and ♦e, ♦a for ¬Ke¬, ¬Ka¬ respectively. If depth(w) = 1, the
expression TS(w) will denote the R4-circle of Re-clusters to which w belongs.
Step 1. We start by analysing the case depth(w) = 1, that is w belongs to
some TS(w) ∈ S1(ChLTK(n)). We will use the following formulae:
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α(w) :=
∧
w∈V (pi)
pi ∧
∧
w 6∈V (pi)
¬pi
ρa(w) :=
∧
wRaz
♦aα(z) ∧ Ka
∨
wRaz
α(z)
ρe(w) :=
∧
z∈CRe (w)
♦e
(
α(z) ∧ ρa(z)
)
∧ Ke
∨
z∈CRe (w)
(
α(z) ∧ ρa(z)
)
ρ4(w) :=
∧
z∈TS(w)
♦4
(
α(z) ∧ ρa(z) ∧ ρe(z)
)
∧4
∨
z∈TS(w)
(
α(z) ∧ ρa(z) ∧ ρe(z)
)
ρ<(w) :=
∧
z∈TS(w)
4♦4
(
α(z) ∧ ρa(z) ∧ ρe(z)
)
We set the formula β(w) to be:
β(w) := α(w) ∧ ρa(w) ∧ ρe(w) ∧ ρ4(w) ∧ ρ<(w)
The intended meaning of the defined formulae is:
(a) ρa(w) specifies the structure of the Ra-cluster generated by w;
(b) ρe(w) describes the Re-cluster generated by w;
(c) ρ4(w) indicates all the R4-accessible worlds from w and it also specifies
that they are the only ones R4-seen by w;
(d) ρ<(w), finally, says that the R4-maximal time-cluster that is R4-accessible
from w consists of all the Re-clusters from TS(w).
Step 2. Suppose w is an element of depth i + 1. The formulae α(w),
ρa(w) and ρe(w) are defined in the same way as the former case. Recall that
w< := {z | wR4z & ¬(zR4w)}.
γ(i) :=
∧
z∈Si
¬β(z)
ρ′4(w) :=
∧
z∈w<
♦4β(z) ∧
∧
z∈Si&z 6∈w<
¬♦4β(z)
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δ(w) := 4
( ∨
z∈w<
β(z) ∨
∨
z∈CR4 (w)
(
α(z) ∧ ρa(z) ∧ ρe(z) ∧ γ(i)
))
We can now define β(w):
β(w) := α(w) ∧ ρa(w) ∧ ρe(w) ∧ ρ′4(w) ∧ γ(i) ∧ δ(w)
The formula ρ′(w) says that w R4-sees a specified set of worlds from Si,
while γ(i) avoids the case w ∈ Si. Finally, δ(w) says that if a world z is
R4-seen by w, then either it belongs to the set of all the R4-successors of w,
or it is in the R4-cluster generated by w. Now, we will show that, for any w, z
from ChLTK(n), if z V β(w), then (w = z). We can have two cases.
Case 1. Assume w has depth 1 and suppose there is a point z s.t. z V
β(w).
(a) If depth(z) = 1, then the structure of β(w) implies that the R4-open
submodels generated by z and w are isomorphic, so they should coincide.
Hence, by the structure of S1(ChLTK(n)), we have w = z.
(b) The case depth(z) = 2 is impossible because ρ<(w) is a conjunct of β(w).
(c) If depth(z) > 2, then either zR4w or ¬(zR4w). The case zR4w is im-
possible for the structure of S2(ChLTK(n)) (i.e. there should be an Re-cluster
C s.t. depth(C) = 2, C ∈ CRe(z)4 and C 6∈ CRe(w)4). Since ρ<(w) is also a
conjunct of β(w), the case ¬(zR4w) is impossible as well.
Case 2. Assume w has depth i + 1 and suppose there is a point z s.t.
z V β(w). By the structure of the conjunct γ(i) of β(w), we have depth(z) >
(i + 1). By the conjunct ρ′4 we have ∀v ∈ Si(wR4v ⇒ zR4v). We can have
two cases:
(a) If depth(z) = i + 1, then, by the construction of ChLTK(n), CR4(w) =
CR4(z) and so w = z.
(b) Suppose depth(z) > i+ 1; then either zR4w or ¬(zR4w). Assume zR4w;
then there are R4-clusters C1, . . . , Cm between CR4(z) and CR4(w) such that
CR4(z), C1, . . . , Cm, CR4(w) is an R4-chain of R4-clusters (i.e. CR4(z)R4C1,
CmR4CR4(w) and for each i, j 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ m, CiR4Cj). By the struc-
ture of the conjunct δ(w), each R4-cluster from C1, . . . , Cm is isomorphic to
CR4(w) and this is impossible by the construction of ChLTK(n). Assume
¬(zR4w); then there are R4-clusters C1, . . . , Cm such that depth(Cm) = i + 1
and CR4(z), C1, . . . , Cm is an R4-chain. Again, by the structure of δ(w), each
R4-cluster from C1, . . . , Cm is isomorphic to CR4(z) and this is impossible by
the construction of ChLTK(n).
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6 Decidability for LTK with respect to inference rules
Definition 6.1
An inference rule r is an expression of the form
r :=
A1(p1, . . . , pn), . . . , Am(p1, . . . , pn)
B(p1, . . . , pn)
where any Ai(p1, . . . , pn) and B(p1, . . . , pn) are wff built up from the letters
p1, . . . , pn (in what follows, we will sometimes use the expression
A1(p1, . . . , pn), . . . , Am(p1, . . . , pn)/B(p1, . . . , pn)).
A substitution σ is a map which assigns a formula to each propositional
variable. Given a formula A, σ(A) is the result of the application of σ to A.
Definition 6.2
Given a logic L and an inference rule r := A1, . . . , Am/B, r is said to be admis-
sible for L if and only if for each substitution σ, if σ(Ai) ∈ L for each i, then
σ(B) ∈ L.
Therefore, the greatest class of rules which can be implemented for a given
logic, i.e. which are compatible with the set of its valid formulae, is the class of
its admissible rules: this is the class of all those rules under which the theory
itself is closed.
Definition 6.3
Given a model 〈F , V 〉, a valuation V ′ is definable if and only if ∀p ∈ Dom(V ′)
there is a formula αp s.t. V ′(p) = V (αp).
From the general result stated by Theorem 3.3.3 in Rybakov [22], it follows
immediately:
Lemma 6.4
An inference rule r := A1, . . . , An/B is not admissible for LTK iff there is an
n-characterising model ChLTK(n) := 〈Ch(n), V 〉 and a definable valuation V2
s.t. Ch(n) V2
∧
1≤i≤n Ai and Ch(n) 6V2 B.
Now, we introduce a special kind of 3-modal Kripke-frames, which will play
a central role in the proof of our main result. The structure of such frame is
depicted in Figure 2.
Definition 6.5
Let FL, FS and FP be Kripke-frames with the following structure:
(a) The frame FL = 〈WFL ,RL4,RLe ,RLa〉 (LOOP-component) is as follows:
WFL is a nonempty set of worlds; R
L
4 = WFL × WFL; RLe is an equivalence
relation on WFL; R
L
a is some equivalence relation on R
L
e -clusters;
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Fig. 2. Scheme of the structure of an LSP-frame.
(b) Let F = 〈WF ,R4,Re,Ra〉 be a finite LT K-frame (i.e. it is an LT K-
frame with a finite base set of worlds. See Definition 2.3); let C1, . . . , Ci be an
enumeration of all the RS4-clusters of worlds from WF ; let Dots := {w1, . . . , wi}
be a set of worlds such that ∀wj , 1 ≤ j ≤ i(wj 6∈ WF ). The frame FS =
〈WFS ,RS4,RSe ,RSa〉 (STRING-component) has the following structure: WFS =
WF ∪Dots; RS4 = R4∪{〈wj , z〉 | wj ∈ Dots & z ∈ Cj}∪{〈wj , wj〉 | wj ∈ Dots};
RSe = Re ∪ {〈wj , wj〉 | wj ∈ Dots}; RSa = Ra ∪ {〈wj , wj〉 | wj ∈ Dots}.
(c) The frame FP := 〈WFP ,RP4,RPe ,RPa 〉 (POINT-component) is such that
its base set contains only one world denoted by @,WFP := {@}, and all the
binary relations on WFP are universal.
An LSP-frame (loop-string-point frame) is a tuple Flsp = 〈Wlsp,Rlsp4 ,Rlspe ,Rlspa 〉
where WFlsp = WFL∪WFS∪WFP; Rlsp4 = RL4∪RS4∪RP4∪{〈w, z〉 | w ∈WFS & z ∈
WFL}; Rlspe = RLe ∪ RSe ∪ RPe ; Rlspa = RLa ∪ RSa ∪ RPa (See Figure 2).
Theorem 6.6
An inference rule r := A1, . . . , Am/B is not admissible for LTK if and only
if there is a finite LSP-frame Flsp, whose size is computable from ‖V ar(r)‖
(where V ar(r) is the set of all the variables occurring in r), and a model
Mlsp = 〈Flsp, V 〉 s.t. Flsp V
∧
1≤i≤n Ai and Flsp 6V B.
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Proof. (⇒) Suppose that an inference rule r := A1, . . . , Am/B is not admis-
sible for LTK and let p1, . . . , pk be all the letters occurring in r. Hence there
are formulae γ1, . . . , γj , 1 ≤ j ≤ k, s.t.
∧
1≤i≤m Ai(γ1, . . . , γj) ∈ LTK and
B(γ1, . . . , γj) 6∈ LTK. Let Prop(γ) be the set of all the propositional letters
occurring in γ1, . . . , γj .
By Lemma 6.4 there is an n + 1-characterising model ChLTK(n + 1) :=
〈Ch(n+ 1), V 〉 and a new definable valuation V2 with Dom(V2) := Prop(γ) ∪
{pn+1}, where pn+1 6∈ Prop(γ), s. t. Ch(n+1) V2
∧
1≤i≤m Ai(γ1, . . . , γj) and
Ch(n+ 1) 6V2 B(γ1, . . . , γj).
Take a world w ∈WCh(n+1) such that:
(a) (Ch(n+ 1), w) 6V2 B(γ1, . . . , γj)
(b) ∀v ∈ w4(v 6∈ V2(pn+1))
(c) ∀v ∈WCh(n+1)(((Ch(n+ 1), v) 6V2 B(γ1, . . . , γj) & v4 ∩
V2(pn+1) = ∅)⇒ ‖w4‖ ≤ ‖v4‖) (i.e. w4 is the smallest set of the kind
v4 containing a world refuting B and such that none of its elements belongs
to V2(pn+1)).
It can be easily noticed that, since the propositional letter pn+1 does not
occur in any γi, such a world w exists in ChLTK(n+ 1).
Let C1, . . . , Ci be an enumeration of all the R4-clusters of worlds from w4
such that depth(Cj) ≥ 2. Now we take and fix, for each R4-cluster Cj a world
wj such that:
(a) wj 6∈ Cj
(b) w4j = {wj} ∪
⋃ C4j
(c) wj ∈ V2(pn+1)
The existence of such a world for each R4-cluster is guaranteed by the
construction of ChLTK(n + 1). In fact, since wj ∈ V2(pn+1) while none of the
worlds from any Cj belongs to V2(pn+1), we have that for any j, CR4(wj) is
not a submodel of Cj . Let Dots = {w1, . . . , wi} be the set of those worlds wj .
Take and fix a world @ ∈WCh(n+1) such that:
(a) @ 6∈ w4 ∪ Dots
(b) @4 = {@}
LetMFlsp := 〈Flsp, V2〉 be an open submodel of ChLTK(n+1) whereWFlsp :=
w4 ∪ Dots ∪ {@}. Since MFlsp is a generated submodel of ChLTK(n + 1), we
have Flsp V2
∧
1≤i≤m Ai(γ1, . . . , γj) and Flsp 6V2 B(γ1, . . . , γj). Moreover, by
Definition 6.5, Flsp is an LSP-frame. Though Flsp is finite, the number of
worlds from its base set is not known. To reduce such number, we apply
the technique used in the proof of Theorem 3.2 in a slightly different way.
Consider the STRING-component FS of Flsp (cf. Definition 6.5, item (b)).
For each D ∈ Sub(B), we consider the R4-maximal world v ∈ WFS such that
(Flsp, v) 6V2 D. We can have two cases: either v ∈ Dots and hence v = wj
for some j, or v ∈ Cj for some j. In both cases, by CD we denote the set⋃ Cj ∪ {wj}. Likewise, by C¬D we denote the set ⋃ Cj ∪ {wj} (such that there
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Fig. 3. Scheme of the structure of Ch(n) and the sets Entry and notEntry.
is an R4-maximal world v refuting D and either v ∈ Cj or v = wj). Then we
define a subframe Flsp′ := 〈WFlsp′ ,Rlsp
′
4 ,R
lsp′
e ,R
lsp′
a 〉 where:
WFlsp′ :=
⋃
B∈Sub(A)
CD ∪
⋃
B∈Sub(A)
C¬D ∪ WFL ∪ {@}
Let MFlsp′ := 〈Flsp′ , V3〉 be a model s.t. V3 = V2  WFlsp′ . It is easy to verify
that MFlsp′ refutes r, Flsp′ is an LSP-frame. Moreover, the number of worlds
from WFlsp′ is finite and computably bounded by the size of V ar(r) (cf. item
(c) page 17). Therefore part (⇒) of the theorem has been proved.
(⇐) Suppose that we have an inference rule r := A1, . . . , Am/B, an LSP-frame
Flsp and a modelMFlsp := 〈Flsp, S〉 such that Flsp S
∧
1≤i≤n Ai and Flsp 6S B.
Let Prop(WFlsp) := {pw | w ∈ WFlsp} and VAR := Prop(WFlsp) ∪ V ar(r). We
define a new valuation S2 for Flsp in the following way:
(a) Dom(S2) = VAR
(b) ∀pw ∈ Prop(WFlsp)(S2(pw) = {w})
(c) ∀x ∈ V ar(r)(S2(x) = S(x))
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Clearly the new model 〈Flsp, S2〉 still refutes B, but not any Ai. We con-
struct, following the procedure explained in Section 4, the model ChLTK(n) :=
〈Ch(n), V 〉, where n = ‖VAR‖. It is easy to see that the model 〈Flsp, S2〉
formerly defined is (isomorphic to) an open submodel of ChLTK(n). We will
construct, now, a new definable valuation V2 for Ch(n) refuting r. The basic
idea is finding a way to extend the valuation S2 from Flsp to the whole frame
Ch(n). Recall that by Lemma 5.2 we know that each world from the base set
of ChLTK(n) is definable (recall that for any world w, by β(w) we denote that
particular formula defining w).
Let @ be the name of that world from WFlsp such that:
(a) @4 = {@}
(b) ∀w ∈WFlsp ((wRe@ or wR4@ or wRa@) ⇒ w = @) (See Figure 3.)
We define the set of all those worlds from WCh(n) that are not R4-related to
any point from [WFlsp − {@}] (see Figure 3), i.e. we set
notEntry := {v | v 6V ♦4β(w), ∀w ∈ [WFlsp − {@}]}
Let Dots be a subset of WFlsp as defined in Definition 6.5, i.e.:
Dots = {wj | wj ∈ [WFlsp − {@}] & ∀z ∈WFlsp (zR4wj ⇒ wj = z)}
Take and fix, for each R4-cluster Cj of worlds from [WFlsp − {@}]−Dots such
that depth(Cj) ≥ 2, a representative world zj belonging to Cj . Let Rep be the
set containing all those representative elements.
For each representative world zj from Rep, we shall define, now, an entry-set
(see Figure 3). It contains all those worlds v from WCh(n) −WFlsp which are
R4-predecessors of zj and such that zj is the R4-deepest world belonging to
[WFlsp − Dots] which is R4-accesible from v: ∀zj ∈ Rep
Entry(zj) := {w | w 6∈WFlsp & w V ♦4β(zj) & ∀v ∈ [WFlsp − Dots]((vR4zj
& ¬(zjR4v))⇒ w 6V ♦4β(v))} (See Figure 3.)
For each representative world zj from Rep, we define a formula φ(zj) that is
true only at those worlds belonging to Entry(zj). ∀zj ∈ Rep:
φ(zj) :=
∧
v∈WFlsp
¬β(v) ∧ ♦4β(zj) ∧
∧
v∈WFlsp&vR4zj&¬(zjR4v)
¬♦4β(v)
It can be easily verified that, given a world v, it belongs to Entry(zj), for
some zj ∈ Rep, if and only if φ(zj) is true at v under V . Recall that for any
zj ∈ Rep, by wj we denote the world from Dots such that zj is one of its
immediate R4-successors.
To define the valuation V2, let Dom(V2) := VAR;
∀p ∈ VAR, V2(p) :=
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⋃
v∈WFlsp&p∈V (v)
V (β(v)) ∪
⋃
v∈notEntry&@∈V (p)
V (β(v)) ∪
⋃
zj∈Rep&zj∈V (p)
V (φ(zj))
Obviously the valuation V2 is definable, in fact, for each p ∈ VAR, there is
a formula αp such that V2(p) = V (αp), namely, ∀p ∈ VAR:
αp :=
∨
v∈WFlsp&p∈V (v)
β(v) ∨
∨
v∈notEntry&@∈V (p)
β(v) ∨
∨
zj∈Rep&zj∈V (p)
φ(zj)
Next step is to show that the inference rule r is not valid in the new model
〈Ch(n), V2〉. It is sufficient to show that the following claim holds: for any
formula A on LLTK containing only letters from VAR
Flsp S2 A ⇔ Ch(n) V2 A.
Notice that the three statements below follow immediately by the definition
of V2:
(a) ∀w ∈ WFlsp (Ch(n), w) V2 A ⇔ (Flsp, w) S2 A (the model 〈Flsp, S2〉
being isomorphic to 〈Flsp, V2〉 which is an open submodel of 〈Ch(n), V2〉);
(b) ∀zi ∈ Rep, ∀v ∈ Entry(zi) (Ch(n), v) V2 A ⇔ (Flsp, wi) S2 A;
(c) ∀v ∈ notEntry (Ch(n), v) V2 A ⇔ (Flsp,@) S2 A.
Since WCh(n) = Wlsp ∪ notEntry ∪
⋃
zj∈Rep Entry(zj), the model 〈Ch(n), V2〉
refutes r.
Corollary 6.7
The logic LTK is decidable with respect to inference rules.
The author would like to thank Vladimir V. Rybakov for his scientific ad-
vising and the numerous improvements he suggested.
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Abstract
The paper aims at providing the multi-modal propositional logic LTK with a sound and complete axiomatisation.
This logic combines temporal and epistemic operators and focuses on modeling the behaviour of a set of agents
operating in a system on the background of a temporal framework. Time is represented as linear and discrete,
whereas knowledge is modeled as an S5-like modality. A further modal operator intended to represent environment
knowledge is added to the system in order to achieve the expressive power sufficient to describe the piece of
information available to the agents at each moment in the flow of time.
Keywords: Modal logic, Multi-modal logic, Temporal logic, Epistemic logic, Combined logics.
1 Introduction
Nowadays research that focuses on modelling human reasoning and agents’ behaviour in a
system is a very active area.Multi-modal languages provide a combination of highly expressive
power and intuitive semantic tools and they are, therefore, widely used in the field. Recently
they have also been applied in Artificial Intelligence and Computer Science in the attempt to
formalise, for instance, reasoning about the behaviour of programs (cf. Goldblatt [9, 8]).
The main feature of modal logics is that they enable the switch from extensional languages
(expressing only facts, statements which can be either true or false) to intensional ones.
Modal logics deal with sentences that are qualified by modalities such as can, could, might,
may, must etc. and they are often constructed by adding one or more modal operators
(usually œ and s) to a classical propositional system. Likewise, multi-modal logics are
obtained by adding more than one modal operator to an existing logical system.
Although traditionally read as expressing necessity and possibility, modal operators have
numerous possible interpretations. The choice would then be suggested by the context one
is to describe. In the case of tense logics, one can interpret the modal propositionhp as it will
always be the case that p, and its dual ep as at some point in the future it will be the case
that p. Such language is, therefore, effective whenever a description of the flow of time,
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towards both future and past is needed. Epistemic logics, on the other hand, are suitable to
formalize reasoning about agents not possessing complete information (see Fagin et al. [5],
Rybakov [12]). However, such systems may have an expressive limitation, for it may be
difficult to deal with modifications in the pieces of information each agent possesses as well
as to give an account of a changing environment. Adding a dynamic dimension to such
systems is therefore almost a necessity. The most natural way partially to improve on such
a deficiency is to insert epistemic logics in a temporal framework. Hence we would
generate a multi-modal system combining tense and knowledge operators (see Fagin et al. [5],
Halpern et al. [10]).
Moreover, systems generated by joining operators representing both time and knowledge
have already proved themselves to be particularly effective in describing the interaction
between agents through the flow of time (see Fagin et al. [5], Gabbay et al. [6], Halpern et al.
[10], [3, 2]). These systems are generated by adding to an existing propositional system two
sets of modalities: one to model the flow of time, the other to describe the agents’ knowledge.
The interaction of such modalities gives a precise account of the dynamic development
of agents’ knowledge. Though interesting and promising, this approach has not yet been
fully investigated, due to the complexity and the extent of the subject. Nevertheless,
in the last decade, the theories developed have have been successfully applied both in the
study of human reasoning and in computing. These theories are concentrated on the
development of systems modelling reasoning about knowledge and space, reasoning
under uncertainty or with bounded resources, multi-agent reasoning and other aspects of
artificial intelligence.
However, several difficulties arise whenever one is to prove an axiomatic system to be
sound and complete with respect to a class of multi-modal frames. According to Bennett
et al. [1] and Kurucz [11], if there is no interaction between modalities a transfer of properties
(such as finite model property, decidability, etc.) from the component simple modal logics to
the newly generated multi-modal system does apply. However, as soon as such interaction
takes place it is not straightforward anymore to prove that the combined system is
conservative with respect to the properties of its components. In some cases the opposite may
apply. Nevertheless, despite such difficulties, interaction between modalities is necessary
fully to exploit the power of multi-modal languages.
This paper aims at providing the multi-modal logic LTK (formerly introduced in [3] and
[2]) with a finite, sound and complete axiomatisation with interacting modalities. In our
previous works this logic has been defined semantically and proved to be decidable with
respect to its theorems [3], whereas a weaker version of it is also decidable with respect to its
admissible inference rules [2]. We start by recalling the semantic framework of our work
introducing a special kind of multi-modal Kripke-frames aiming at modelling a set of agents
operating in a system where the time is considered as linear and discrete. Besides a temporal
operator and a knowledge operator for each agent operating in the system, our language
provides a further epistemic modality, which is intended to represent environmental
knowledge, i.e. a modality which makes our logic sufficiently powerful to express the piece of
information available to the agents at each moment in the flow of time. We provide a sound
axiomatic system and we proceed by following the standard approach of constructing
canonical models, generated submodels and making filtration (see Gabbay [7]). Since
standard tools are not sufficient to show completeness, in Section 3 we prove Lemma 3.15,
which is the core of the whole work (cf. Goldblatt [8]) and makes a substancial use of our
multi-modal version of the axiom presented by Dummett and Lemmon [4].
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2 Syntax and Semantics
The alphabet of the language LLTK includes a countable set of propositional letters
P :¼ fp1, . . . , pn, . . .g, round brackets ð, Þ and the boolean operations f! ,?g as well as a set of
modal operators fh4,Ke,K1, . . . ,Kkg. Well formed formulae (wff’s) are defined as follows:
each propositional letter p 2 P is a wff and if A is a wff, then so are h4A,KeA,KiA. We assume
e4, ee and si to be abbreviations for :h4:, :Ke: and :Ki: respectively. The boolean
operations :,^,_ are defined in the usual way by means of ! and ?.
The intended meaning of the modal operators formerly introduced is: (a)h4A: the fact A is
true from now on; (b) KeA: A is true everywhere in the environment; (c) KiA: the agent i
operating in the system knows A in the current moment in the sense that all the information
points accessible to agent i provide the information A.
Formulae in the language LLTK allow occurrences of temporal operators in the scope of the
epistemic modalities K1, . . . ,Kk , leading to the possibility of expressing formulae such as
Kie4A, interpreted as agent i knows that eventually it will be the case that A. To prevent
agents from having pre-knowledge concerning future events we introduce a weaker language
LLTK. A formula A is local if and only if it does not contain any occurrence of the modal
operator h4, i.e. each propositional letter is local and if A is local, then so are KeA and KiA for
each i. Well formed formulae are defined as they are in the former case, with the only
exception of formulae containing a modal operator Ki for some i: if A is a wff, then KiA is a wff,
provided that A is local.
By the expression FmaðLLTKÞ we denote the set of all the wff’s on LLTK and by the term
formula we always refer to a member of FmaðLLTKÞ. Clearly FmaðLLTKÞ  FmaðLLTKÞ.
Although we assume the reader to be familiar with possible world semantics, we provide
few basic definitions necessary to understand the particular case we will work with.
DEFINITION 2.1
A k-modal Kripke-frame is a tuple F ¼ hW ,R1, . . . ,Rki where W is a non-empty set of
worlds and each Rj is some binary relation on W W . Given a frame F , by WF we denote
its base set.
Given a Kripke-frame F , a modelM on F is a tupleM¼ hF ,V i where V is a valuation of
a set P of propositional letters in F .
DEFINITION 2.2
Given a Kripke-frame F :¼ hWF ,R1, . . . ,Rki, for any Ri, an Ri-cluster of worlds is a subset
CRi of WF s.t.: 8w8z 2 CRi ðwRiz & zRiwÞ and 8z 2WF8w 2 CRi ððwRiz & zRiwÞ) z 2 CRi Þ.
An Ri -cluster is said to be: degenerate if it consists of one single Ri -irreflexive world;
simple if it consists of a single Ri -reflexive world; proper if it contains at least two
Ri -reflexive worlds.
For any Ri, CRi ðwÞ is the Ri-cluster s.t. w 2 CRi ðwÞ. Given two Ri -clusters Cm and Cj the
expression CmRiCj is an abbreviation for 8w 2 Cm8z 2 Cj ðwRizÞ.
We use a special kind of multi-modal Kripke frames called LT K-frames, where the prefix
LT K is an acronym for Linear Time and Knowledge. These structures aim at modelling a set
of agents operating in a temporal framework.
DEFINITION 2.3
An LT K-frame (Linear Time and Knowledge frame) is a kþ2-modal Kripke-
frame F :¼ hWF ,R4,Re,R1, . . . ,Rki, where WF is the disjoint union of certain
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non empty sets Cn, for n 2 N: WF :¼
S
n2N Cn. The binary relations R4, Re, and Rj are
as follows:
(a) R4 is the linear, reflexive and transitive relation on WF such that: 8v8z 2WF ðvR4z iff
9i, j 2 Nððv 2 CiÞ & ðz 2 Cj Þ & ði  jÞÞÞ
(b) Re is a universal relation on any Ci 2WF : 8v8z 2WF ðvRez,9i 2 Nðv 2 Ci & z 2 CiÞÞ;
(c) each Rj is some equivalence relation on each Ci.
Each world can be interpreted as a single information point. The linear temporal relation
R4 links such information points so that, given two worlds v and z, the expression vR4z
means either that v and z are both available at a moment n, or that z will be available in the
future with respect to v. Hence two information points are concurrent if they belong to the
same R4-cluster (time-cluster) and an R4-cluster can be seen as a moment in the time line
(cf. Figure 1). Although time is usually perceived as continuous, it may as well be thought as
discrete. In this context the property of discretenss means that given any two distinct points
in the time line, there might be only a finite amounts of moments between them (though each
moment may contain an infinite amount of information points). Therefore the relation R4 is
discrete with respect to time-clusters. This is actually the way in which computers work.
Moreover, the temporal line has a first point starting from which it proceeds towards the
future. The most important assumption is to consider the flow of time as linear and hence not
branching. This implies that we may not quantify over possible though not actual temporal
paths. In other words, what is relevant is only the actual path the world goes through.
Such strong theoretical deterministic assumption may be practically justified by the
observation that, in analogy to the human situation, all the agents operating in the
system are not aware of the prefixed unicity of their temporal path and they act as heading
to a not-determined future.
The relation Re is defined at each moment in the time line and it links all the information
points belonging to the same environment. In our specific interpretation, only one
environment is possible at each moment and hence time-clusters and environment-clusters
do coincide (see the Appendix for the general case of multiple concurrent environments
and further discussion).
The relation Ri links all the information points accessible by agent i in a given
environment. Any information point provides the agents with some information.
LT K-frames are a suitable tool to interpret the language LLTK as well as LLTK. The only
difference would be that in the case of LLTK, all the facts available to the agents are local
and therefore do not concern any future event. Nevertheless at each world a certain number
of statements about the future could be true, but this piece of information would not be
available to any agent.
FIG. 1. Scheme of the structure of an LT K-frame: here each big circle represents both a
moment in the time line and an environmental cluster, whereas each small circle is intended
to represent a single information point.
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Besides the standard ones, the main features of LT K-frames are the following properties:
PM.1: vRez ) ðvR4z & zR4vÞ i.e. the information points available in the same
environment are concurrent
PM.2: vRiz ) vRez i.e. the information points available to agent i must be in the same
environment (hence at the same moment)
PM.3: ðvR4z & zR4vÞ ) vRez i.e. concurrent information points are in the same
environment
A model M on F is a pair hF ,V i, where F is an LT K-frame and V is a map (valuation)
which associates to each propositional letter p 2 P a set of worlds from the base set of F .
The valuation V can be extended in the standard way from the set P onto all the well formed
formulae built up on P. In particular, 8v 2WF ,
(a) ðF , vÞV p , v 2 V ðpÞ;
(b) ðF , vÞV h4A , 8z 2WF ðvR4z ) ðF , zÞV AÞ;
(c) ðF , vÞV KeA , 8z 2WF ðvRez ) ðF , zÞV AÞ;
(d) For each j, ðF , vÞV KjA , 8z 2WF ðvRj z ) ðF , zÞV AÞ.
IfM¼ hF ,V i is a model on a frame F , a formula A is said to be true in the modelM at the
world v if ðF , vÞV A; A is true in the modelM, notation F V A, if 8v 2WF , ðF , vÞV A; A is
valid in the frame F , notation F A, if, for any valuation V for F (that is for any model
MF on F ), F V A. Given a class of frames F, A is valid on F (and we say A to be F-valid)
if 8F 2 F,F A.
DEFINITION 2.4
Let LT K be the class of all LT K-frames. The logic LTK is the set of all LT K-valid formulae:
LTK :¼ fA 2 FmaðLLTKÞ j F A & F 2 LT Kg. If A belongs to LTK, then A is a theorem of
LTK. Likewise LTK :¼ fA 2 FmaðLLTKÞ j F A & F 2 LT Kg
Axioms of ASLTK (Schemata)
Axioms of CPC (classical propositional calculus)
Kh4 : h4ðA! BÞ ! ðh4A! h4BÞ
Th4 : h4A! A
4h4 : h4A! h4h4A
3h4 : h4ðA^h4A! BÞ _h4ðB^h4B! AÞ
KK : KðA! BÞ ! ðKA! KBÞ,  2 fe, 1, . . . , kg
TK : KA! A,  2 fe, 1, . . . , kg
4K : KA! KKA,  2 fe, 1, . . . , kg
5K : :KA! K:KA,  2 fe, 1, . . . , kg
M :1 : h4A! KeA
M :2 : KeA! KiA, 1  i  k
Dumh4 : h4ðh4ðKeA! h4AÞ ! KeAÞ ! ðe4h4A! h4AÞ
Inference Rules of ASLTK :
MP :
A, A! B
B
Nec :
A
h4A
It is easy to notice that we can derive a necessitation rule for the modalities Ke,K1, . . . ,Kk
by means of the axioms M.1 - M.2 and the rule Nec .
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DEFINITION 2.5
A deduction D in an axiomatic system AS is a finite sequence of formulae A1, . . . , An s.t.
each Ai is either an instance of an axiom schema from AS or it has been obtained from a
sequence of formulae B1, . . . , Bk occurring before A in D via application of an inference rule
from AS. A formula A is a theorem in AS, denoted by ‘AS A, if there is a deduction
D ¼ D1, . . . ,Dk with Dk ¼ A.
DEFINITION 2.6
LTKax :¼ fA 2 FmaðLLTKÞ j ‘ASLTK Ag.
LTKax :¼ LTKax \ FmaðLLTKÞ.
Our axioms for the time modality h4 give rise to an S4:3 modal system, known to be
sound and complete with respect to the class of linear orders. Formerly we stated that
each agent operating in the system is provided with a certain knowledge background.
In order to give a simple account of it, we associate each agent to an S5-modal system.
The assumptions we make are the usual ones:
– If agent i knows A, then the fact A is provided by all the resources she/he has access to;
– Positive Introspection: if someone knows something, she/he is also aware of it;
– Negative Introspection: if someone ignores something, she/he is aware of it.
Moreover, we assume each agent to be logicallly omniscient (knowing both all the
tautologies and all the consequences implicit in her/his knowledge).
The same assumptions appear to be more natural when it comes to model the
behaviour of the environment. In our system, the axioms involving the environment
modality play a central role. In the interaction between different modalities, the operator
Ke works like a bridge connecting the others, which otherwise would not interact at all.
The axioms M.1 and M.2 state that if something is always true toward the future,
then it is also true at the current moment/environment (M.1) and hence each agent
knows it (M.2).
More specifically, Axiom M.1 aims at achieving property PM.1, whereas Axiom M.2 is
responsable for PM.2. Axiom Dumh4 entails the property PM.3 in a less evident and
straightforward way. However, this is probably the most interesting one, for it is the one
regulating the peculiar relation linking h4 to Ke. Indeed, as it is made clear by Lemma 2.7,
axiom Dumh4 achieves two things:
(a) making temporal and environmental clusters coincide;
(b) ensuring a discrete order of temporal clusters.
THEOREM 2.7 (Soundness)
8A 2 FmaðLLTKÞ ðA 2 LTKax) A 2 LTKÞ
PROOF. (by induction on the length of the deduction D ¼ D1, . . . ,Dj of a theorem A 2 LTKax).
Suppose j¼ 1, then A is an axiom from ASLTK. We provide a proof only for the axioms M.1,
M.2 and Dumh4 . (a) Suppose there are an LT K-frame F , a valuation V for F , and a world
v 2WF such that ðF , vÞ 1V h4A! KeA. Then ðF , vÞV h4A and ðF , vÞ 1V KeA. Hence for
each world z 2 ft j vR4tg, z V A but there is a world u 2 ft j vRetg such that u 1 A. Since by
definition ft j vR4tg  ft j vRetg, this leads to a contradiction. Using a similar argument,
it can be easily seen that Axiom M.2 is valid too.
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(b) Suppose that Axiom Dumh4 is not valid. Then there are an LT K-frame F , a valuation
V for F , and a world v 2WF such that ðF , vÞ 1V h4ðh4ðKeA! h4AÞ ! KeAÞ !
ðe4h4A! h4AÞ, and hence:
ðF , vÞV h4ðh4ðKeA! h4AÞ ! KeAÞ ð2:1Þ
and
ðF , vÞ 1V ðe4h4A! h4AÞ ð2:2Þ
Condition (2.1) implies that 8z 2WF ðvR4z ) ðF , zÞ V h4ðKeA! h4AÞ ! KeAÞ. This
means that for each R4-successor z of v, at least one of the following conditions should hold:
(2.1.1).: ðF , zÞ 1V h4ðKeA! h4AÞ, then there is a world t such that zR4t &
ðF , tÞV KeA & ðF , tÞ 1V h4A;
(2.1.2).: ðF , zÞ V KeA.
Let us analise condition (2.2): if ðF , vÞ 1V ðe4h4A! h4AÞ, we have that both of the
following conditions (2.2.1) and (2.2.2) must hold:
(2.2.1): ðF , vÞ V e4h4A;
(2.2.2): ðF , vÞ 1V h4A;
From condition (2.2.1) and (2.2.2) it follows that there is a world R4-accessible from v in
which A is not true, while there is another point R4-accessible from v starting from which A
holds true everywhere toward the future. Since each LT K-frame is a linear and discrete
order with respect to R4-clusters, there is a world v2 such that vR4v2 and ðF , v2Þ 1V A and
for each world z2 such that v2R4z2 & :ðz2R4v2Þ, ðF , z2Þ  A, and hence ðF , z2Þh4A.
Trivially, condition (2.1.2) does not hold at v2, for Re is reflexive.
Then condition (2.1.1) should hold. This implies that there is a world t2 such that v2R4 t2,
ðF , t2ÞV KeA and ðF , t2Þ 1V h4A. Hence t2R4 v2 (for, by the way we chose v2, if v2R4 t2
and :ðt2R4v2Þ, we should have ðF , t2Þ V h4A). Moreover :ðt2Rev2Þ. However, this is in
contradiction with Definition 2.3, for in LT K-frames R4-clusters and Re-clusters should
coincide.
Finally, if lgðDÞ ¼ n þ 1, it could be easily shown that each inference rule preserves
validity. g
3 Canonical models and Generated subframes
We briefly recall few standard definitions and results concerning canonical models and
generated submodels.
DEFINITION 3.1
Given an axiomatic system AS on a language L, a set   FmaðLÞ is:
(a) AS-consistent iff  0AS?;
(b) L-complete iff 8A 2 FmaðLÞ A 2  or :A 2 ;
(c) AS-maximal iff  is AS-consistent and L-complete.
DEFINITION 3.2
Let L be a consistent normal k-modal logic on a language L containing the modal operators
h1, . . . ,hk . An n-canonical model Mcn ¼ hW cn ,Rc1, . . . ,Rck ,V cn i for L is such that:
(a) W cn is the set of all the possible L-maximal sets w.r.t. those formulae built up from the
propositional letters p1, . . . , pn;
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(b) 8v, z 2W cn , vRci z () fA j hiA 2 vg  z, 1  i  k;
(c) V cn ðpiÞ ¼ fv 2W cn j pi 2 vg, 1  i  n.
LEMMA 3.3
Let L be a consistent normal k-modal logic and let Mcn ¼ hW cn ,Rc1, . . . ,Rck ,V cn i be an
n-canonical model for L. Then 8v 2W cn , 8Aðp1, . . . , pnÞ 2 FmaðLÞðhiA 2 v ()
8z 2W cn ðvRci z) A 2 zÞÞ.
LEMMA 3.4 (Truth Lemma)
Let L be a consistent normal k-modal logic and let Mcn ¼ hW cn ,Rc1, . . . ,Rck ,V cn i be an
n-canonical model for L. Then 8v 2W cn , 8Aðp1, . . . , pnÞ 2 FmaðLÞ
ðF cn, vÞ V cn A () A 2 v
where F cn denotes the n-canonical frame on which Mcn is built.
Take and fix for the rest of the paper a formula Bðp1, . . . , pnÞ 62 LTKax. Hence the set f:Bg is
ASLTK-consistent and it follows that there exists an ASLTK-maximal set w w.r.t. all the
formulae built up from p1, . . . , pn such that B 62 w. Therefore there is an n-canonical model for
Mc ¼ hF cn,V cn i for LTKax (where F cn ¼ hW cn ,Rc4,Rce,Rc1, . . . ,Rcki) such that w 2W cn and,
by Lemma 3.4, ðF cn,wÞ 1V cn B. Although this model shows some interesting properties,
it is not built on an LT K-frame.
However, the binary relations in the n-canonical frame have the following properties:
(a) Rce, R
c
i are reflexive, symmetric and transitive.
(b) Rc4 is reflexive, transitive and weakly connected.
(c) 8v, z 2W cn ðvRcez)ðvRc4z & zRc4vÞÞ. Notice that the opposite direction does not hold.
DEFINITION 3.5
An n-modal K-frame F ¼ hWF ,R1, . . . ,Rni is a subframe of an m-modal K-frame
S ¼ hWS,S1, . . . ,Smi if n¼m, WF WS and each Ri is the restriction of Si on WF , i.e.
Ri ¼ Si WF .
DEFINITION 3.6
An n-modal K-frame F ¼ hWF ,R1, . . . ,Rni is a generated subframe of an m-modal
K-frame S ¼ hWS,S1, . . . ,Smi (notation F v SÞ if F is a subframe of S and
8v 2WF 8z 2WS if there is a relation Sj such that vSj z in S, then z 2WF . A model
hF ,V i is a generated submodel of hS,Si if F v S and V is the restriction of S on WF
(i.e. V ¼ S WF ).
LEMMA 3.7 (Generated subframes)
If M¼ hF ,V i is a generated submodel of M2 ¼ hF 2,V2i, then 8v 2WF ,
ðF , vÞV A () ðF 2, vÞ V2 A.
DEFINITION 3.8
Given a Kripke-frame F ¼ hWF ,R1, . . . ,Rki and a world w in WF , wRi :¼ fz j wRizg and
wRi< :¼ fz j wRiz & :ðzRiwÞg. Given a Ri-cluster C, CRi :¼ fCj j CRiCjg and
CRi< :¼ fCj j CRiCj & :ðCjRiCÞg (wR4 and CR4 shall henceforth be referred to as w4
and C4 respectively).
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Consider the generated submodel of hF cn,V cn i generated by w4 (recall that w is that
world refuting B in the n-canonical model) and denote it by hFw4 ,V cn i. Hence ðFw4 ,wÞ 1V cn B
which entails Fw4 1 B.
As the following lemma will clarify, the generated submodel hFw4 ,V cn i shows some
interesting properties shared with LT K-frames:
LEMMA 3.9
Fw4 has the following properties:
(a) The relations Rce,R
c
1, . . . ,R
c
k are equivalence relations;
(b) The relation Rc4 is reflexive, transitive and connected;
(c) 8v, z 2WF vRcez ) ðvRc4z & zRc4vÞ;
(d) 8v, z 2WF vRci z ) vRcez;
PROOF. (c) Suppose :ðvRc4zÞ. Then there is a formula h4D 2 v s.t. D 62 z. By Axiom M.1 it
follows KeD 2 v and hence :ðvRcezÞ. The same case arises if we assume :ðzRc4vÞ. (d) Suppose
:ðvRcezÞ. Then there is a formula KeD 2 v s.t. D 62 z. By Axiom M.2 it follows KiD 2 v for
each i and hence :ðvRci zÞ g
A good way to achieve the required property of discreteness (i.e. given any two disctint worlds
in a model, there could be only a finite amount ofmoments between them) is to make a filtration
of the base set of the model in order to have it finite. Although it is a standard technique, it
requires a careful and appropriate selection of the filtration set. The well known results
concerning this method are recalled below and they would allow us to show the following:
LEMMA 3.10 (Filtration Lemma)
8D 2  8v 2W cn ðv V cn D , ½vV  DÞ
We start by defining the filtration set  as the union of several sets:
– 0 :¼ SubðBÞ, where SubðBÞ is the set of all the subformulae of B
– 1 :¼ SubfDumh4ðDÞ j D 2 0g (where the notation Dumh4ðDÞ is intended to denote the
instance of the axiom Dumh4 by the formula D)
– 2 :¼ fKeh4D j h4D 2 0 [ 1g
– 3 :¼ fKiKeD j KeD 2 0 [ 1 [ 2g for 1  i  k
Let the filtration set  be the union of the formerly defined sets:
 :¼ 0 [ 1 [ 2 [ 3
Then we define a new relation between worlds as:
8v, z 2W cn ðv  z , 8D 2 ðv V cn D , z V cn DÞÞ
and we generate equivalence classes with respect to the relation :
½v :¼ fz j v  zg
The -filtered model M is defined as hF,Vi where F ¼ hW,R4,Re ,R1 , . . . ,Rk i and:
(a) W :¼ f½v j v 2W cn g
(b) Re and each R

i are standard S5 filtration relations, i.e.:
½vR ½z , 8KD 2 ððF cn, vÞ V cn KD , ðF cn, zÞ V cn KDÞ for  2 fe, 1, . . . , kg
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(c) R4 is a standard S4:3 filtration relation, namely:
½vR4½z , 8h4D 2 ððF cn, vÞ V cn h4D ) ðF cn, zÞ V cn h4DÞ
(d) 8pi 2 fp1, . . . , png V ðpiÞ :¼ f½v j v 2 V cn ðpiÞg
It remains only to show that such model satisfies the two filtration conditions for each binary
relation R :
F1 vRcz ) ½vR ½z, where  2 f4, e, 1. . . kg;
F2.1 ½vR ½z ) 8KD 2 ðv V cn KD ) z V cn DÞ, for  2 fe, 1. . . kg;
F2.2 ½vR4½z ) 8h4D 2 ðv V cn h4D ) z V cn DÞ
LEMMA 3.11
The following properties hold true in the model M:
(a) The relation Re satisfies F1 and F2:1.
(b) Each relation Ri satisfies F1 and F2:1.
(c) The relation R4 satisfies F1 and F2:2.
PROOF. (a) F1. Suppose there are two worlds v and z such that vRcez. Then
v V cn KeD ) z V cn D. Since v V cn KeD! KeKeD we have ðv V cn KeDÞ )
ðv V cn KeKeDÞ ) ðz V cn KeDÞ. Suppose ðz V cn KeDÞ. Then ðz V cn KeKeDÞ. Since Rce is
symmetric by Lemma 3.9, we have zRcev and hence ðv V cn KeDÞ. Therefore, by our definition
of Re , it follows vR

ez.
F2.1. Suppose ½vRe ½z. Then 8KeD 2  ðv V cn KeD , z V cn KeDÞ. Since z V cn KeD! D
we have z V cn D. g
The proof of cases (b) and (c) is similar.
Hence by the standard results concerning filtrations, we can state the following:
LEMMA 3.12
8D 2  8v 2W cn ððF cn, vÞ V cn D , ðF, ½vÞ V  DÞ.
COROLLARY 3.13
ðF, ½wÞ 1V  B.
Once more again, we can show that our current -filtered modelM is conservative with
respect to the properties stated by Lemma 3.
LEMMA 3.14
In the model M the following holds:
(a) Re and each R

i are reflexive, symmetric and transitive.
(b) R4 is reflexive, transitive and connected.
(c) 8½v, ½z 2W  ð½vRe ½z ) ð½vR4½z & ½zR4½vÞÞ.
(d) 8½v, ½z 2W ð½vRi ½z ) ½vRe ½zÞ.
PROOF. (a) Trivially ðv V cn KeDÞ , ðv V cn KeDÞ. Hence ½vRe ½v and Re is reflexive.
Suppose ½vRe ½z and ½zRe ½u. Hence ðv V cn KeDÞ , ðz V cn KeDÞ and ðz V cn KeDÞ ,
ðu V cn KeDÞ, which entails ðv V cn KeDÞ , ðu V cn KeDÞ. Hence ½vRe ½u.
Suppose ½vRe ½z. Then ðv V cn KeDÞ , ðz V cn KeDÞ and hence ðz V cn KeDÞ , ðv V cn KeDÞ
which means ½zRe ½v.
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(b) For the properties of reflexivity and transitivity see the previous case. Since by
F1 ðvRc4zÞ implies ð½vR4½zÞ and Rc4 is connected (see Lemma 3.14), it follows that R4
is connected.
(c) Suppose ½vRe ½z and either :ð½vR4½zÞ or :ð½zR4½vÞ. If :ð½vR4½zÞ, then there is a
formula h4D 2  such that v V cn h4D and z 1V cn h4D. By Axiom 4h4 it follows
v V cn h4h4D, hence by Axiom M.1 we have v V cn Keh4D. But Keh4D 2  by construc-
tion1, therefore since ½vRe ½z we have z V cn Keh4D and, by reflexivity, z V cn h4D, which is a
contradiction. We reach a similar contradiction if we assume :ð½zR4½vÞ.
(d) Suppose ½vRi ½z for some i and :ð½vRe ½zÞ. Then there is a formula KeD 2  s.t.
v V cn KeD and z 1V cn KeD. Again, by the axioms 4Ke and M.2 we obtain v V cn KiKeD.
The formula KiKeD belongs to  by construction
2, therefore, given ½vRi ½z, we have
z V cn KiKeD and, by reflexivity, z V cn KeD, which gives rise to a contradiction. g
Properties of filtered relations. From Lemma 3.14 follows that the new binary
relations possess certain properties, namely all the knowledge modalities are reflexive,
symmetric and transitive, whereas the time relation is connected as well as reflexive and
transitive.
Both properties PM.1 and PM.2 hold true:
8v, z 2W ðvRez ) ðvR4z & zR4vÞÞ
which means that two information points (worlds) are simultaneous whenever they are from
the same environment. But this is something we were able to state even in the previous stages
of our construction. The main achievement is that now we have a very important property.
In fact, since the base set of the filtered frame is finite, trivially the time relation R4 gives rise
to a discrete linear order of temporal (R4-) clusters, which in this context means that given
any two distinct worlds, there is only a finite number of moments between them.
However we do not have the property PM.3 yet:
8v, z 2W ððvR4z & zR4vÞ ) vRezÞ
In other words in this frame we may have R4-proper clusters of R

e -clusters, which in our
intended interpretation means that it can be the case that two points, though at the same
moment of the flow of time could belong to different environments (see Figure 2).
Unfortunately, this is not the case for LT K-frames, therefore another transformation seems
to be necessary to prove our axiomatic system to be complete w.r.t. this kind of structures.
To achieve this goal, we will construct another frame. The idea is to unravel each R4-proper
cluster, without using the standard technique of bulldozing, which would give rise to an
infinite, but non discrete (with respect to tempooral clusters) frame. In other words we will
define a well ordering on Re -clusters inside each R

4-proper cluster, in order to construct a
new frame. Such frame will be obtained by substituting each R4-proper cluster with the
1Indeed if h4D 2 , then there are only two possibilities: either h4D 2 0 or h4D 2 1 and in both cases
Keh4D 2 2 and hence it belongs to  as well.
2IIn fact if KeD 2 , then either KeD 2 0 or KeD 2 1 or else KeD 2 2; hence KiKeD 2 3 and it belongs to 
as well.
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finite ordered line formerly defined. The only troubling case is for formulae of the form h4D
from SubðBÞ. There could be, for example, a world v in an R4-proper cluster such that it
falsifies h4D and another world, say z which is the only point R

4-accessible from v falsifying
D. If such world z belonged to the same R4-proper cluster as v and it were not R

4-accessible
from v in the new unravelled frame, then we would have a lack of truth values for formulae
from SubðBÞ. However this situation is made impossible by the subsequent lemma, stating
that whenever a world v in an R4-proper cluster falsifies h4D, D is falsified either in the
same environment-cluster to which v belongs, or in another world z which is strictly above
with respect to v, i.e. vR4z & :ðzR4vÞ.
LEMMA 3.15
8h4D 2 SubðBÞ8v 2W  if v 1V  h4D and v is not final, then there is a world z 2W s.t.
vR4z, z 1V  D and either vR

ez or :ðzR4vÞ.
PROOF. Suppose there are a formula h4D 2 SubðBÞ and a non final world v such that
v 1V h4D. There are only two possible cases.
Case 1. v V e4h4D. Hence, since the instance of Axiom Dumh4 with respect to the
formula D is true in the modelM (for the way we defined , and in particular 1), we have
v 1V h4ðh4ðKeD! h4DÞ ! KeDÞ, and then v V  e4ðh4ðKeD! h4DÞ^ee:DÞ.
Therefore there exists a world z such that:
ðvR4zÞ & ðz V h4ðKeD! h4DÞ^ee:DÞ ð3:1Þ
Let us suppose by contradiction that
(a) The formula D is true in each world from the Re -cluster of v, i.e. 8t 2W 
ðvRe t ) t V  DÞ.
(b) There is no world strictly above w.r.t. v in which D is false, i.e. 8t 2W 
ðvR4t & :ðtR4vÞ ) t V  DÞ.
From (b) and (3.1) follows that zR4v. By (3.1) we also have z Vh4ðKeD! h4DÞ, hence
v V  KeD! h4D. But from (a) follows that v V  KeD, therefore v V  h4D, which is a
contradiction.
Case 2. v 1V  e4h4D. Hence v V h4e4:D. This implies that D is false at least in some
world from the final R4-cluster and such world is strictly above w.r.t. v, which is non final by
assumption. g
FIG. 2. Scheme of the structure of the frame F.
250 An Axiomatisation for LTK
4 Completeness
Consider the frame F.
(a) Fix a well ordering C1, . . . , Cf among R4-clusters such that i < l if and only if
ðCiR4CmÞ&:ðCmR4CiÞ.
(b) Fix some well ordering among Re -clusters inside any R

4-cluster, so that each R

e -cluster
would be taken once and only only once.
Hence each single world from the base set of F would be displayed as hvj , ii, meaning
that v belongs to the j -th Re -cluster inside the i-th R

4-cluster.
Given that the number of R4-clusters is f, we stipulate that the index f denotes that
a world hvj , fi belongs to the final R4-cluster Cf.
(c) Define a new frame S ¼ hWS,S4,Se,S1, . . . ,Ski in the following way:
– WS ¼
S
v2W hvj , ii;
– hvj , iiShzm, li () vR z, for 1    k;
– hvj , iiSehzm, li () i ¼ l & j ¼ m;
– hvj , iiS4hzm, li () ðj  m & i ¼ l Þ or i< l or l ¼ f, i.e. z is R4-final;
(d) LetMS ¼ hS,V Si be a model such that 8p 2 fp1, . . . , png V SðpÞ ¼ fhvj , ii j v 2 V ðpÞg.
Then clearly the following holds:
LEMMA 4.1
8D 2 SubðBÞ8v 2W  ððF, vÞ V  D , ðS, hvj , iiÞ V S DÞ.
PROOF. (a) (By induction on the length of D). Trivially, if lgðDÞ ¼ 1, D has the form p,
v 2 V ðpÞ and hence hvj , ii 2 V SðpÞ. Therefore hvj , iiV Sp.
Suppose D has the form KeA. Then v V  KeA if and only if 8z 2W ðvRez ) z V  AÞ.
By inductive hypothesis (IH) hzm, li V S A. Since vRez implies that both v and z belong to
the same R4- and R

e -clusters, it follows i¼ l and j¼m, and hence hvj , iiSehzm, li, which
means hvj , ii V S KeA.
Suppose hvj , ii 1V Sh4A. Then there is a world hzm, li such that hvj , iiS4hzm, li and
hzm, li 1V SA. This means that either i< l, or ði ¼ l & j  mÞ or else l ¼ f. Each of these
cases implies vR4z. By IH we have z 1V A and therefore v 1Vh4A.
(b) Assume v 1V h4A. Suppose v is not R

4-final. Then, by lemma 3.15, there is a world z
such that vR4z, z 1V A and either vR

ez or :ðzR4vÞ. If vRez, it follows that both v and z
have the same indices for the R4- and R

e -clusters they belong to, i.e. they are displayed as
hvi, ii and hzi, ii. Hence hvi, iiS4hzi, ii. By IH hzi, ii 1V SA and therefore hvi, ii 1V S h4A. Else if
:ðzR4vÞ, given that the worlds v and z are displayed as hvj , ii and hzm, li, it follows that i < l,
and hence hvj , iiS4hzm, li. Again, by IH we have hzm, li 1V S A and therefore hvj , ii 1V S h4A.
Finally suppose v is R4-final. Then there is a world z which is R

4-final as well and it is such
that vR4z and z 1V A. Since z is displayed as hzm, fi, it follows that hvj , fiS4hzm, fi. By IH
hzm, fi 1V S A and therefore hvj , fi 1V Sh4A.
COROLLARY 4.2
S 1V S B
The frame S has the structure depicted in Figure 3. If we regard environment-clusters
(Se-clusters) as single worlds, this frame has the structure of a reflexive balloon.
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Whenever the S4-final cluster of our model is an S4-proper cluster of Se-clusters (i.e. not
simple), the frame we have obtained is not an LT K-frame. We recall that these frames
have no S4-proper clusters of Se-clusters inside, and hence our final construction cannot be
considered as a member of such class. However, this is not a problem, for it follows from [2]
and [3] that these structures are nothing but p-morphic images of LT K-frames.
Therefore we can state the following:
THEOREM 4.3
8B 2 FmaðLLTKÞ if B 62 LTKax then there is an LT K-frame F such that F 1 B.
COROLLARY 4.4. (Soundness and Completeness)
(a) LTKax ¼ LTK
(b) LTKax ¼ LTK
COROLLARY 4.5
LTK1ax (the version of LTKax with only one agent operating in the system) has the effective
finite model property and it is decidable w.r.t. admissible inference rules.
Appendix
So far we have presented a semantic framework for reasoning about time and knowledge
which can be useful whenever the flow of time is considered as linear and discrete and only
one situation (environment) is possible at each moment. However, we might be interested in
generalising such approach and presenting a system based on more general theoretical
assumptions. A generalised LT K-frame can be thought as a structure which is identical to an
LT K-frame except for the fact that it allows distinct environment-clusters to be concurrent
(see Figure 4)3. This aspect may result of use whenever we aim at reasoning about
simultaneous alternatives to a given state of affairs without assuming the time as branching.
FIG. 3. Scheme of the structure of S: a particular case of reflexive balloon.
3Following the terminology previously used, a generalized LT K-frame can be understood as an LT K-frame
lacking the property PM.3.
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The logic GLTK generated by this class of generalised frames can be easily proven to be
decidable with respect to its theorems.
To prove this claim it is sufficient merely to modify our previous proof in the following way:
(a) Let ASGLTK be an axiomatic system obtained by deleting Axiom Dumh4 from ASLTK and
let GLTKax be the set of theorems generated by ASGLTK.
(b) Trivially, delete part (b) from Theorem 2.7;
(c) Change the filtration set  to  :¼ 0 [ 2 [ 3 where:
– 0 :¼ SubðBÞ
– 2 :¼ fKeh4D j h4D 2 0g
– 3 :¼ fKiKeD j KeD 2 0 [ 2 g for 1  i  k
At the end of the process of filtration, we obtain a model based on a finite generalised
LT K-frame.
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The language of multi-modal logic is a good tool to study the interaction of agents’ knowledge
in the flow of time. Many different axiomatic systems for multi-modal propositional logics involving
time and knowledge modalities have been introduced. We study a logic of this kind, but generated
in a semantic way by introducing a certain class TK of multi-modal frames, called LT K-frames. In
these frames the flow of time is linear and agents are operating synchronously. One agent - the wise
agent - plays a special role: the wise agent knowledge is the universal modality on time clusters in
these frames. The multi-modal logic LTK is the set of all LT K-valid formulae. It has been already
proved by us that LTK has the fmp, and hence LTK is decidable.
Our present research is devoted to extending this result to admissible inference rules. We
consider the logic LTK1, a weaker variant of LTK, with only one agent besides the wise agent.
Our approach involves the construction of n-characterising models ChLTK(n) for LTK1 and the
description of free temporal algebras Fw(LTK1) by means of these models. A rule r is admissible
in LTK1 if and only if r is valid in the models ChLTK(n) with respect to all definable valuations.
Using this approach we prove
Theorem 1 The logic LTK1 is decidable w.r.t. admissible inference rules.
Corollary 2 The quasi-equational theory of free temporal algebra Fw(LTK1) is decidable.
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1 Background
How do human beings reason? How do they
interact? There will never be, probably, a fully
satisfactory answer to such questions, but if we
were to enumerate the tools developed so far to
try to give an answer, we would find that Modal
and Multi-modal logics are doubtless among the
best ones. Since they combine a highly expressive
power with several handle semantic tools (as the
easily understandable Possible World Semantics
[1]), they suddenly become far more effective than
classical propositional systems for this purpose.
Propositional modal logic have been investigated
since the dawn of philosophical, hence logical,
research. The study of modal logic began with
Aristotle and his attempt to analise statements
containing words like possible and necessary. Re-
cently modal logics have found several applications
in Artificial Intelligence and Computer Science in
the attempt to formalise, for instance, reasoning
about the behavior of programs (cf [2]).
The main feature of modal logics is that they
enable to switch from extensional languages (ex-
pressing only facts, statements which can be either
true or false) to intensional ones. Modal logics deal
with sentences that are qualified by modalities such
as can, could, might, may, must et c. A modality
is, therefore, any word that could be added to a
statement p to modify it: the new statement says
something about themode of truth of the old one (cf
[2]). Modal logics are often constructed by adding
one or more sentential operators (usually 2 and 3)
to a classical propositional system. Likewise, multi-
modal logics are obtained by adding more than one
modal operator to an existing logical system.
Traditionally the modal operators 2 and 3 are
interpreted as expressing necessity and possibility
respectively, so that an expression like 2p would
be read as it is necessary that p. But this is only
one of the many possible interpretations: modal
languages are extremely flexible. Our choice
would then be suggested by the context we are
to describe. Temporal logics, for instance, are
obtained by joining tense operators to an existing
logic, usually the classical propositional calculus
(cf. [3]). In the case of temporal logics, we can
interpret the modal proposition 2p as it will
always be the case that p, and its dual 3p as at
some point in the future it will be the case that
p. Therefore, the language of temporal logic is
particularly effective when we want to describe
the flow of time, towards both future and past.
Epistemic logics, on the other hand, are suitable
to formalize reasoning about agents not possessing
a complete information. They interpret modal
operators in terms of knowledge (the expression
Kap standing for the agent a knows that p, see [4]).
However, such systems have an expressive limi-
tation. They cannot handle modifications in the
pieces of information each agent possess, nor can
they give an account of a changing environment.
Adding a dynamic dimension to such systems is
therefore almost a necessity. The most natural
way to partially fix such deficiency is to insert
epistemic logics in a temporal framework. Hence
we would generate a multi-modal system.
Moreover systems generated by joining op-
erators representing both time and knowledge
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have already proved themselves to be particularly
effective in describing the interaction of agents
through the flow of time ([4, 5, 6, 7, 8]). They are
generated by adding to an existing propositional
system two sets of modalities: one to model the
flow of time, the other to describe agents’ knowl-
edge. The interaction of such modalities gives a
precise account of the dynamic development of
agents’ knowledge. Though highly interesting and
fascinating, this approach has not yet been fully
investigated, due to the complexity and the extent
of the subject. Nevertheless, in the last decade,
the theories developed have found many fruitful
applications in the study of human reasoning
and computing. These are concerned with the
development of systems modelling reasoning about
knowledge and space, reasoning under uncertainty
or with bounded resources, multi-agent reasoning
and other aspects of artificial intelligence.
However, despite the power of multi-modal
propositional logics, multi modal languages can
only express formulae which are static in a way:
the statements only fix a fact, and cannot handle a
changing environment. But this is exactly what is
required in the case of human reasoning, computa-
tion and multi-agent environment. In fact, we are
usually more interested in deducing what follows
logically given some premises, rather than knowing
logical truths. For this reason, inference rules, or
logical consecutions, are a core instrument.
For instance, rules can describe properties of
modal frames in some cases in which using formu-
lae may be difficult. A good example is Gabbay’s
irreflexive rule (cf. [9]):
ir :=
¬(p→ 3p)→ A
A
(where p does not occur in the formula A). This
rule states that each world of a model, where A is
not valid, should be irreflexive.
The greatest class of rules that can be applied
to a certein logic is that of admissible consecutions.
Such a class contains all those rules under which
the logic itself is closed, i.e. all those rules that
can be applied to a given logic while preserving its
set of theorems. So far, the research in this field
has investigated many modal and superintuitionis-
tic logics (see, for instance, Ghilardi [10, 11, 12],
Golovanov et al. [13], Iemhoff [14, 15], Jerˆa´bek
[16], Rybakov [17, 18, 19]). The investigation be-
gan with Harrop’s observation (cf. [20]) that we
can enlarge an axiomatic system by adding admis-
sible, though not derivable, inference rules.This ap-
proach led Friedman (see [21]) to ask whether there
is an algorithm to recognise the rules admissible in
IPC, the intuitionistic propositional calculus. This
question and its analogues for modal logic has been
solved by Rybakov [19, 22, 23], and a robust math-
ematical theory has been developed1.
However, for the case of multi-modal logics, not
much is known concerning admissible inference
rules, though there have been some attempts to
approach the problem (cf. for instance Golovanov
et al. [25]). Nowadays, logics of this kind are an
active research area and the axiomatic systems
that have been constructed and examined are
numerous (cf. Halpern et al. [8]).
2 Our research
In our research, we would like to extend the inves-
tigation to a multi-modal propositional logic, LTK
(Linear Time and Knowledge), which combines
tense and knowledge modalities. This logic is
semantically defined as the set of all LT K-valid
formulae, where LT K-frames are multi-modal
Kripke-frames combining a linear and discrete
representation of the flow of time with special
S5-like modalities, defined at each time cluster
and representing knowledge. Initial results of
our research have been published in [5] and a
more comprehensive paper has been accepted for
publication ([6]). They have also been presented
by the author at European Logic Colloquium 2005
(Athens).
So far the aim of our research has been to show
that the multi-modal propositional system LTK is
decidable with respect to admissible inference rules,
i.e. we have found an algorithm which, given a rule
r, checks if r is admissible for LTK. This have been
proved in the following way:
a. we start by showing that LTK has the effective
finite model property and hence it is decidable with
respect to theorems;
b. we construct special countable n-
1For a more detailed historical account see Rybakov [19],
Iemhoff [24].
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characterising models for LTK;
c. we show that an inference rule r is admissible
in LTK if and only if it is valid in all the frames of a
special kind, whose size is computable and bounded
by the size of r. Hence, we prove that LTK is de-
cidable w.r.t. inference rules.
3 Further Work
In the light of the results obtained, we plan to ex-
tend our research to finding a sound and complete
axiomatisation for our logic system LTK. Although
many axiomatic system have been presented in [8],
we remind the reader that such system is original
and as far as we are concerned it has never been
investigated.
This would enable us to prove several more
important properties, especially Kripke Com-
pleteness, and it would confer more generality to
the work done up to now. We would approach
the matter with both standard tools (as canon-
ical models, filtration and unravelling) and new
methods. The idea is to model each knowledge
modality as an S5-modal system, while the time
would be represented as an S4.3-system. Several
new axioms mixing and modelling the interactions
among modalities would be introduced.
construct an algorithm recognising admissibility
for inference rules with meta-variables.
This would enable us to prove several more im-
portant properties, especially Kripke Complete-
ness, and it wuld confer more generality to the work
done up to now. We would approach the matter
with both standard tools (as canonical models, fil-
tration and unravelling) and new methods. The
idea is to model each knowledge modality as an S5-
modal system, while the time would be represented
as an S4.3-system. Several new axioms mixing and
modelling the interactions among modalities would
be introduced.
Methodology. More specifically, the structure of
our proof and the techniques involved would be as
follows.
a. Syntax. Introduction of our Hilbert-style ax-
iomatic system: language, axiom schemata, rules
and syntactical definitions.
b. n-Canonical Model.
c. Open submodels.
d. Filtration. This technique is used to reduce
the amount of worlds in an infinite frame to a fi-
nite number. It is particularly effective when the
canonical frame of a given logic system does not
have the required properties, like our case. Apply-
ing this technique we would prove the fmp (finite
model property).
e. Unravelling. This is a transformation
which would very likely help us reaching our
goal. It unravels all the loops inside our model, so
that the final construct is finite, linear and discrete.
Moreover we are planning to extend our research
to finding a basis fpr admissible inference rules in
LTK. A basis can be understood as the smallest set
of rules from which we can derive all vthe admissi-
ble consecutions. More formally, we say:
Definition 3.1 A collection B of admissible infer-
ence rules for some logic L is said to be a basis for
all admissible rules of L iff every rule r is admissi-
ble for L if and only if r is a consequence of B in
L.
There are several difficulties hidden in the
scheme presented. If in a multi-modal system
there are no interactions between modalities, many
important properties do transfer, like decidability
and finite model properties. As soon as we have in-
teraction between modalities, this is no longer true
(see [26]). It might happen that such combined
logics turned out to be undecidable, hence useless
from the computational and knowledge representa-
tion point of view. That is why it is so important
a deep and precise analysis of combination and in-
teractions between modalities. Multi-modal logics
are powerful and useful and in order to be applied
to Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence
need to be investigated deeply and carefully. Our
result is therefore original and it allows a little
step towards a complete investigation of the area.
The interdisciplinary nature of our project is
clear. It concerns philosophy, knowledge repre-
sentation, mathematics, artificial intelligence and
computation as well. Modern applications of logic
in computer science and artificial intelligence of-
ten require languages able to represent knowledge
about dynamic systems (such as program execu-
tions, information flows, expert, distributed and
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multi-agent systems, temporal databases, consult-
ing by Web, et c.). Distinct designed logics, e.g.
modal and temporal logics for multi-agent reason-
ing, serve these applications in a very efficient way,
and we would absorb and develop some of these
techniques to represent logical consequences in ar-
tificial intelligence and computation.
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A SOUND AND COMPLETE AXIOMATIZATION FOR THE LINEAR
LOGIC OF KNOWLEDGE AND TIME LTK
ERICA CALARDO
The multi-modal propositional logic LTK combines linear time and
knowledge and is semantically defined as the set of all the formulae valid
on LT K-frames, the prefix LT K standing for Linear Time and Knowl-
edge. LT K-frames are multi-modal Kripke-frames that combine a linear
and discrete representation of the flow of time with special S5-like modal-
ities, defined at each time cluster and representing agents’ knowledge.
The logic LTK has already been proved to be decidable with respect
both to its theorems and to its admissible inference rules (see [2, 1]).
Our research aims at finding a sound and complete axiomatization of
LTK. We have developed an axiomatic system ASLTK in which the axioms
describing the flow of time give rise to an S4.3 modal system, whereas the
ones intended to describe agents’ knowledge produce a series of S5 modal
systems. Moreover, several axioms have been added to the system in order
to regiment the interactions between distinct modalities. This is the most
important part of our approach because there are several problems behind
the interactions of different modalities. However, we proved the following
result:
Theorem 1. LTK = LTKax.
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Section A.2 Philosophical and applied logics
Basis of Admissible rules for the multi modal logic of knowledge
and time LTK1
Erica Calardo
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Multi-modal propositional systems generated by joining operators representing both time and knowl-
edge have already proved themselves to be particularly effective in describing the interaction of agents
through the flow of time ([2, 1, 3, 4, 6]). These logics are generated by adding to an existing propositional
system two sets of modalities: one to model the flow of time, the other to describe agents’ knowledge.
The interaction of such modalities gives a precise account of the dynamic development of agents’ knowl-
edge.
However, despite the power of multi-modal propositional logics, multi modal languages can only express
formulae which are static in a way: the statements only fix a fact, and cannot handle a changing environ-
ment. But this is exactly what is required in the case of human reasoning, computation and multi-agent
environment. In fact, we are usually more interested in deducing what follows logically given some
premises, rather than knowing logical truths. For this reason, inference rules, or logical consecutions,
are a core instrument.
Our research aims at investigating a multi-modal propositional logic, LTK1 (Linear Time and Knowl-
edge), which combines tense and knowledge modalities. This logic is semantically defined as the set
of all LTK-valid formulae, where LTK-frames are multi-modal Kripke-frames combining a linear and
discrete representation of the flow of time with special S5-like modalities, defined at each time cluster
and representing agents’ knowledge.
So far we have proved that the logic LTK1 (i) has the finite model property [2]; (ii) is decidable with
respect to its admissible inference rules [1]; (iii) has a finite axiomatisation1.
Our latest results is to show that LTK1 has a finite basis for admissible inference rules, i.e. all those
rules under which the logic itself is closed.
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Admissible rules in the multi modal logic of knowledge
and time LTK
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Multi-modal logics are one of the best tools developed so far to describe the
behaviour of agents throughout the flow of time. Since they combine their highly
expressive power and flexibility with several handle semantic tools (as the Pos-
sible World Semantics), they are far more effective than classical propositional
systems for this purpose.
Multi-modal logics are obtained by adding more than one modal operator to
an existing logical system. This feature guarantees flexibility in the sense that the
interpretation of the modal operators can be chosen according to the situation
to be described. In our research we join tense and knowledge operators to the
classical propositional calculus. The interaction of these two sets of modalities
gives a precise account of the dynamic development of agents’ knowledge (see
[1, 2, 3], Fagin et al. [4], Gabbay et al. [5], Halpern et al. [6]).
Although highly interesting and expressive, combined modal logics, however,
present several difficulties if seen as a class. It is known, in fact, that if there is
no interaction between modalities a transfer of properties (such as finite model
property, decidability, etc.) from the component simple modal logics to the newly
generated multi-modal system does apply. But as soon as such interaction takes
place it is no longer straightforward to prove that the combined system is conser-
vative with respect to the properties of its components (see Bennett et al. [7] and
Kurucz [8]). Indeed, in some cases the opposite may apply. Nevertheless, despite
such difficulties, interaction between modalities is necessary fully to exploit the
power of multi-modal languages.
Moreover, although highly expressive, multi-modal languages have a limita-
tion. The formulae which are expressible by means of multi modal languages
are static: they can only state facts and hence they cannot handle a changing
environment. But this is exactly what is required in the case of human reason-
ing, computation and multi-agent environment. In fact, we are usually more
interested in discovering what follows given some premises, rather than deducing
logical truths. For this reason, inference rules, or logical consecutions, are a core
instrument.
1
An admissible consecution for a given logic is a rule which can be applied to
the logic itself while preserving its set of theorems. So far, the research in this
field has investigated many modal and superintuitionistic logics. The investiga-
tion began with Harrop’s observation that we can enlarge an axiomatic system
by adding admissible, though not derivable, inference rules. This approach led
Friedman to ask whether there is an algorithm to recognise the rules admissible
in IPC, the intuitionistic propositional calculus. This question and its analogues
for modal logic has been solved by Rybakov [9], and a robust mathematical the-
ory has been developed.
However, for the case of multi-modal logics, not much is known concerning
admissible inference rules, although there have been several attempts to approach
the problem.
In our research we extend the investigation concerning admissible inference
rules to a multi-modal propositional logic, LTK (Linear Time and Knowledge),
which combines tense and knowledge modalities and which allows interactions
between modal operators. This logic is semantically defined as the set of all
LTK-valid formulae, where LTK-frames are multi-modal Kripke-frames combin-
ing a linear and discrete representation of the flow of time with special S5-like
modalities, defined at each time cluster and representing agents’ knowledge.
So far we have proved that LTK is decidable with respect both to its theorems
[1], and to its admissible inference rules [2]. Moreover, LTK has been proved to
have a finite, sound and complete axiomatisation [3]. Our latest result is that
LTK has a finite basis for admissible inference rules.
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